

# ENGLISH SUMMARIES



## Shaping the Attitudes of Conscript Leaders

*Marko Pungar*

The role of small-unit leaders has now become more important than ever. The Estonian Defense Force is a reserve army which educates its squad and platoon commanders through conscription. To achieve better results the Estonian Defense Forces need commanders who possess not only the required knowledge and skills, but also the right attitudes that enable them to complete tasks in a combat situation. If attention is not paid to the attitudes of the commanders during conscription, then the risk arises that they will not respond to call-outs for mobilization or reservist training. And even if they do turn up, there is also the possibility that they will be unable to promptly fulfill their tasks according to their positions.

The aim of the present article is to examine how the attitudes of conscript leaders are shaped, and whether they can be shaped. To this end, the author raised four research questions:

- 1) In which direction and in what way should the attitudes of the conscript leaders be shaped?
- 2) Are the attitudes of conscript leaders reflected in the regulations? If yes, how?
- 3) How are leadership qualities understood and valued?
- 4) How are the attitudes of conscript leaders shaped in practice?

The first paragraph sketches a model of the qualities that are inherent to leadership. The model, which is based on “The Estonian Defense Forces Ground Force Principles in the Battle” and “Human Centered Leadership”, is meant as a template for understanding and valuing the principles necessary for the coordination and training of conscript leaders. The qualities necessary for leadership show the direction to which the attitudes of the leaders during conscription should be developed. Using inductive analysis the author identifies six main qualities of leadership: *trust*, *mission command*, *responsibility*, *care*, *initiative* and *example*. The author placed *free will*, the *courage to decide*, *independence*, the *will to defend* and *cooperation* under

*responsibility*. He placed *morale, motivation, justification, empathy* and the *ability to communicate* under *care*. *Initiative* was subdivided into the subcategories of the *ability to initiate, flexibility, creativity, understanding mistakes* and *purposeful control*. *Example* subsumed *professionalism, honesty, lessons compliance for reality* and *self-reliance*.

The same paragraph also presents the model of change theory as posited by Edgar Schein which answers the question of how the attitudes of conscript leaders should be shaped. It consists of three phases – unfreezing, changing and refreezing. The aim of the first phase is to initiate the motivation to change. The second phase concerns cognitive redefinition. The third ensures that the lessons learned correspond to the surrounding society.

The second paragraph of the thesis, which relies on discourse analysis, studies the basic documents of national defense such as behavioral training guides and regulations. The third paragraph examines timetables. According to the original documents, it can be inferred that at the state level, attitude receives enough attention to justify its importance. However, as one moves down the hierarchy of documents (training regulations, training programs, timetables) attitude receives less consideration. The shaping of attitudes is an unstructured discipline – there is no standard procedure of how to apply theoretical ideas from the higher level to practical training. Behavioral guidance and regulations are rather based on detailed behavioral norms that aim to reach a desired outcome. As a result, no attention is paid to the free will of conscripts, which is a necessary precondition for achieving more effective behavioral outcomes, as opposed to the strict adherence to detailed compulsory norms.

The results of the questionnaires suggest that, in general, the qualities of leadership are valued. Supervision, or the presence of instructors, plays an important role in the shaping of the attitudes of leaders during conscription. This gives cause to believe that the absence of such supervision (e.g. in wartime) may create difficulties for leaders, and may result in their inability to act independently. The fact that conscript leaders are not entirely trusted during training gives credence to the aforementioned point. The occurrence of care and initiative is problematic.

It is apparent that instructors lack the ability to motivate conscripts to adapt themselves to the lessons provided during conscription. It would be, naturally helpful to rely on the desire to defend the country to create this impetus, but this is not being done by the instructors. As there is no conception for developing the desire to defend the country during conscription, instructors do not consider it important. During conscription, complications

arise when leaders are given responsibilities without concurrently facilitating the motivation for the evolution of the conscripts and then hoping to see signs of initiative. The results also revealed that in addition to the lack of vision, some eligible leaders are assigned to drivers' posts, as finding good drivers seems to be a priority at present.

This article shows that the attitudes of conscript leaders are not shaped at the organizational level. These attitudes either develop independently by themselves or through the individual visions of instructors. As the defense forces do not direct the shaping of attitudes, the end result cannot be effective.

The author's most important suggestion would be to update the training regulations and programs so that they would include conceptions for shaping attitudes and the will to defend. The author would also recommend introducing an evaluation of leadership characteristics during the conscription service. In the event that neither of those changes is adopted, the present research proposes that during the conscript leaders' period of service, their training should simulate actual combat situations as much as possible. The situations need not only be tactical, they could also be administrative, or training or public relations associated, etc. – this means that in peacetime they are given as much latitude as is possible and therefore will have much less fear of making mistakes.

For further studies the author sees the need for researches to identify the suitable way for defense forces to shape the attitudes of leaders during conscription. This necessitates creating a conceptual framework for shaping attitudes and inculcating a will to defend.

### **Changes in Cadet Candidates' Motivation to Study in the Estonian National Defence College During Conscript Service**

*Kristjan Kask, Kersti Kõiv and Aarne Ermus*

When young persons wish to study to become officers in the Estonian National Defence College (ENDC), it is necessary that they should have finished their secondary education, and also have completed the obligatory conscript service in Estonia. Sometimes, however, after their service, some cadet candidates do not wish to continue their studies at the ENDC. The aim of the paper is to examine the changes in the motivation, attitudes and values of future cadets who come to study in the ENDC. We examined cadet candidates who were accepted to the ENDC in the summer of 2013 (n=13) and started

their conscript service either in July or October of 2013 and then compared their results to the reference groups (those who applied but were not accepted as candidates,  $n=13$  and ordinary conscripts,  $n=84$ ). The participants were examined three times during the conscript service. They responded to a survey regarding different aspects of their conscription. Together with evaluations of their motivation to study in the ENDC, they were also asked questions about their attitudes and values. The results demonstrated that there were no great changes in cadet candidates' motivation during their conscript service. Future research is necessary to analyse this trend more in depth.

## **Cadets' Understanding of Studying and Teaching**

*Katri Kütt, Tõnis Männiste*

This article gives an insight into a phenomenological survey that was conducted at the ENDC in order to analyze cadets' concepts about learning and teaching.

The data for this survey was collected from 2<sup>nd</sup> year land force curriculum cadets in the spring 2013 while they were studying in the trainer course. There were 32 males, and 1 female cadet who took part in the survey with an average age of 22.6 years. All the questions were open ended and the cadets were advised to freely write down their ideas.

Qualitative analyses revealed that the cadet's concepts about learning and teaching tend to be teaching-centred, and indicate a mainly surface oriented approach towards learning. Learning and teaching was mostly seen as a one-way process amongst the cadets, wherein the teacher's role is to give information and the learner's role is to receive that information. The purpose of learning and teaching was described in the same way – the purpose is to, one way or another, pass on or acquire knowledge and skills. A need for the active construction of knowledge and skills by learners was mentioned infrequently. Attitude, whether it be the learner's attitude, or a possible outcome of learning, in addition to the acquisition of knowledge and skills, was not mentioned by the cadets, nor was student/teacher virtues, even though those are considered to be a very important part of military training.

At the same time, the cadet's descriptions about the type of learning activities that they thought would bring about the best results were somehow different. This time the cadet's concepts were much closer to deep learning and the related activities which support it. Motivation, the importance of support

from fellow students, group work and other social elements were mentioned, but on the overall it was, according to the cadets' descriptions, the students' own effort that determined whether a topic was considered interesting. The role of the teacher in making learning interesting by creating a suitable learning environment was never mentioned. Thus, it seems that cadets have a rather good understanding of effective learning activities, but are unable to clearly recognize the link between effective learning and the contributions of the teacher.

In order to facilitate more purposeful training for officers and utilize more effective teaching methods, there seems to be a need to change the cadets' perceptions of learning and teaching. One possible way of achieving this is for lecturers to become more aware of the students' preconceptions of teaching and learning being teacher-centred. When lecturers understand the students' perceptions they can take this into account during the teaching and learning process, and also prepare themselves for the students' potential resistance when using more learner-centred methods in their teaching. But this is only possible when ENDC as an organisation and the teachers themselves possess the necessary virtues and concepts to teach and learn.

Hence, there is also a need to study the ENDC teachers' perceptions of teaching and learning as well.

### **The Decline of Estonia's Defence Capability? An Analysis of the Task Organization of the New National Defence Development Plan**

*Rene Toomse*

In the beginning of 2013, the Estonian government endorsed the new National Defence Development Plan for 2013–2022. It was publicly praised by the Ministry of Defence and by the President, but has fallen under criticism by the former Commander of the Defence Forces and the former Head of the Headquarters' Planning Section. The clash is not only about minor details, but rather concerns some principal changes that the new plan endorses. The critics have pointed out that the new plan is so defective that implementing it would endanger the security of the State. The main fault lies in the change of the command structure of the Defence Forces as stipulated by the Plan that would arguably collapse the command system that has worked relevantly well for last 14 years. The replacement is not likely to work at all and that

would leave the command system vulnerable and perhaps even non-existent in the event of war.

The Plan will abolish the Defence Districts that are meant to conduct operational planning and provide leadership at the regional levels. Consequently, responsibility for territorial defence would be handed over to the mostly volunteer based Defence League in its entirety. Land Forces would retain just two infantry brigades, which would be focused on only two possible avenues of approach by hostile forces in case of war while leaving all other areas weakly defended. The main drawbacks, as professed by several high ranking retired officers, are that the command chain will be more centralized rendering it unable to respond quickly enough, and that the weakly supported Defence League cannot fulfil the new responsibility due to a lack of professional officers and assets.

The dispute and allegations are serious but there has been no convincing response or justification from the other side. These publicly declared criticisms have largely been ignored. The only sources from which to discern some explanations are the interviews with the present leading officers such as the former Commander of Land Forces and the Commander of the Defence League. The new plan is somehow described, but it is not explained how it will lead to a better outcome than the old system. Rather, the descriptions reveal that the planned change has not really been thought through.

This article will, therefore look into the dispute by utilizing recognized and relevant principles of warfare and a few historical case studies that will create the theoretical framework. After presenting the statements regarding the old command structure and then presenting the counterarguments of the critics, the arguments of both sides will be analyzed in order to find evidence as to whether these serious allegations have substance. In the end the conclusions will summarize the findings, which in fact reveal that there is a possible disconnect between the reform plans in the short term, and the necessities of the future. The findings come to conclusions that indeed the current situation could pose a serious threat to the national security due to the absence of an operational level command system the result of which will likely weaken the whole readiness of the defence system for years to come.

The findings also reveal that, contrary to the critics' assertions, the Defence League could actually be more suitable for the regional operational command. However, this would only be feasible if it were adequately supplied with people, funds and enhanced fighting capabilities. The new land defence regional commands should be permanently operable and not just activated during times of crisis. Also, they need to plan and train with all the

forces in their area of operations consistently during peacetime in order to achieve the best preparedness for war. Finally, the regional commands need to have the proper funding and authority to allow them to operate with independency to achieve the needed operational freedom and tempo.

Also the abolishment of the Land Forces Staff is not likely to become a major weakness of the command structure. However, a reasonable restructuring within the Headquarters needs to be done, and a chief of territorial defence needs to be appointed. The vacancy could be filled by the Deputy Commander of the Defence Forces who could focus on land operations while the Commander of the Defence Forces would provide him with other necessary elements.

The study argues that the Commander of the Defence Forces alone should not lead the land battles but he should rather focus on planning and coordinating the bigger picture. Finally, he also needs to provide a suitable buffer between the political level and the commander who leads the battles. The final point is equally important for successful outcomes in combat and for maintaining the strategic focus, as history has proven many times in past wars of many other countries.

## **The Role of the Scientific Paradigm in Military Science According to Thomas Kuhn**

*Karl Salum*

War is a phenomenon as old as mankind. The use of violence and armed forces to achieve certain outcomes is the manifestation of a cognitive process that has contributed to and benefited from discoveries in various branches of science. However, the issues related to war and the military have not developed into a distinct branch but have rather remained as fields of research within other sciences. This indicates that in essence, war can be studied scientifically and can have, by extension, scientific implications. This raises the question: why hasn't war developed into a clearly distinguishable field of science.

This article seeks to identify, whether war science (or military science) could be viewed as a distinct branch of science using the scientific paradigm framework designed by Thomas Kuhn. The aim is to familiarize the reader with the potential concept of military science and its connections to other branches of science, mostly focusing on the philosophical level and less on

the conceptual level. As a tertiary goal, the article maps the current understanding of military science in Estonia and its armed forces.

In the first chapter, the definition and scope of science and its methodology are defined as endeavours with the purpose of achieving and implementing new cognitive, and practically relevant knowledge as well as the use and preservation of existing knowledge. There are several classic philosophical and conceptual frameworks for science in general, such as can be found in the works of Popper, Carnap, Lakato to name but a few. However, for the purposes of this article, Thomas Kuhn's concept of scientific paradigm which has been described in the book 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' (1966) is used.

Based on Kuhn's model, we could say that military science cannot have a distinct paradigm as there are no scientific achievements that are uniquely specific to war; all scientific achievements arising from developments in warfare and related affairs originate from other branches of science. Crises which form a crucial part of Kuhn's model, are also solved by research in other branches and are then simply used in military or war-specific applications to solve the crises in warfare or military.

We could argue that according to Kuhn, problems and crises are the central element of a scientific paradigm. This could then justify the existence of a military or war-specific paradigm. However, even if a hypothetical military science paradigm indeed serves as a framework for solving military or war related problems in a scientific manner, we can still not escape the fact that such a paradigm and theories and methods used for problem solving are not independent of other branches of science. Herein lies the biggest challenge of defining a military or war science paradigm: to what extent do we have to consider the paradigms of other branches, and what should be done when the requirements of military science clash with the paradigms of other sciences?

At present it cannot be said that any branch of science is discrete or independent, rather, they each possess interdisciplinary dimensions and utilize parts of each other's theories and even methods, at least within their larger group (social sciences, formal sciences, natural sciences). Therefore, military science which in essence is completely interdisciplinary has the potential to develop a scientific paradigm which could encompass the necessary elements of other branches, in a manner similar to medical science, for example. Consequently, whether military science should be considered a distinct branch is an epistemological question, not just a bureaucratic issue. The so-called soft sciences (humanities and social sciences) which have been labeled as non-scientific in the past have by now risen to the level of hard sciences by



means of long-term and meticulous research and development in theory and methodology. It is imperative that military science follow the same path in the quest for complete recognition and acceptance as a distinct branch of science.

Due to the lack of a scientific paradigm, military science in Estonia could currently be identified as being in the pre-paradigm phase. In a military context, we could technically consider doctrine as a quasi-paradigm; however, at present there is no distinct Estonian military doctrine, either. Estonia has adopted numerous NATO doctrines and participates in NATO's research and development efforts but in order to develop our military science, Estonia should outline important puzzles or problems to solve and the basic scientific principles, theories and methods for finding the solutions to them. As suggested by Kuhn, this is the best way to develop from a pre-paradigm to a comprehensive, established science.