Some degree of religious-cultural pluralism exists in all European societies, if the term ‘pluralism’ is used descriptively, not ideologically. Pluralism in a descriptive sense refers to racial, linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity in society. ‘Multiculturalism’, according to the definition of Sasja Tempelman, refers to the ideological doctrine that recognizes cultural diversity as a permanent and valuable part of political societies. Thus, one can talk about multiculturalism descriptively by referring to an existing cultural pluralism – society consists of different populations from different cultural traditions –, or to an ideological worldview that normatively considers the latter as positive and valuable.

H. A. Hellyer, who uses the above-mentioned distinction, recognizes that European societies are all multicultural, yet some of these societies are more multiculturalist than others. Multiculturalist societies treat social pluralism in a positive manner. They celebrate cultural differences “and the possibility of social harmony based upon mutual trust, respect and recognition”. They do not want to obliterate or erase or smooth out these differences, but rather to find “ways of living, connecting, relating, arguing, and disagreeing in a society of differences.” Concomitantly, multiculturalism refers not merely to the tolerance of cultural diversity but also to the legal recognition of the rights of ethnic, racial, religious, or cultural groups.

The tolerance of differences has never been an objective and an absolute ‘good’ in itself. At most, the differences are tolerated to a certain degree. Additionally, the ‘goodness’ of the tolerance of cultural differences, is also

2 H. A. Hellyer classifies country as multicultural, when there is more than one culture, and multiculturalist, when those cultures are treated in a positive manner. H. A. Hellyer. Muslims and Multiculturalism in the European Union. – Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 3/2006, p. 330.
relative for particular social groups. As multiculturalism encourages cultural minorities to maintain their own culture, it seems to benefit cultural minorities more than the majorities. However, multiculturalism should be perceived as a two-way process, which demands positive commitments and compromises from both the cultural majority and minorities.

Cultural minorities are expected to be committed to the host society, to maintain positive sentiments regarding the public culture, and to learn about the local language, history and institutions. On the other hand, the larger society should express a certain level of commitment to the minority cultures, and adapt its institutions to accommodate their identities and practices. Consequently, in a multiculturalist society the cultural differences are recognized and supported in both public and private spheres. The alternative, the assimilation society, expects the minority groups to assimilate to the dominant culture and restricts the toleration of cultural differences to the private sphere alone.

For the representatives of the dominant societal culture, the multiculturalist arrangement of society is obviously a demanding undertaking. Individuals are primarily concerned with their own values and interests. Similarly, social majorities are also primarily concerned with the preservation of their own culture.

Thus, it is not surprising, that also for the most part of European history, loyalty to the culture and religion of the society has been a test of allegiance to society and state. For that purpose, various forms of cultural accommodation and homogenization of the cultural minorities – such as ethnic cleansing, genocide, forced religious conversion and religious compulsion – have been applied.

In general, the European social tradition has been a homogeneous culture and religious conformism. From the beginning of Christian societies in the fourth century until the 18th century, religious pluralism was illegitimate even as an idea. In the 16th century, some territories practiced limited religious tolerance, like France from 1598 until 1685. Yet even such exceptions to the rule of religious-cultural homogeneity were based on pragmatic concerns for social and political stability, not on a genuine appreciation of religious pluralism. Until the French Revolution, European social organization was based on the Westphalian principle of the alliance of church and state and on territorial religious-political conformity.

At the end of the 17th century, European countries were particularly intolerant of religious differences. Unlike most of the continental European countries, after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, England extended religious

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7 Hellyer 2006, p. 332.
toleration to Protestant dissenters, but not to Unitarians, Catholics, Muslims or Atheists. Thereafter, the status of tolerated Protestant dissenters was comparable to the toleration of Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. Both were allowed to worship but could not hold public office, although the dissenters of England could also publicize their views and vote.\(^8\)

In contrast to the European Christian tradition, the Ottoman Empire, and the historical practice of Islamic countries at large, afforded religious autonomy to several non-Islamic religious minorities. For instance, until the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire allowed religious autonomy to the adherents of Armenian Orthodoxy, Syrian Orthodox Christians, and Jews. The members of the tolerated religious minorities were considered as a subordinated class and citizens of a second rate. Philip Jenkins equates this aspect of the Ottoman policy of religious minorities with the worst extremes of 20th century European racism.\(^9\) Such a parallel, however, seems faulty in several ways. First, it equates the practice of limited religious toleration with racial policies and places the policies of ethno-religious segregation in the same category with genocide and racial extermination. Secondly, the Ottoman Empire afforded legitimate space for Jewish and Christian traditions at a time when Western European societies practiced practically no tolerance of Islamic culture. The Ottoman Empire allowed the conquered Christian populations to retain their faith. In contrast, the usual policy of Christian conquests – at least in the European geographical area – was to convert subordinated Muslims to Christianity. Thereafter, the Muslim converts to Christianity could even remain suspect of crypto-Islam, which was the case with the Spanish Moriscos who were expelled from the society in 1614. A suitable parallel is the 1915–1916 genocide against ethnic Armenians in the Ottoman Empire where some Christian Armenians converted to Islam in order to avoid death.\(^10\) Yet it is important to note that during the 19th century the toleration of non-Islamic minorities declined in the Ottoman Empire in conjunction with the rising influence of western ideas of nationalism. Thus, it is appropriate to ask the following questions: “To what extent is the

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\(^9\) Philip Jenkins relies on the historical experience of the Balkan populations under the Ottoman rule. He concludes that Balkan Christians experienced “…a brutal occupation that can legitimately be compared to later European experiences under the Nazis or Communists. Turkish rule resembled Nazi rule in the creation of a master caste, in this case Muslims, before whom all despised lesser breeds were to cower.” Philip Jenkins. God’s Continent: Christianity, Islam, and Europe’s Religious Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 106.

genocide of Armenians an outgrowth of the traditions of the Ottoman Empire? Or was it a policy option “learned from the West”? One cannot provide uncontested answers to the above-mentioned questions. Yet it is very highly likely that the 17th century Ottoman Empire was still closer to the ideal of multicultural society than any European Western Christian society of that time.

The European tradition of a homogeneous social culture should be neither over- nor under-emphasized. Contemporary Denmark has about 200,000 Muslims, which constitutes a visible religious minority unprecedented in Danish history. For centuries, the social culture was either homogeneously Catholic or Lutheran. On the other hand, contemporary Danish policies regarding ethno-religious minorities may be influenced less by the pre-19th century practices of the established church and religious intolerance than by the ideas and practices that have emanated from the French and American Revolutions. Both Revolutions introduced ideas of the separation of religion and politics, and of prioritizing territorial allegiance over doctrinal truth and allegiance to a community of co-believers. By the end of 20th century, these ideas had become hegemonic and taken for granted in Western societies.

The resulting pluralist, all-inclusive and increasingly multicultural societies are in strong contrast with the previous historical practices.

The traditions of a homogeneous culture and nationalist cultural homogenization were most profoundly undermined by atrocities such as the genocide of Armenians of 1915–1916 and the racism of the Nazi regime delegitimized the extreme versions. After the Second World War, the popularity of the ethno-nationalistic conception of political community and majority rule declined even more, while the protection of the rights of minorities became increasingly important.

At first, the policies on emerging ethnic and ethno-religious minorities emphasized human rights of the individuals over the group-specific rights. It was perceived that this approach would yield similar results, which earlier helped to reduce the historical religious tensions between Catholics and Protestants. The intra-Christian disputes were solved not by granting group-specific rights to religious minorities but primarily by separating the church

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and state and protecting the freedom of religion of each individual.\textsuperscript{14} It soon became clear, however, that in contemporary societies, the expectation of spontaneous and un-regulated integration of individuals into the public culture is not a sufficient cure for the emerging cultural tensions.

It is very unlikely, that the European countries, which after the Second World invited guest workers from countries of markedly different cultures, were consciously aiming at the creation of multicultural societies. Multiculturalism in Western European societies was an un-intended outcome of several cross-cutting processes. The public debates over the multicultural society started in the 1970s, when the group-rights of the ethnic minorities started to be re-emphasized. The civil rights of individuals were increasingly translated into ethnic rights, and thereafter from ethnic community rights into religious community rights.\textsuperscript{15} Such a change in ideas, debates and policies was paralleled by a general transformation of societal norms.

Correspondingly, the public debate over multiculturalism appeared at the same time, when the core populations were undergoing significant secularization, liberalization and individualization. Emerging liberal democratic societies ceased to be ordered according to an authoritative Christian tradition or a particular comprehensive ideology. In the realms of political preferences, lifestyle, values, worldview and religion, more space was yielded to the individual choice of a private individual. Social tensions became conceptualized as conflicts between interest groups instead of religious, racial or class conflicts. Public decision-making concentrated on compromises and the accommodation of divergent group-interests. Concomitantly, in contemporary democracies, the ‘opponent’ is no longer a heretic or an oppressor, an enemy of a nation or a class.

The majority still matters more than minorities, and local (public) culture enjoys privileges not available to the culture of minority. Yet the liberal democratic society is by nature pluralist, where no one doctrine, ideology, value, group or preference can have a predetermined monopoly of interpreting the truth or good for the rest of the society. In conformity to liberal democracy which functions as a meta-ideology, that forms a basis for the interplay of social groups and political parties, it is natural for liberal societies to consider cultural majorities and minorities as ‘relatively equal’.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, the toleration of minorities is never absolute. The pertaining theoretical question is: “To what an extent should the liberal society protect the rights of groups, which are illiberal themselves, whose values and practices are perceived to be in conflict with

the public norms or who are considered in some direct or indirect way to be connected with forces dangerous to the national security?” The practical solutions to these important questions vary among European societies and remain subject to contested public debates. The essentially complex nature of multicultural issues requires more space than available in this chapter. We confine ourselves to selected theoretical issues and general policy patterns that relate religion to multiculturalism in European societies.

The chapter consists of three parts. The first part presents the theoretical discussion over multicultural society from the perspectives of culture, religion, and democracy. The second part analyses external and internal civilizational, cultural, and religious ‘others’ from Medieval European societies until the dynamics of European identity in the light of recent waves of European enlargement. The third section compares issues related to multiculturalism and religion in post-communist and West European societies.

1. Theoretical Considerations

In this section, multiculturalism in liberal society is approached from three different perspectives – culture, religion, and democracy.

1.1. Culture

Commonly, the dominant social group finds it quite natural to consider their own culture as unchangeable and homogeneous. Contrariwise, the social position of minorities, especially that of recent immigrants, encourages them to ponder over the need for adaptation of their cultural tradition to the norms and values of public culture. In other words, it is more natural for minorities to consider their culture as capable of transformation and accommodation.

Often it goes unnoticed that the increasing social multiculturalization – which refers descriptively to the increase of cultural diversity in a society, and normatively to policy measures that protect the rights of minority groups to maintain their cultural heritage – transforms both majority and minority cultures. It is very probable that the extent of transformation is different for majority and minority cultures. Nevertheless, in real societies, some amount of transformation is inevitable for both.

This does not mean, however, that the interested parties are willing to consider their own cultures as capable of change, willing to adapt or accommodate. From the perspective of the host society, the social advance of non-national cultures may be considered as a threat to the core national
societal values, national identity and social cohesion. The national culture is perceived as static, not needing any adaptation and change. Minority cultures, contrariwise, are perceived to be the ones capable of change and are required to do so.

Conversely, the social minorities may have the same arguments regarding their own culture. Their social position contributes to positive sentiments regarding all the positive ideals of multiculturalism – tolerance, the right of minorities to maintain their cultural heritage, equal treatment in public and economic spheres and the rights to collective expression. Correspondingly, they feel that the national culture is already relatively plural and is capable of change. Their own culture, however, needs protection, because it is the foundational basis of their identity.

Thus, both the national majority and societal minorities may have strong preferences of their own. It is highly likely that neither of them is naturally inclined to transform and accommodate their own cultural tradition. Social stability and peaceful co-existence in a culturally plural society requires some degree of cultural adaptation from both. Thus, in the 20th century United States, the final integration of Catholics and Jews to the social mainstream has also transformed the public culture of Americans. Similarly, the integration of Christian minorities to national communities since the 19th century and multiculturalization of the British and Dutch societies during the last decades of 20th century did leave an imprint on the respective societal cultures.

The idea of an unchangeable nature of the cultural tradition also contains a potential danger. Several negative examples from recent history demonstrate that the atrocities and crimes against cultural minorities were preceded by transformations of the cultural perceptions of the social majorities. The Holocaust, the genocides in post-communist Yugoslavia and of Christian Armenians during 1915–1916 followed the rising influence of the ideas that racial, ethno-national identity is inherent in the person and is essentially unchanging.

Moreover, in real societies, majority and minority cultures are rarely homogeneous. The minorities include many individuals who fuse identities or create new identities for themselves. Likewise, multiculturalists are also found among the societal majority.

16 Kymlicka 2000, p. 183.
17 The positive ideals of multiculturalism were derived from Kymlicka 2000, p. 183.
18 Rae 2002, p. 4.
Due to the reasons mentioned above, the analysis of the relations between cultural minorities and majorities should be made cautiously or better still, arguments that assume the unchangeable nature of any involved cultural tradition should be avoided.

I.2. Religion

Religion is most visible in such forms of cultural diversity, where religious cleavage overlaps with ethnic or socio-economic cleavages. For instance, such diversity is strengthened and magnified in England, where the white, traditionally Christian majority differs from the Islamic ethnic sub-culture of Pakistanis.

The second cleavage may be concentrated on ethnicity and language, and less on religion. Thus, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia follows Catholicism like the Slovakian majority. Ethnicity-related divisions may also be manifest within a larger category of a religious minority. Correspondingly, Muslims with Bosnian, Somali, Turkish, Iranian and Pakistani origin constitute to a significant extent cultural diversity within the Islamic minorities of European societies.

The third kind of cultural tension manifests itself in the way in which religion is interpreted for the society and politics by groups who formally belong to the same ethnic or religious group. The majority of the citizens of United States are nominal Christians, yet the presidential elections of 2008 demonstrated the social polarization between modernized, secular and liberal Christians against Fundamentalist traditionalists and conservatives. It is likely that the European Muslim minorities have similar internal divisions between secular immigrants with a religious background, traditionally practicing and believing Muslims, and radical-fundamentalists.

Three statements are also due regarding the scholarly analysis of various patterns of religion and multiculturalism.

First, the scholarly analysis over religion and multiculturalism tends to favor secularism and separation of religion from politics. In reality, instead of absolute subordination of politics to religion, or absolute separation of religion from politics, the prevailing pattern of European societies is relative separation or a moderate form of separation of state and religion (and/or culture). European secularism tends to be ideationally hegemonic and absolute, but moderate in practice. Most Western European societies, except

21 According to Tariq Modood the relative separation of culture and state describes the situation where culture and politics are „distinct from each other even though there may be points of overlap”. Modood 2000, p. 188.
France, follow moderate forms of separation of state and religion. The secularism, which enjoys hegemony in Europe, has historically evolved via a compromise with religion and not by the absolute separation of religion and politics. Instead of being neutral towards all religious traditions and treating them all equally, national cultures usually enjoy a legally protected relationship with their historical religious traditions. The public role of traditional religions may be advanced by the status of established religions or of the privileged partners of the government. Liberal-minded discussions over the place of religion among social minorities, however, tend to confine their religiosity to the private sphere. According to this perspective, the state should use its power to encourage individualistic religions, which is the realm of state’s neutrality, over those orientated to intervene into the public sphere.

The second scholarly problem is related to the relationship of religion with non-religious spheres and identities such as economics, politics, class and race. Scholars should be careful in not over-emphasizing ‘religious’ identities in situations, where the spheres and identities of religion and non-religious are enmeshed. Nor should the religious labels be used indiscriminately and differently for the minorities than they are used for the majority. Otherwise the category of ‘Muslims’ may often include non-believing and non-practicing members of an ethno-cultural community, while the label ‘Christian’ remains reserved exclusively for individuals with religious affiliation, belief or practice. Broad religious categories should be applied cautiously and uniformly.

Thirdly, like ethnicity, nationality, race or class, religion can also be the basis for either social solidarity or social divisions. Yet unlike the other forms of social conflict, the particular instances of religious-related violence tend to damage the general image of religious politics and result in a normative bias against any religious group. As Tariq Modood has pointedly emphasized, scholars should avoid such biases against religious groups.

Irrespective of the level of social secularization, some form of religion is usually still involved in political processes. Religion remains an effective political tool due to two major reasons. First, the interpretation of religion is subject to innovation and change, which allows it to be accommodated to almost any political, social or private need. Any scholar of religion also knows that religious traditions transform and change, it is the perception of religious identities as if ultimate and unchangeable, that often makes them meaningful and useful in conflicts between social groups. Secondly, even if

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22 Modood 2000, p. 189.
23 Modood 2000, p. 190.
24 Eck 2007, p. 745.
some religious traditions have largely lost their supramundane and transcendent emphasis, religion still remains qualitatively different from secular ideologies. As Gerd Baumann has pointedly observed, because religion “can be made to sound as if it determines objective and unchangeable differences between people”, it can be effectively used for the more relative, such as, political and economic purposes.26

1.3. Democracy

For the social majority, the debates over multiculturalism are relatively easier, when it concerns non-citizens such as refugees or recent immigrants. The latter are naturally considered as different and unequal from citizens. Concurrently, the issues become more delicate as increasing number of individuals of different cultural origin obtain citizenship.

It is also expected that national minorities with a long historical presence within the society cause less cultural tensions than the culturally ‘other’ immigrants. National minorities do not want to integrate to the social culture. They aim at the preservation of their territorially concentrated communal cultures. Immigrant minorities, however, want to change the institutions and laws of the mainstream society to become more accommodating of cultural differences.27

There are two general policy options regarding cultural minorities – integration and multiculturalism.

1. The integrationalist approach aims at cultural homogenization by integration of individuals from minorities into the culture of the host society. The increase of naturalized immigrants does not, however, automatically mean that the tensions over cultural differences will decrease. In Western Europe, for example, the disputes over the rights of the cultural minorities arose in parallel with the process of increasing naturalization of the second and third generation of young European Muslims.

Naturalized individuals are no more aliens, and do not have to perceive themselves as such. They may feel quite at home, because in a democracy, all citizens are equal. Consequently, as equals to any other citizen, they are

26 Baumann 1999, pp. 21, 23.
27 In contrast to immigrant minorities, the national minorities are territorially concentrated, have historical experience of self-government, and want to maintain their cultural tradition by various forms of autonomy or self-government which enable them to preserve their distinct communities. Recent immigrants typically want to integrate into the social mainstream as full and equal members. Kymlicka 1996, pp. 10–11, 14.
free to use all the rights and opportunities available to protect their rights and stand for their values and interests.

The host society may hope that the naturalization of foreigners will result in minorities accommodating to the social culture. This expectation has a solid historical basis, but is usually accomplished only after several generations. The whole process of integration is founded on individuals seeking citizenship, and not on the construction of a multicultural social order, which protects the cultural, ethnic or religious rights of minority communities. Maybe after half a century there will be enough of those, who have adopted the language, norms and values of the dominant culture. Yet in the meantime, the increasing number of integrated and upwardly mobile individuals, and their public presence in society, may facilitate social tensions.

2. The multiculturalist approach concentrates on the groups. Normatively, multiculturalism means that “a given country must recognize all ethnic groups who live on its territory, together with their history, culture and language, and that all must be treated as equal in public matters.” In Belgium, for example, such a policy is applied regarding Dutch-speaking Flemings and French-speaking Walloons, who are treated equally in every matter of public life.

Multiculturalist policies are easier to apply to national minorities than for immigrant communities.

From the cultural perspective, multiculturalism is in closer accordance with the rights of minorities and is more culturally sensitive than integrationalist policies, yet this approach also has a strong potential to result in increasing social tensions. Instead of social harmony, multiculturalist policies may contribute to the formation of segregated ghettos or intra-social violence.

What kind of policy regarding cultural minorities then would be best suited with a democratic social order? Which of the two polar opposites mentioned above?

In principle, democracy does not require a homogeneous culture in society or cultural neutrality by the state. In practice, Western democracies are capable of embracing cultural differences to a significant extent. At the same time, states have never been culturally absolutely neutral.

Typically, the liberal democracies have protected their common societal culture and common language by being selectively repressive of ethnocultural diversity and minority nationalisms. At times the protection of a social culture has also been pursued by recognition of some minority

29 Kymlicka 2000, p. 185.
cultures. As a rule, however, this has been applied to national minorities, not regarding immigrant communities. If national minorities have a well-developed sense of distinct nationality, the recent policy of Western democracies is to ensure their loyalty through accepting, not by attacking, their identity.30

Cultural neutrality would require the impossible from the state – to be absent from social antagonisms. Even, if the state is perceived to be culturally neutral, this neutrality is manifested in the regulation of intolerance between social groups. Typically, in Western countries, the traditional and larger religious communities have been afforded with rights and privileges not available to smaller and non-traditional religious groups. Yet as a trend, post-industrial societies witness increasing religious pluralism facilitated by the processes of globalization. Consequently, the regulation of religious pluralism in the society is another issue that nation-states just cannot put aside.31

Increasing ethnic diversity raises concerns for traditionally dominant ethnic majorities. Likewise, increasing religious diversity raises not only theological, but also social and political concerns for traditional religious communities. The dominant religious tradition may want to use the state to protect their privileged position against perceived competitors. One policy option for that purpose is to define religion in the laws of the state narrowly enough so that the religious practice of minority groups is hindered.32 Thus, the ban on religious clothing or symbols from public institutions does little harm to Protestants, whose religious practice does not require religious clothing, yet is more harmful to those religious traditions, where religious dress is a constitutive part of the religious identity of lay people.

For political communities, increasing social multiculturalism raises questions about the fundamental nature of the polity and of the social identity. Historically, the latter has always been defined by the opposition to internal or external ‘others’. As Western European societies are not haunted by the dead scepter of the Communism, it is easier to find ‘others’ on a cultural and religious basis, than on the basis of ideology. In post-communist societies, the dominant ‘other’ is still related to the previous experience of Communist rule.

Thus, there are several multicultural issues that may raise concerns for social majorities. Yet there is no essential controversy between democracy and religious-cultural pluralism. In contrast to totalitarian or authoritarian forms of government, democracy is characterized by social and political

30 Kymlicka 2000, p. 188.
31 “raising fundamental questions about one’s own faith in relation to the religious other”. Baumann 1999, p. 53.
pluralism. Concomitantly, also religious and cultural pluralism do not contradict with democracy. *Vice versa*, religious pluralism can encourage political pluralism and social tolerance. If the state legislates behavior that is unacceptable for a specific religious community, this will test the limits of what religious people find tolerable in the society.\(^{33}\)

The other essential questions regarding the relationship between democracy and multiculturalism concern compatibility of values (Do democracy and multiculturalism promote the same kind of values?) and forms of democracy (Does the answer to the previous question depend on the type of democracy?)

Equality, toleration, and autonomy are the values usually related to liberal democracy. The pertaining question is, whether multiculturalist policies correspond better to the values of liberal democracy than the integrationalist ones?\(^{34}\)

Any discussion over democracy has to specify what form of democracy is being talked about. Parliamentary representative democracy may be one of the least supportive of multiculturalism, because it does not facilitate the representation of the values and interests of the minorities. If the religious minorities are represented via peak-associations, like trade unions or business corporations, such representation is often considered as different in kind and undemocratic in essence.\(^{35}\) Unlike labor or business interests, religious minorities can easily be perceived as aliens to the society. Even if individuals of religious minorities are citizens, they are often still expected to abstain from electoral politics.\(^{36}\) Yet these negative perceptions regarding the democratic participation of religious minorities are *per se* essentially undemocratic.

Social majorities may prefer unorganized and incoherent minorities. Democracy, however, benefits, if the marginal and disadvantaged groups are included into public life.\(^{37}\) At least from the communitarian perspective of democracy it would be better, if the religious and ethno-religious minorities

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35 Modood 2000, p. 192.
would form cohesive communities, and would thereafter be able to enter into
dialogue with state and society.38

Lastly, how much multiculturalism is good for democracy? The more the
better, would be the normative answer. Too much multiculturalism, how-
ever, has its own deficiencies. Increasing cultural pluralism is an opportunity
for a “more vibrant civil society and political culture”, yet too strong
minority bonds, that accompany multicultural societies, may undermine
social cohesion, stability and governance.39 The conflict-potential of strong
intra-social bonds increases substantially if the boundaries between religion
and ethnicity overlap.40 The latter is exemplified by the ethno-religious wars
that followed the disintegration of Communist Yugoslavia.

Before presenting the contemporary political solutions to these theoretical
dilemmas, the main historical examples of cultural ‘others’, and their
function in the construction of European identity will be briefly presented.

2. Civilizational, Cultural and
Religious Boundaries of Europe

Europe has never been a state, nation, language or religion.41 At best, Europe
can be identified as a civilization or as a culture. The geographical, religious
and political boundaries of Europe can be defined only by some general
ideas about European culture or civilization. Concomitantly, the transfor-
mation of the ideas of Europe has resulted in the constant flux of geo-
 graphical and religious borders of Europe during last two millennia.

Western Christianity has been related to European identity more than any
other religion, yet at no point of time has a common version of Christianity
unified the whole continent. On the other hand, Europeans traditionally have
defined themselves in opposition to Judaism and Islam as the main religious
‘others’.42

38 Shireen T. Hunter. Conclusions and Outlook for European Islam. – Islam,
Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape.
39 Banchoff 2007, p. 4.
40 Baumann 1999, p. 55.
41 Europe has never been a single political unit with a distinct political identity,
although European societies and states are today perhaps closer to this ideal than
ever before.
42 Also Persians (for Alexandre the Great), Barbarians, Heathens, Mongols, to
name a few, have functioned as the ‘others’ in opposition to whom Europeans have
defined themselves.
Besides heretics, and at varying times also Protestants and Catholics, Jews have most constantly been the internal ‘others’ in European societies. Jews did not possess a mighty empire that could potentially enslave and subordinate European communities, although at times they could be perceived to be also the agents of some external enemy. At present, Jews comprise a tiny community in Europe (about 0.25 percent of the European population). Yet Judaism has surely been one of the European religions. In 1900, about 80 percent of world’s Jews lived in Europe (including czarist Russia). Today this number has decreased to about 10%.

The paradigmatic external ‘others’ of European societies have been Ottoman Turks – who represented Islam – and Orthodox Russia as a representative of Eastern Christianity. Accordingly, Samuel P. Huntington placed the cultural boundaries of Europe at a location, “where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin.” At present, among the 27 member-states of the EU, the highest percentage of Muslims is in Cyprus (slightly below 20%). The historical presence of Muslims in European territories, however, has been almost continuous since 8th century. Spanish territories were conquered by Muslim Moors in the 8th century and re-conquered in the 15th century. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the territories of Eastern and Central Europe brought along permanent Muslim populations in European territories.

During the Crusades, but especially, when the Turks were under Vienna in 1529, the confrontation with Muslims strengthened the connection between Europe and Christianity. In practice, from 16th century until the First World War internally divided European states could often enter into strategic collaboration with the Ottoman Turks. For the European identity, however, the image of the ‘other’ has mattered more than the many-sided relationship in practice.

Especially during social or political crises, Jews, Muslims Turks and Orthodox Russians have been represented as evil, related to tyranny, the agents of the Devil, inferior creatures, and the enemies of European civilization and Christendom. Until the Crusades, the Jews were considered as pariah people, aliens without human status or human rights within Chris-

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44 Jenkins 2007, p. 37.
tian society. During the Crusades and the early Reformation, the Jews were considered either as enemies or the agents of the external enemies (Turks, Catholics or Protestants).

The Jews were far more misrepresented than the Ottoman Turks. The images of the latter, of course, could also involve some erroneous stereotypes, yet also included some realistic fears. After all, Turks did not march on Vienna in 1683 under the banners of love, peace, friendship and multicultural dialogue. At that time, the practice of converting European Christian boys into fanatical Muslim warriors and the use of those Janissaries in the conquest of Hungary did incite realistic fears.

Similar negative representation of Russia started to spread in the 15th century, when Russia started to expand its dominion into the Baltic territories governed by the Livonian Knights, and in the 16th century, when Russia attacked Finland, until then governed by Sweden. The Livonian Knights depicted Russians “as uncivilized, like apes in their nature and intelligence,” and followers of heretic religion. Also Swedish king Gustav Vasa (1496–1560) declared Russians to be a danger to humankind and the whole of Christendom and compared them with Turks and “other pagans”.

Such examples of the struggle between good and evil, ‘us’ and ‘them’, can be found throughout European history until the Cold War, where the dangerous ‘other’ was related to Communism. Genocides in post-communist Bosnia and Kosovo serve as recent warning examples, because they were legitimized among others by the ideas of liberation from (Communist) tyranny, the atheistic religious heresy, and also from the yoke of Islam.

The actual relationship of Turkey and Russia with Europe has other facets, besides the function of the definitive ‘other’, several of them positively related to Europe. Without being a European colony, Turkey has transformed itself from a ‘core state’ of the Islamic world into a westernized secular state. If France has served as the historical example of a secular state for Western European countries, Turkey fulfills the same function for Muslim countries. As the secularism in Turkey has been modeled according to the French patterns, secularism in both countries has a strong resemblance.

49 Jenkins 2007, p. 106
50 Harle 2000, p. 69.
51 Harle 2000, p. 70.
52 Harle 2000, p. 5.
Turkey has pursued integration into the European Union since 1959. During the last decade, Turkey has been led by moderate Islamists, who are strongly in favor of accession to the European Union. At present there is a real possibility, that “a Turkish democratic state, truly representative of its ordinary Muslim population,” will one day join the European Union.

Turkish membership of NATO (since 1952) has been explained away as being caused by the political necessities of the Cold War era. Accordingly, Samuel P. Huntington has suggested that at least in the post-Cold War world, further memberships of NATO should be reserved only for traditionally Western Christian countries:

“It also means recognizing that in the post-Cold War world, NATO is the security organization of Western civilization and that its primary purpose is to defend and preserve that civilization. Hence states that are Western in their history, religion, and culture should, if they desire, be able to join NATO. Practically speaking, NATO membership would be open to the Visegrad states, the Baltic states, Slovenia, and Croatia, but not countries that have been historically been primarily Muslim or Orthodox.”

Taking into account the inclusion of Muslim-majority Albania (since 2009), and predominantly Orthodox Bulgaria and Romania (since 2004) into NATO, the representation of essentialist confrontation between West, Islam and Orthodoxy seems to have a stronger impact on the way in which the global world is perceived (in the form of cultural images and stereotypes) than followed in practical political behavior.

The simplest cursory look at the history of Russia should distinguish several periods, each with its own peculiar relationship to Europe and the West. In the mid-20th century, Nicolas Berdyaev distinguished ‘five different Russians’ in history – the Russia under the dominion of Kiev, the Russia of the Tartar period, the Russia of Muscovy, the imperial Russia of debates, although in Turkey there are significantly more women wearing some sorts of headscarf.

54 According to surveys, most in favor of the accession to European Union in Turkish politics are moderate Islamists and Kurdish nationalists, among the least are secularists. Dirk Rohtus. Turkey and the European Union. – How to Conquer the Barriers to Intercultural Dialogue: Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Christiane Timmerman, Barbara Segaert (eds.) Berlin: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2005, pp. 145–146.
Peter the Great, and the new Soviet Russia. The Russia of Muscovy and Communist Russia were characterized by an opposition to the West and a strong profession of true faith (Orthodoxy or Communism respectively). 57 Russia of Peter the Great, in contrast, pursued westernization. 58 Concomitantly, Russia can draw from her history both ideas and examples that will position Russia in Europe, will bring her closer to Europe, or provide a unique and superior identity with a mission in Europe.

3. Patterns of Religion, Culture and Politics

3.1. Integration of Post-communist Countries

The process of Western European integration has been driven by economical needs and political causes, not by religion and culture. The immigration of non-European origin minorities to this region started about half a century ago. Since then there has been an increasing debate about the preservation of their cultural identity of the core societies. Recently, between 2002 and 2004, when several post-communist countries of East-Central Europe were to be included to the European Union, the public debates also concentrated on the civilizational foundations of Europe. Subsequently, however, the debates over the common European identity have been on the decrease.

In 2004 eight former Socialist East-Central-European countries, plus Cyprus and Malta were accepted into the European Union. Among those, only Cyprus (predominantly Orthodox) was not traditionally Western Christian. Consequently, the European Union has integrated nearly all traditionally Western Christian post-communist territories, except Catholic Croatia, which still remains on the waiting-list. As a whole, this round of European integration was a Catholic wave headed by Poland as the largest and pivotal accession state. 59 This round of enlargement can also be interpreted as a further reconciliation of the historical Protestant/Catholic


58 For example, in reforming the church-state relations Peter the Great imitated the traditional Lutheran model. He abolished the Byzantine tradition of patriarchs and replaced it with a Holy Synod, directly subordinated to himself. Duncan, Peter J. S. Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Holy Revolution, Communism and after. London: Routledge, 2000, p. 13.

divide, although the European Union still does not encompass countries such as Norway, Switzerland and Iceland.

The inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 added about 30 million Orthodox believers to the population of the European Union, where Orthodoxy was previously represented by Greece and Cyprus. Taking into account significant Orthodox minorities that also exist in Estonia and Latvia, Orthodoxy is no more an outsider to the European Union.

Likewise, any further enlargement will most probably increase the proportion of Orthodox and Muslims in the EU. Turkey, Kosovo and Albania are predominantly Muslim, and Macedonia, Serbia, Ukraine and Moldova are mostly Orthodox. And lastly, the neighborhood initiative of the European Union has also developed relationships with countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Belarus, and Russia, which indicates that the Western Christian civilizational boundaries have been transcended even if there will be no further enlargement of EU in the near future.60

3.2. East-West Comparison

3.2.1. Secular Culture vs National Religion

The public culture and national identity of West-European nations are less related to religion than in post-communist societies. Irrespective of the policy option regarding religious minorities, the societies follow liberal and secular norms. If integrationalist policy is used, like in France, where it is expected that all social groups accommodate to normative laicist republicanism, the Muslim minorities have a hard time in accommodation to the dominant secular culture. If multiculturalist policy is followed, as in Great Britain, cultural pluralism is socially valued, and it is not expected that “one norm to rule absolute”61, the state faces difficulties in integration of religious minorities. In the latter case there is room left for non-secular minority culture, but the end result is usually the same. The religious minority has troubles with secular society, and society has troubles with the religious minority.

Although the culturally ‘other’ religious minorities are outnumbered by formal membership in traditional Christian confessions, they take religion more seriously both in practice and belief. For example, in England more people every week attend services in mosques than in Anglican churches.62

61 Baumann 1999, p. 46.
The cultural integration of such minorities would require them to also accommodate the more liberal and loose attitude toward religion that characterizes the host society. In French society, some segments of Islamic minorities tend to take the religious part of identity more seriously than the host society devoted to liberal republicanism. The French republican school system is even "committed to the values of gender equality and to the critique of oppressive religious, familial and traditional norms." Consequently, there is a tension, where the values and commitments of the minorities contradict with those of the social majority. Thus, the 2004 ban on "ostentatious" religious symbols in public institutions was directed at not all religious traditions, but mostly at the practice of headscarves worn by Muslim women. Traditional Christian groups had already accommodated to the secular society. While the headscarves issue would not cause similar social tensions in Great Britain, in France the ban, which was perceived to be against the symbols of the subordination of Muslim women, enjoyed an overwhelming support among the French citizenry.

Denmark resembles England in also having a state church. The normative understanding of Danish society, however, is alike to France. Dominant public discourse in Denmark emphasizes equal rights over multiculturalism, and universal, liberal values and citizenship as a means towards the inclusion of immigrants. As in other Scandinavian Lutheran societies the secularized and liberalized understanding of religion restricts religion to the private realm of the individual, and leaves the realm of external conduct to be regulated by state authority. Thus, minority religions in Denmark are expected to accommodate to this pattern. Muslims can attain full rights of a citizen as individuals, but are not considered to constitute a separate community under ethnic, cultural, or religious paradigm.

Unlike post-communist societies, the recent waves of immigration to Western European societies have resulted in a growing economic underclass, where "the immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socio-economic..."
unprivileged ‘other’ all tend to coincide. Concomitantly, the increasing public presence of Muslim communities is felt mostly in larger industrial cities and regions – such as London, Paris, Rotterdam, the Ruhr industrial area in Germany –, where the Muslim communities are mainly concentrated.

In Eastern Europe, the problems with ethno-religious minorities concentrate less on the economy or cultural differences (over homosexuality, free speech and the like). Instead, the main religio-political issues concentrate on the relationship between national religion with national minorities or New Religious Movements. Despite not having any state church, the national culture of post-communist societies is usually based on some form of ethno-religion. This pattern describes well not only Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Romania, where the majority of the population belong to national churches, but also to the Russian Federation, where the levels of religious practice and belief are lower than the numbers of those Russians who consider themselves as culturally Orthodox. In some post-communist countries – like the Czech Republic or Estonia – the national identity is predominantly secular, yet the basis of national identity remains still ethnic, not civic.

In Estonia, the political identity is vaguely related to Lutheranism. The inter-ethnic tensions have appeared due to the Estonian citizenship law of 1993, which excluded from citizenship a good part of the predominantly Orthodox Russian-speaking residents. The public debates in Estonia, however, concentrate more on the political rights than on cultural differences or cultural autonomy of the Russophone minorities.

In Western Europe, Islamic communities are the most culturally suspect religious minorities. In Eastern Europe, like in the Russian Federation, the same position is occupied by religious groups such as Charismatic Christians and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Concomitantly, Russian Islamic minorities cause less cultural worries than in Western Europe. Instead, Western Protestant religious minorities are often considered to be “foreign religions”.

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70 Marsh, Christopher. Russian Orthodox Christians and Their Orientation toward Church and State. – Journal of Church and State, 2/2005, p. 560.
portrayed as “anti-social,” “criminal,” and “dangerous,” or considered to be a threat to the Russian national identity and the prevailing Orthodoxy national culture.

One of the reasons, why Islam does not constitute a cultural problem in Russia, has to do with the historical presence of Muslim minorities within the Russian society. The Russian Federation includes about the same number of Muslims as are living in the European Union (around 15 million).

The general pattern in both Eastern and Western Europe, however, is that the cultural problems have increased with the more recent religious minorities. Concomitantly, in Russia, this means the increasing influx of Western Protestants, in Western Europe it concentrates on Muslims, whose number has tripled just during the last 30 years. The influx of “culturally others” raises fears of brainwashing and of undermining the core culture of the society. In France and Germany it may have been in addition to Islamic groups that there are also certain ‘sects’, ‘cults’ and other new religious groups. In Russia, similar fears are related to the influx of Western Protestants.

Nevertheless, the Russian Federation may have one of the sharpest “Islamic challenges” in Eastern Europe, but the challenge is essentially political – related mostly to the self-determination of the peripheral areas of Tatarstan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan –, not cultural. Although similarly to Western Europe, some larger Russian cities have witnessed also an economically driven influx of Muslim populations, including Muslims of Central Asian origin.

### 3.2.2. Different Levels of Cultural Secularisation

Western European post-industrial societies follow more secularized and liberal social values that emphasize individualism over collective and gender equality over traditional values. In postmaterialist Western societies, Islam has become the “the un-liberal other”, the religion that “pits patriachalism against gender equality, ideals of collectivity against individual autonomy,

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73 Shterin and Richardson 2000, p. 249.
74 Marsh 2005, p. 546.
77 Mouritsen 2005, p. 88.
intolerance against tolerance, authoritarianism against liberalism”. 78 The ways of life of Western Muslims – perceived as collectivist, intolerant, authoritarian, illiberal and theocratic – are considered to be fundamentally incompatible with those of Europe. 79 Traditional Western Christian communities also have troubles with the secularized, individualistic, and liberal secular public culture, although they fight less against the secularized condition. Concomitantly, the French headscarf ban in public schools was considered discriminative also by French Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant church leaders. 80 Also Pope Benedict XVI would prefer some version of traditional – i.e. not secular and liberal – common foundation for the social culture. Additionally, the pope is critical regarding multiculturalism, which “can sometimes amount to an abandonment and denial, a flight from one’s own heritage”. 81

The post-communist societies of Europe meet the challenge of the Western European kind of more advanced cultural secularization during the integration into Europe 82. While most of the post-communist countries do not have strict laws limiting the rights to abortion (unlike Poland), the regional difference is more manifest regarding the legal treatment of same-sex unions. The European Parliament has recently resolved that all EU members-states should treat same-sex unions on the same terms as traditional families. 83 Such recommendations do not receive a warm welcome among post-communist societies, which tend to hold on to more traditional understanding of marriage and gender roles.

83 Jenkins 2007, p. 67.
3.2.3. Securitization of Minority Religion

Minorities that adhere to a religion connected to a political group or state that is considered to be a threat to national security have traditionally faced some form of intolerance by the state. In the time of John Locke, the Catholics were suspect in England due to the close relation of Catholicism and the French state. The Kulturkampf of Otto von Bismarck against the Catholic Church had the same undertone. At present, similar worries have been caused by the potential connection of Muslim minorities to international terrorism.

Poland is perhaps the only EU country, which articulates in the constitution (article 53) the limitations to freedom of religious expression if it is “necessary for the defence of State security, public order...”. Yet, national security is commonly an important cause for limiting the rights of religious minorities. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, most of the European states have put a stronger emphasis on the religious motivation of terrorism in anti-terrorism legal provisions. The terrorist attacks in Madrid (14/3, 2004) and in London (7/7 and 21/7, 2005) also linked Islam increasingly with violence and anti-Western values.

The public understanding of the war against terror often concentrates on the images of “us versus them”, and the coalition forces against the Taliban. These perceptions tend to be also applied to European Muslims. Consequently, Islamic communities are considered to be monolithic, related to fanaticism and terrorism. As a result, many rank and file Muslims, who have no connection with international terrorism, have become targets of arbitrary detentions, expulsions, hate crimes and human rights violations.

To imagine Islam as a violent religion is unfair for two main reasons. First, violence in the past and present is common among the followers of any world religion. Secondly like most Christians, so also most Muslims do not

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85 Ferrari 2004, p. 364.
support violence.89 Paradoxically, the image of violent Islam is often built on individual cases of religion-related terrorism performed outside of Western Europe – be it the civil war in Lebanon in 1980s, 9/11 or 2003 hostage crises in Beslan. These singular events have contributed to the general image of Islam not only as different, but also as dangerous.90 In the time of mass media, such stereotypes and images have a life of their own, largely autonomous from the actual number of radicals harbored within a local religious community. Consequently, it may go unnoticed, that the same radical Muslims have also been fighting with Islamic communities.

In real life, the Muslim communities are characterized by vast diversity. European Muslims are not uniformly pious, primitive, and fundamentalist91. Most of them are law-abiding and have never participated in riots inside European societies, which have been relatively minor and have lasted only for a short periods.92 Therefore as Olivier Roy suggested, the policies of European states should distinguish terrorists from the mainstream Muslims in Europe, even “meet the aspirations of mainstream Muslims […] – Islam recognized as a Western religion, Muslims as full citizens” and avoid the creation of closed communities, ghettos, and minority status.93

**Conclusion**

The policy of a narrow and forced assimilation is no more considered as a viable option in Europe94. In Germany it was hoped that Muslims would accept the high German culture (Leitkultur), the cultural and political ethos of the German society, and while remaining Muslim, their religion remains a private matter95. Since the 1970s such an assimilationist option has been increasingly recognized as: unrealistic, because immigrants do not lose their identities and practices; unnecessary, because the immigrants can be both loyal citizens with a strong sense of their own identity; and unfair, because “it denies equal respect for immigrants, and turns integration into an oppressive process.”96 In 2000, Germany changed its citizenship laws from

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89 Ferrari 2004, p. 360.
90 Schiffauer 2005, p. 111.
91 Jenkins 2007, p. 17.
96 Kymlicka 2000, p. 191.
ius sanguinis to ius solis, and made citizenship available to those born in the country.

Those states, however, which practised multicultural policies, now tend to emphasise more assimilation and naturalization\(^7\). Both old (the Netherlands, Britain and France) and new immigration hosts (such as Spain and Italy), find it increasingly hard to adopt the multicultural approach and are inclined towards the assimilationist approach\(^8\). The Netherlands was earlier among the most willing to accommodate cultural differences\(^9\), but has recently adopted more restrictive legislation, “setting clear limits to the kinds of un-European, unmodern norms and habits it is ready to tolerate.”\(^10\)

Concomitantly, some form of multiculturalism is the option for the future. What sort of multiculturalist political framework a society should follow, this still remains under debate.\(^11\) The European states need to find a working balance between the respect of cultural diversity and the protection of “the cohesiveness of the community” and national security\(^12\).

What particular lessons can be learned from the historical treatment of religio-cultural minorities in Western societies?

First, in the long run, religious traditions tend to accommodate to the social context and secular state. In France, the social polarization between the Catholic Church and a secular state culminated in 1905 with law of church-state separation. The hostile attitudes from both sides lasted for about half a century, but after 1958, both sides accommodated. The church is reserved in her criticism of the secular state, and the French government has provided financial support to Catholic elementary schools.\(^13\) The values of the Catholic Church still differ markedly from the secular liberal values, but the Church has accommodated to the society, which legislates on divorce, the use of contraception and the legal right to abortion.

Secondly, the cultural accommodation of religious minorities may take several generations, if not a century. In the United States, the pre-World War I immigrant Jews were related to threats of revolution and subversion,

\(^{7}\) Turner 2007, p. 129.
\(^{11}\) Hellyer 2006, p. 345.
\(^{12}\) Hellyer 2006, p. 346.
immigrant Catholics were perceived as non-Christians with outdated gender attitudes, authoritarian religious structures, dangerously high levels of reproduction, and were considered to be a uniform group of people despite differences in ethnic origins and their attitudes regarding religion (indifferent, anticlerical or religious). By the end of 20th century, the social values, demographic trends and political differences of Catholics and Jews have harmonized with the ones characteristic to U.S. society. The cultural inclusion of European Muslims may follow the same pattern.

Lastly, any religious tradition should be evaluated according to its existing internal diversity. Gilles Kepel has pointedly noticed, that “there are a thousand ways of being Muslim in everyday life, just as there are a thousand ways of being Christian, Jewish, Buddhist or atheist”. Few Europeans know that among German Muslims, there are about 400,000 of Turkish Alevis, whose faith does not forbid them to eat pork or drink alcohol. In order to know, which segments of Muslims communities actually are the cultural ‘others’, one should recognize internal division between “Turkish”, “Arab”, or “Bosnian” mosques, and acknowledge the different versions of Islam of North Africans in France, Pakistanis of Great Britain and Turks in Germany, which tend to have very little in common.

The road to mutual acceptance and accommodation between Muslim communities and European societies is neither free of tensions nor is it uniform and linear. However, in order to efficiently integrate Muslims into European society the policies of integration should be applied on those needing integration, not on anyone adhering to Islam.

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105 Jenkins 2007, p. 23.
107 Jenkins 2007, p. 125.
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