It is well known that liberal democracies do not take a uniform approach to matters of religion and education and reject the communist approach of inculcating one comprehensive secular ideology and outlawing religious visions. However, democratic states diverge on the questions of how to deal with religion in public schools and how to address funding and regulation of religious schools. Stephen Monsma and J. Christopher Soper attempt to make sense of these differences by identifying three general types of church-state relationships in liberal democracies. These include “partial establishments,” “strict separationism,” and “pluralist or structural pluralist” models. Partial establishments include England, Greece or other countries where one religious group receives government favoritism and serves as part of the state establishment fit into this category. “Strict separationism” includes

1 Reprinted from Journal of Church and State 49, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 53–73; used by permission.
2 By liberal democracy we mean “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property,” Fareed Zakaria. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy. – Foreign Affairs, 76 /1997, p. 22.
3 They also differ over whether to allow various forms of home schooling that might include religious instruction. For a description of the laws and regulations in various western democracies, see the Home School Legal Defense Association website: www.hslda.org/.
5 This label is similar to what Madeley and Enyedi label as “mono-confessionalism” in Church and State in Contemporary Europe. We are using Michael Walzer’s definition of “civil society” as “the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks – formed for the sake of the family, faith, interest, and ideology – that fill this space,” Michael Walzer. The Idea of Civil Society. – Dissent, 38/1991, p. 270.
countries, such as the United States, where all religious groups are considered separate entities from the state, exist largely as part of civil society, and rarely receive direct government funding. Other democratic states, like Netherlands, Germany, and Australia, attempt to find a middle ground. They recognize a wide variety of religious groups as official public entities and promote and fund both religious and secular charities and schools. Monsma and Soper call this approach the “pluralist or structural pluralist” model.

Where does post-communist Russia fit into this pattern? This essay provides a partial answer by presenting a broad overview of developments with regard to religion in both higher and lower education in Russia over the past fifteen years. Overall, it demonstrates that Russia does not fit neatly into any types that Monsma and Soper describe above.

Legally, Russia could be considered to be charting a fourth type. Certainly, its Constitution sounds a strict separationist and a pluralist note. Nonetheless, its 1997 law, “On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations,” promotes what Nikolas Gvosdev calls, “managed pluralism” or what we will label “managed historical pluralism.” According to the law, only those groups that had existed in Russia for fifteen years (prior to 1997) can register and obtain various rights and privileges. This stipulation means that only religious groups established in Russia before the 1917 Revolution receive certain rights and privileges, because new religious groups originating during perestroika in the late 1980s do not qualify. The actions of state officials, however, are often different than the ideals set forth in national constitutions or various federal laws. In education, as the following overview will show, various government actors and administrations have demonstrated little consistency in their approach. Though

---

6 Article 14 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation sounds the strict separationist note, “The Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be established as a state or obligatory one,” while Article 28 gives the pluralist note, “Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of conscience, the freedom of religion, including the right to profess individually or together with any other religion or to profess no religion at all, to freely choose, possess and disseminate religious and other views and act according to them.”


8 Any group that did not meet this requirement had to register each year to obtain legal status and was deprived of many rights and privileges given to groups that qualified for the fifteen year registration. However, a 1999 Court decision has somewhat altered the requirements of this provision without declaring it unconstitutional. As a result, most groups that existed before 1997 have been able to reregister, according to Lev Simkin. Church and State in Russia. – Law and Religion in Post-Communist Europe. Silvio Ferrari and W. Cole Durham, Jr. (eds.) Dudley, Mass.: Peeters, 2003.
difficult to generalize, with regard to state-sponsored primary and secondary education, an early pattern that vacillated between pluralism and partial establishment has now given way to a form of strict separation. The treatment of religion in state universities has more closely followed the managed historical pluralism model. The approach to private education has followed a strict separation model when it comes to financing and a managed pluralism model with regards to regulation. Private religious higher education experiences strict separation with regard to financing but it appears to profit more from structural pluralism when it comes to regulation. The conclusion attempts to summarize the possible implications of these inconsistent approaches for the future of religious liberty in Russia.

I. History

The history of religion, education, and church-state relations in Orthodox countries initially shared similarities to other western democracies influenced by Catholicism or Protestantism, but it later diverged at important points. Like many European countries, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) played an important role in the development of early educational institutions. Throughout early Russian history, monasteries, Orthodox schools, and seminaries provided education for those who wished to join the clergy as well as others interested in learning literacy and grammar. In various ways, the Russian state also supported the educational initiatives of the ROC.9

As Russia expanded, however, strong secular leaders such as Peter the Great ensured that higher education served the state first and the church second. The state also placed heavy restrictions on private education making independent religious forms of education even more difficult. Some of these regulations, such as requiring the teaching of the Scriptures in private schools, paradoxically enforced the Orthodox religion. Nonetheless, rulers made it clear that enforcing the Orthodox perspective was meant to promote the stability, legitimacy and authority of the state.10 This approach had a major impact on the ROC’s role in higher education. For instance, while in the Christian West, the Catholic Church and later the Protestant churches

played a major part in forming and maintaining universities, the ROC, as was true in many Orthodox societies, exerted only a minor influence on the formation of universities. Russia’s first major universities, such as Moscow Imperial University and St. Petersburg Academy, were established primarily for secular reasons and did not include theology departments.

With regard to primary and secondary education, the state and the ROC maintained a much closer relationship. In fact, until the end of the nineteenth century, church schools outnumbered the schools sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Education. Direct government funding of church schools also continued and even increased at this time. Dneprov notes that the relationship was parasitical: “The monarchy increasingly needed the ideological support of the church. In turn, the church was losing its influence among the populace and relied on state funding. In the early twentieth century the government spent on church schools twice the amount of funding it contributed toward maintaining and developing schools of the Ministry of Public Education.” Nonetheless, before the 1917 Russian Revolution, primary and secondary education had started to secularize with the more secular-oriented Ministry of Education schools outnumbering the ROC schools two to one.

The 1917 Russian Revolution brought about an even more radical secularization of education in Russia. At various levels of intensity, the Communist Party attempted either to destroy or control religious education. Soon after the Revolution, the Bolsheviks penned the law, Separation of the Church from the State and the School from the Church. In 1919, the Party made its intentions quite clear by stating, “In relation to religion ... the Party strives toward a complete destruction of the relation between the exploiting class and the organization of religious propaganda. ...” To achieve this end, it outlawed religious education of children, shut down every religious primary and secondary school, abolished the teaching of God’s Law, an Orthodox form of catechism, from state schools, and developed courses in the scientific study of atheism. The Communist Party also created an extensive system of youth organizations aimed at propagating the materialist

---

13 Ibid., p. 106.
perspective on human life and history and Marxist-Leninist ideology.\textsuperscript{15} Overall, the communists solved religion and education problems by attempting to destroy religion.

\section*{2. Post-Communist Developments}

The demise of the Soviet Union created both new opportunities and challenges with regard to the relationship between religion and education in Russia. The following overview examines the various church-state issues that have emerged in both state and private education. Overall, the church-state developments in this period have not followed any consistent pattern in state or private education or in higher or lower education.

\subsection*{2.1. State Schools}

\textit{Primary and Secondary Schools}

The role of religion in primary and secondary schools has varied throughout the post-communist period, partly stemming from larger changes in the Russian system of education. In the two decades after communism, state-funded education made the transition from being a highly centralized system with curricular rigidity and clear political-ideological functions to a more decentralized and pluralistic system. More recently, state schools have reverted closer to the old centralized, politicized system.\textsuperscript{16}

Moreover, the initiatives coming from the Russian Ministry of Education, even during the time of supposed decentralization, have also fluctuated. After the Russian Ministry of Education discarded atheistic forms of education and began to open up the curriculum to religious influence and content, the battles over this influence went through three phases. Interestingly, the battles in all these phases involved curricular matters and not religious rituals such as prayer and devotional Bible reading.

\textit{Structural Pluralism.} In the first phase, the Russian Ministry of Education displayed a new openness to religious influence in the public schools. The openness stemmed from a desire to find a new source for \textit{vospitanie}, variously translated as upbringing, moral education, or character education.

\textsuperscript{15} For a more thorough description, see ibid.

When the Russian Ministry of Education disbanded the communist program of moral education, including the communist youth organizations and compulsory ethics courses, such as “Ethics and Psychology of Family Life,” both administrators and teachers sensed the loss of moral foundations. They wanted to find new sources of vospitanie they could impart within a public education system that now accommodated ideological pluralism.

With few financial resources available, the Ministry of Education turned to foreign aid and many of the groups willing to participate were religious groups. As early as 1991, the Ministry of Education accepted an offer from an American Christian parachurch organization, International School Project, to train Russian teachers in Christian moral education. Over 41,000 post-communist teachers attended ISP convocations. In 1992, the partnership expanded to include a coalition of eighty Western Christian parachurch agencies, denominations, and colleges named the CoMission. When asked why the CoMission was allowed by the Ministry of Education to help Russian public schools, Alexander Asmolov, a Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, told a group of Western journalists, “When a person is in a waterfall and he wants to save his life, and he sees a hand extended to him for help, can he think whose hand is that? He will accept the hand which is first. The first hand was of the CoMission.” From 1992 to 1997, the CoMission sent more than 1,500 missionary-educators to Russia and performed training work in more than 2,500 schools using an ethics text on the life of Jesus written by Western evangelicals. Over seven years, the group claimed to have trained over 50,000 Russian educators to teach a Christian ethics curriculum.

Another helping hand came from a branch of Sun Yung Moon’s Unification Church. In 1993, the International Educational Foundation (IEF), founded by a follower of the Unification Church, worked with a professor from Vilnius University to publish a high school moral education curriculum for Russian public schools entitled My World and I. In 1994, the Ministry of Education issued a positive evaluation of the text. According to IEF, over

As evidenced by this diversity, the Russian Ministry of Education, according to its spokespersons, was not interested in making a particular religious confession the established religion. Instead, it sought to implement a pluralistic approach to moral education that could be attended on a voluntary basis. For example, Asmolov explained at a press conference announcing the Ministry of Education’s partnership with the CoMission that allowing a plurality of religious approaches to *vospitanie* would go hand in hand with the new democratic outlook and an appreciation for the importance of voluntary choice in the development of moral virtue. He also expressed support for what was then termed the “deideologization” of Russian education, but would likely be better labeled support for ideological pluralism:

> There are no systems in the world without ideology. ... We are supposed to give a plurality of approaches and it answers our ideas of democracy. We don’t want mono-ideology. Because mono-ideology means absence of any individual thought. We have been for a long time slaves of one ideology. Nobody will be willing to go into new forms of slavery now. Only a free choice can bring real faith. This is the internal conscience and honor of every individual.22

Overall, the Ministry of Education appeared willing to support a radically new form of pluralism in Russia. Consistent with this vision, the Ministry also allowed Islamic and Catholic groups to hold conferences similar to those held by ISP, the CoMission, and the Unification Church.23

*The Orthodox Revival and Partial Establishment.* In the second phase of change, the Russian Ministry of Education took a different turn. Understandably, the ROC did not find structural pluralism to their advantage, partly because the pluralism envisioned by the Ministry of Education was not always practiced in reality. The ROC did not enjoy the same access to opportunities for training teachers as Western groups. As Elena Speranskaia, the spokeswoman for the ROC, shared, “So the CoMission comes, and Orthodox priests are kicked out, and the Americans start to teach. This

---

22 Glanzer 2002, p. 79
brings out a very negative reaction from our church and from most of the population." If either pluralism or strict separation now existed in Russia, the Orthodox Church wanted it fairly enforced. If the Orthodox Church could not have access to government schools, it certainly did not want Protestant or Unification church missionaries there, nor did it want these groups evangelizing Orthodox believers. The ROC eventually used its influence to end any official centralized Ministry of Education partnership with the CoMission and the Unification church in 1997, although these groups continued their work at the local level.

Soon afterwards, the ROC not only sought fairness and consistency in the state’s partnerships with religious groups regarding moral education, they also contended that the ROC deserved a special relationship to Russian public schools. Not content with fairness, the ROC pressed for Orthodoxy to receive a special place in the required curriculum. The ROC based its case on four types of arguments: 1) The public schools cannot be neutral in their approach to vospitanie. Any approach will favor one group (e.g., Orthodoxy, atheism, neopaganism, etc.); 2) The Orthodox Church is currently the majority faith (the ROC usually made the controversial claim that 80 percent of Russians are Orthodox); 3) The history of culture (Russian, in particular) has a very tight connection with religious and spiritual issues. And if the core curriculum includes the history of culture, then the Church should be the main provider for this kind of education; 4) The state would be helped by such a partnership or symphonia. Without it, the state will be “doomed to self-destruction.” Despite arguments such as these, the Russian Ministry of Education resisted giving Russian Orthodoxy a special place in the curriculum throughout the mid-1990s and continued to affirm a pluralistic approach by “offering religious organizations the opportunity to teach

---

25 The ROC later set forth its official position about these matters at the 2000 Jubilee Council of Bishops in the Basic Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church warned, “The danger of occult and neo-heathen influences and destructive sects penetrating into the secular school should not be ignored either, as under their impact a child can be lost for himself, for his family and for society.” See Basic Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church, 2000, XIV. 3. <http://www.mospat.ru/chapters/e_conception/>, (accessed April 30, 2004). All quotes are taken from the English translation found on the official ROC web site.
26 Glanzer 2002.
28 See Basic Social Conception in n. 20.
children religion on an extracurricular basis in facilities of state and municipal educational institutions.”

The actions of both the ROC and the Russian Ministry of Education, however, soon demonstrated an approach closer to the partial establishment of Orthodoxy. In 2001, Patriarch Alexei II declared, “We will try again to persuade the government of the necessity of introducing the history of Orthodox culture in the curriculum of the schools.” One year later, the Orthodox Church achieved part of its goal when the Russian Ministry of Education introduced a new course into the core curriculum entitled “Fundamentals of the Orthodox Culture.” Filippov, the Russian Minister of Education at the time, officially introduced a sample of the course content, outlining an eleven-year curriculum that would be optional for regional officials and principals to include in the required curriculum.

The introduction of the course produced a storm of controversy. The arguments against the curriculum found in the press reflected a longing for the type of church-state separation that presently exists in the United States. For example, Alexei Volin, deputy director of Government Administration, argued that the proposal showed disrespect for Russia’s secular, pluralistic democracy: “It is dangerous to introduce classes in Orthodox religion in a multi-confessional and multiethnic country like Russia. ... As a secular state, the Russian Federation should not allow any religious teaching in a state school.” Critics also pointed out that the suggested outline of the course imitated an Orthodox theology course taught in ecclesiastical seminaries. Despite the controversy, Filippov continued to declare, “The Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture will be taught in schools no matter what barriers state officials attempt to make,” and reports indicated that at least twenty regions supported the teaching of the course.

Despite this apparent government promotion of Orthodoxy, both the government and the ROC still signaled that they wished to support more pluralistic approaches. For instance, the Ministry of Education published an

---

34 Glanzer 2005.
order in 2003, specifying that religious groups can offer religious education in voluntary classes outside the required education program. The ROC also demonstrated a willingness to pursue solutions consistent with managed historical pluralism by working with the Interreligious Council of Russia, which includes Buddhist, Muslim, and Jewish confessions, to support initiatives such as creating a course and textbook on the “Fundamentals of Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism,” requesting more state funding of religious schools and voluntary religion classes, and the reviewing of religious information in textbooks by religious organizations. Nonetheless, the ROC continued to support its own partial establishment. For instance, it stated that this recommendation for a course addressing Russia’s historical confessions should not replace or preclude the course on the Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture.

Strict Separationism. In April 2004, Vladimir Putin appointed a new Minister of Education and Science, Andrei Fursenko. This appointment brought about a third phase that has taken Russian public schools closer to American strict separationism. Soon after being in office, Fursenko stated that he believed a course in the history of the major world religions should be mandatory. Furthermore, unlike the earlier proposal, he maintained, “I am not talking about teaching only the history of Christianity,” although he added “Orthodoxy has lain at the base of the creation of Russia and this must be understood.” According to Fursenko, he and Patriarch Alexei II agreed on this issue and that Orthodoxy should not be “taught as law.”

36 The Council did not include Catholic or Protestant traditions in their discussions or in their Council, because these traditions were not considered “traditional” for Russia. Nadezhda Kevorkova noted that since Catholics and Protestants were excluded from this conference it appears “the path into the schools is closed for them” (Nadezhda Kevorkova. School Children will Study Fundamentals of Religious Doctrines. – Gazeta, 10 April 2003. English translation available online at: <http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0304-a.html>. Trans. Paul Steeves (accessed 19 February 2007).
39 Minister of Education: History of Religion Should Be Required Subject in Schools. – Mir religii, 2 April 2004, and Ministry of Education Will Introduce
The Ministry’s recent efforts to promote strict separationism have drawn criticism from the leadership of Russia’s major religious confessions. The Interreligious Council of Russia, which includes the ROC, on 19 May 2005, called on Fursenko to allow students to study religion from the point of view of each confession. The Council’s letter to the minister claimed, “We think that the information contained in the general humanities courses on the history and values of world religions is very fragmentary and often tendentious and in such a context it results in the children receiving actually distorted information.” The solution to this problem, they argued, would be to allow the religious organizations to teach about religion.

Despite this request, Fursenko continued to declare, “The position of the ministry is that religion, the history of religion, and the culture of religion are an inseparable part of the history of the development of the country and the history of the development of the world.” He also insisted no preference for individual religions should be given and confessional forms of religious education should not take place in public schools. To further this direction, the Ministry helped sponsor textbooks for the required course on the history of religions.

As a result, conservative Orthodox groups and individuals increased their criticism. The Union of Orthodox Citizens declared, “We will not cease until Fursenko is removed, our church schools are accredited, and the ‘Foundations of Orthodox Culture’ course is introduced into the federal educational curriculum.” Along with Russian Orthodox officials and organizations, Muslim leaders have also described the proposal to teach history of religion in public schools as one of numerous examples of the Ministry’s “unconstructive and antireligious position” in regard to religious education. To
encourage the principled pluralism option, the Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan, in conjunction with the Russian Islamic University and the History Institute of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, is developing a textbook for secondary schools titled “Fundamentals of Muslim Culture.” The textbook discusses “the values of Muslim faith, morality and ethics, Islam and society, history of Islam, and the treasury of the Islamic culture.”

Russia’s academic community appears divided over the issue of religion in public schools and universities. Viktor Sadovnichii, president of Moscow State University, represents a faction of scholars who argue that “science and moral education cannot be separated from religion,” and thus religion should be integrated into public education. Other prominent scholars, such as Nobel Prize winner Vitaly Ginzburg, advocate strict separationism. In a recent interview, Ginzburg has said that while “a high school student should know what religion is, this should involve religious studies,” meaning an approach similar to the one proposed by Minister Fursenko.

Even with the official emergence of this separationist phase, the other two approaches still exist in Russia. For instance, the western Christian organization, International School Project, continues to sponsor conferences that train public school teachers to teach their curriculum on Christian ethics. Likewise, the ROC continues to promote the teaching of “Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture” in areas such as Kursk and Tambov as a supplemental course. The ROC also shares few reservations about using the state public school system to promulgate religion. For example, Fr Ioann Ekonomtsev, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department of


Religious Education and Catechization, praised one particular school that undertook such activities despite the law:

> For example, there is a School #30 in Nizhny Novgorod. This is a regular public school but as soon as you enter the school, you see icons everywhere. Classes begin and end with prayer. But it is a state school. Somehow the principal has been able to do this. She is an ardent believer; came to the faith not long ago. A wonderful pedagogue and a wonderful intellectual. This is one of the miracles that sometimes happen here.49

As Ekonomtsev noted, “The difference is that we support the teaching of religion and the Ministry of Education has taken a very cautious position on this issue.” Which of the three approaches will dominate Russian public education remains to be seen, but for now, it appears that the current Minister of Education has turned to a more separationist approach similar to that used in the United States.50

### 3. Religion and State-Supported Higher Education

The situation in state-supported institutions of higher education has developed along a slightly different pattern. Similar to general public schools, by 1991, courses in scientific atheism had largely disappeared from the curriculum of Russian state universities. In addition, various types of religion courses began to emerge in philosophy, culturology, and history departments. Some religion faculties also began as parts of other departments (e.g., philosophy).51

The major source of religion-state tensions in secular universities, however, has pertained to the teaching of theology. Prior to communism, the major state universities, such as Moscow State and St. Petersburg Universities did not contain theology departments. Major Russian universities are unlike state schools in many other Orthodox countries (e.g., Greece,

49 Fr Ioann Ekonomtsev, interview by co-authors, Moscow, May 18, 2005.
where the Orthodox Church sponsors theology departments at state universities. Russian tsars had largely relegated theological training to seminaries. Communist governments, of course, continued this practice. With the fall of communism, the question emerged as to whether state universities should follow the practice of certain secular state-funded universities in the West that primarily contained religion or religious studies departments (religiovedenie) or whether they should allow theology (teologiya) departments.

Initially, universities followed the former pattern. For example, Jonathan Sutton noted in the mid-1990s that while he found several emerging religious studies departments, he found only one department of theology, in a state university in Chernivtsi, Ukraine.52 Through the influence of the Orthodox Church, however, this situation began to change. Since the Russian Ministry of Education must approve all higher education majors and the curricula associated with them, in 1998 the ROC submitted a curriculum proposal for the theology major. However, it was not until a letter was sent by the patriarch in January 2000, with signatures from prominent academics that the Ministry acted.53 The Ministry soon approved the curriculum and adopted curricular guidelines and standards for the degree.

Various scholars and officials expressed skepticism about state universities approving degrees in theology, especially since such degrees were also allowed for other traditions, such as Islam and Judaism. For instance, two professors from Ekaterinburg argued, “The teaching of theology and catechism in a state school constitutes a ‘time bomb’ and is in conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. ...”54 Likewise, Vyacheslav Bocharov, an atheist logic professor at Moscow State University asked, “Why should I ... an atheist and taxpayer finance from my pocket the activities of my ideological enemies?”55 The Orthodox authors countered that the guidelines could be adopted by other faiths. After all, the Ministry’s standard for theology programs leaves room for confessional courses in addition to the required disciplines such as History of World Religions, Philosophy of Religion, Religious Ethics, Religion and Science, Church

52 Ibid., p. 13.
53 Byron MacWilliams. The Orthodox Church will Battle Atheism at Russian Universities. – The Chronicle of Higher Education, 46, 2000, A74.
55 MacWilliams 2000, A74.
Despite the controversy and opposition from religious studies faculty at state universities, theology departments began to develop in institutions such as Tula State University and Tver State University. Now there are over twenty other Russian institutions of higher education with degrees in theology while private non-Orthodox higher education institutions have also begun to build their theology curriculum around the state standard. Overall, it appears the Russian Ministry of Education will allow a limited form of managed historical pluralism when it comes to theology programs (e.g., Orthodox and Islamic) with the actual result being a partial establishment of Orthodoxy.

### 3.1. Private Education

When it comes to private religious education, the major church-state issues in most liberal democracies concern funding and regulation. A basic pattern in Russia has emerged in which the funding approach follows the American strict church-state separation model, but the regulation of private primary, secondary, and higher education institutions fluctuates between managed historical pluralism and structural pluralism.

**Private Primary and Secondary Schools**

As mentioned above, religious forms of private education for primary and secondary schools existed in Russia before the Revolution. These schools exhibited a range of diversity. For instance, Darinskii notes that before the Revolution there were over seventy private secondary institutions in St. Petersburg with over half of them being gymnasiums for females, while the others included both classical and non-classical education as well as

---


57 State institutions that have begun to offer theology majors include a variety of institutions such as large research universities (e.g., Omsk State University, Belgorod State University, Ryazan State University), teacher training universities (e.g., Nizhii Novgorod State Pedagogical University, Ural Pedagogical University, Yaroslavl Pedagogical University), and other specialized schools (e.g., Russian State Social University, Moscow State Linguistics University, Murmansk State Technical University).
technical or commercial training. Most of these schools also required Orthodox education as part of the curriculum.

After the fall of communism, private primary and secondary schools once again immediately emerged with some schools starting even before the 1992 Law of the Russian Federation on Education made their existence legal. Estimates hold that within five years, anywhere from 600 to 700 private schools existed in Russia. These new schools also show a significant amount of diversity, although they focus more on elite education. For instance, a late 1990s survey of private schools in St. Petersburg found that one-third were elite private schools, while only thirteen of the sixty-seven were religious schools. Moreover, only three of the schools were Russian Orthodox. Another survey discovered similar results, although the fact that both surveys were undertaken in the diverse city of St. Petersburg should be taken into consideration. In addition, it is also likely that many non-confessional elite schools also teach a religiously-based form of moral education.

Church-state problems have emerged for only some of the schools with regard to government regulation. The 1997 religion law, “On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations,” reaffirmed the right of religious organizations to create educational institutions; however, the law preserved this right only for “traditional confessions,” Russian Orthodoxy, Judaism, Buddhism, and Islam. As a result, nontraditional religiously-affiliated schools associated with Hasidic Jews, Episcopalians, Lutherans, Roman Catholics, the Unification Church, and Seventh Day Adventists have been subject to government restrictions and harassment. Since they do not receive government funding and many Russians cannot afford the cost, a number of these schools receive foreign financial aid.

Numerous “private” Orthodox schools have also started. Recently, it was estimated that there were approximately 100 Orthodox schools and

---

60 Ibid.
61 Darinskii 1998, p. 27.
62 For example, see N. Maandi, “Education Plus ...,” Russian Education and Society 41, no. 7 (1999): 68–73.
64 Elena Lisovskaya; Vyacheslav Karpov. The Perplexed World of Russian Private Schools: Findings from Field Research. – Comparative Education, 37/2001, pp. 43–64.
gymnasiums in Russia, with twenty located in Moscow. It remains unclear what role the ROC played in founding and funding new Orthodox schools, since reports indicate that the official ROC offers these private ventures little financial help. Orthodox schools, as well as schools started by traditional religious confessions, have not faced nearly as much government harassment or restrictions.

One of the major church-state issues regarding religious schools in liberal democracies concerns state funding. The 1992 law, on paper, allowed for the equal funding of these schools and some hope existed at that time that such funding would become available. Currently, private religious schools in Russia, even Orthodox private schools, have not received such aid from the federal government. Fr Ioann Ekonomtsev, the leader of Russian Orthodox education, wished for the issue of Orthodox schools to be resolved similar to the way religious schools operate in Western Europe, by receiving full financial support from the government. When asked which groups should receive funding, Ekonomtsev stated, “Without question all religious entities that are recognized by the state should receive state support. There should be no question about that.” In other words, he acknowledged some respect for pluralism, but it was only the managed historical pluralism affirmed in the 1997 law. Although the ROC has failed to receive federal funding for schools, it has been successful at procuring funds from local authorities in various cities and regions. In an example of partial establishment at the local level, in February 2005, the Moscow City Duma made a decision to provide funding for Orthodox schools out of the regional budget. The ROC has also pressed the Russian government for the return of ROC school buildings taken by the communist government shortly after the Revolution. Currently, the ROC is unsatisfied with the state government’s progress in this matter.

66 Lisovskaya, Karpov 2001, p. 58.
68 Fr Ioann Ekonomtsev, interview by co-authors, Moscow, May 18, 2005.
70 Ekonomtsev, interview.
Private Higher Education

After the fall of communism, the state granted a degree of autonomy in higher education that Russia had never before experienced. In the context of this freedom, private seminaries, academies, and institutes began to reemerge. In addition, another type of institution not previously present on Russian soil also began to take root and grow – religious liberal arts colleges.

Private Confessional Seminaries. Whereas only three seminaries existed prior to perestroika, by 2001, the state registry included 203 theological institutions of different faiths. 71 In 2005, the Moscow Patriarchate’s official web site listed two theological academies, twenty seminaries and twenty pre-seminaries in Russia, 72 and the East-Asian Accrediting Association of Evangelical Schools listed eighteen member Bible schools, theological institutes, and seminaries from Russia. 73 This listing does not include a number of foreign institutions, Pentecostal schools, or mainline Protestant institutions.

According to the 1997 law, however, only centralized religious organizations may create seminaries for professional religious education. The Russian government, nonetheless, does not dictate the content of theological education provided by confessional higher education institutions. Religious groups with legal status in Russia have the freedom to offer courses that suit their distinctive beliefs and practices. As part of the licensing process, the government only regulates those aspects of the work of theological institutions dealing with health and safety standards, as well as other areas that are not directly related to the content of education. 74

The most recent church-state controversy with regard to confessional schools involved the issue of state accreditation. As these theological institutions developed and started to expand their academic programs to include non-theological majors, their leadership began to raise questions concerning the possibility of acquiring state accreditation. In a centralized system of higher education such as Russia’s, the importance of state accreditation can

71 There were 46 Orthodox, 114 Muslim, 17 Evangelical, Baptist and Pentecostal, 5 Jewish, 4 Anglican and 5 pagan registered institutions. These numbers have stayed fairly steady in the following years.
hardly be over-estimated. Accreditation provides numerous benefits for the students, including deferments from the military and discounted passes for public transportation and museums. More important, it helps assure potential employers of the quality of education received by a student or graduate of an accredited institute or university. Finally, state accreditation helps raise the overall prestige of the higher education institution. It is not surprising, therefore, that theological institutions decided to seek accreditation.

However, as leaders of non-Orthodox theological institutions approached the Ministry of Education requesting accreditation, they encountered opposition. In an open letter to President Putin, Pentecostal leader Sergei Riakhovskii even accused Ministry of Education officials of “blocking this decision in the spirit of atheistic persecutions.” In response to these concerns, the Russian government requested the Institute for State and Religion of the Russian Academy of Sciences to examine the legal provisions for the accreditation of theological institutions. The Institute pointed out the unwarranted biases in the Ministry’s approach to the issue and affirmed the possibility of granting state accreditation to those programs at theological institutions that meet government standards since, “The Russian legislation allows for the accreditation of private religious educational institutions ... if the offered programs comply with state educational standards.”

Private Christian Colleges, Academies, and Institutes. The fall of communism also created another unique phenomenon related to religion and education – the emergence of the private college, academy, and institute. As mentioned earlier, the origins of Russian higher education were decidedly secular since “... from the beginning, the influence of the church on the Russian universities was very limited.” The Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, founded in 1724 by Peter the Great, and the Imperial Moscow
University, founded in 1755 under Empress Elizabeth, originated with the sanction and support of secular-minded rulers for national and civic purposes. They were also established without the support of the Orthodox Church, which even regarded these institutions with suspicion. Neither institution had a theological faculty or department. Instead, the training of priests was left to the ecclesiastical seminaries. Nonstate or private universities emerged in Russia in the late 1800s and the early 1900s. However, the fifty-nine private institutions were not controlled by the church. After the fall of the Tsarist regime, this group of institutions was easily disbanded or taken over by the Communists.

With the fall of communism, the number of private educational institutions quickly mushroomed so that by 2003, there were 570 non-state institutions (337 with state accreditation) enrolling over 750,000 students. Because the role of religious groups in the creation of institutions of higher education is a new phenomenon in Russia, only a small percentage of these present private universities are religious.

The current situation with religious colleges and universities is even more diverse than the situation with private secondary and elementary institutions. Currently, at least ten private religious educational institutions attempt to offer academic training beyond theology or are in the process of expanding their schools to do more than train clergy. They include two institutions that the ROC officially recognizes, three broadly Christian institutions, a Seventh Day Adventist Christian school which accepts students from any background, and two Muslim, one Buddhist, and one Christian institution that were originally started to train religious professionals (mullahs, monks, and pastors), but will soon be expanding their offerings (cultural studies and social work). Finally, one of the earliest organizations is the Jewish University in Moscow which was started in 1991 and accredited in 1993 by the Russian Ministry of Education.

Like primary schools, these institutions face two major challenges with regard to church-state relations. The issue of funding, one might argue though, is really not a major concern. According to our interviews conducted in 2005 with officials at these schools, not one of the schools receives any direct government aid. The ROC universities received some of their buildings from the government, but in both cases, the buildings belonged to

---

78 Ibid.
the ROC before the Revolution. For the most part, the federal government practices a separationist approach when it comes to funding.

The major challenge each of these institutions faces with regard to the state concerns regulations set forth by the Ministry of Science and Education. When interviewed, leaders responded that any difficulties with the Ministry of Education pertained less to church-state issues and more to bureaucratic problems. Possible church-state difficulties only emerged at two particular points. First, colleges that were not Orthodox and had some foreign influence experienced problems. For example, although the Muslim institution in Moscow did not report experiencing any problems, the Russian Islamic University in Kazan has experienced regulatory problems. The state has not licensed or accredited the secular curriculum that prevents students from transferring or gaining credit from secular institutions. In addition, their contacts with foreign Islamic scholars have been limited.\textsuperscript{82} Likewise, one Christian school official mentioned some difficulties with accreditation due to the Christian nature of the institution. She noted:

There were countless governmental organizations we needed to go to. There were several officials who would rip up my documents and demand that I leave their offices. They did this as soon as they saw the name of RACU – Russian-American Christian Institute. One of the officials began to yell, stamp his feet, and said that there cannot be Christianity in America and that all of us sold ourselves to the Americans. There were many negative experiences like that. The problem was that without his signature I could not get a signature of the Head of the Licensing Department. . . .\textsuperscript{83}

Later, the same official reportedly told this individual that RACU would never get a license or accreditation. Despite this claim, the professor working on accreditation was able to appeal to the official’s supervisor to obtain the necessary signatures for accreditation. Moreover, it appears from this example, the hostility of the official may have related less to the religious nature of the institution and more to the foreign connections of this university.

The second problem mentioned involved flexibility with the curriculum. The centralized nature of Russian education and the fact that the Ministry of Education controls the curriculum content for majors means these colleges have only a limited ability to include their special courses. Professors and administrators at one Christian college in particular emphasized that they would

\textsuperscript{82} Byron MacWilliams. In Russia, a Small Islamic University is a Large Political Thorn. – The Chronicle of Higher Education, 48/2002, A43, 2p, 2c.

\textsuperscript{83} Erna Abramyan, Deputy to Vice-President for Academic Affairs, interview by co-authors, digital recording, Moscow, May 15, 2005.
like to have additional room to include courses addressing a Christian worldview, but that the set curriculum limited them. However, other universities reported that they were able to work within the prescribed curriculum.

4. Conclusion

Overall, as this cursory overview demonstrates, the Russian government shows little consistency in its approach to church-state issues in education. In some of its building projects, past educational initiatives, and local funding initiatives of private schools, some parts of the government appear to promote an establishment model that favors the Orthodox Church. Yet, at one point soon after communism and more recently in one of its approaches to vospitanie and religious education in state schools, the government promotes structural pluralism. Moreover, in its federal funding of religious educations or charities or how it recently approaches religious content in public school curriculum, the government appears to take a strict separatist stance.

If any generalization can be made, it might be said that the state affirms strict separationism when it comes to funding, and managed historical pluralism when it comes to regulating religion in state or private education. This trend has actually resulted in religious groups becoming more entrepreneurial contributors to education in civil society. The Orthodox Church, however, does not perceive itself as benefiting from such a situation, and will likely continue to press for managed pluralism or partial establishment, especially in funding. This later development will not only likely prove disadvantageous to new religious groups in Russia, but will continue to undermine Russia’s adherence to international agreements regarding religious liberty. Nonetheless, it would not make Russia’s approach to religious liberty outside the norm of other countries considered to be liberal democracies.

Bibliography


MacWilliams, Byron. In Russia, a Small Islamic University is a Large Political Thorn. – The Chronicle of Higher Education, 48/2002, A43, 2p, 2c.
MacWilliams, Byron. The Orthodox Church will Battle Atheism at Russian Universities. – The Chronicle of Higher Education, 46, 2000, A74.


