Terrorism, its Past, Present and Future Developments

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The events of 11 September 2001 have made it painfully clear even to an uninformed observer that we have entered a period of history when states and even superpowers can be challenged in unorthodox ways. Such challenges may come from within states and be backed by a variety of parties.

Today, in 2007, we find ourselves in a world where there is an ongoing ‘war on terror’. Is this the first time that states have faced the challenge of terrorism? Who are these ‘terrorists’ and what is this ‘terror’ that is being fought, and what are our chances of success?

These questions form the basis of the present study. It is designed as a review of the history, effectiveness, incidence, and the foreseeable future of terrorism. The emphasis is put on highlighting the trends and regularities involving terrorism to develop a general understanding of this phenomenon.

Adopting the definition of terrorism as a tactic of instilling fear, the study outlines four major waves of international terrorism of which the religious wave is currently sweeping the world. While the incidence and destructiveness of terrorism in daily life in developed states have been quite low after 2001, terrorists have succeeded in becoming the focus of public attention and there is always the ‘shadow of the future’ with the threat of possibly more destructive terrorist acts. Al-Qaeda appears as an exception among terrorist organisations. It has evolved from a terrorist organisation and, subsequently, from a network of organisations into a self-funded global Islamic movement that is very skilfully tapping into the grievances of Muslims all over the world. It has mastered all means and possibilities of the global society to engage more and more people, and exert stronger pressure on target governments. The war between the developed world and al-Qaeda is as much a war of ideas as it is a physical war.

Therefore, it is has been suggested that to tackle al-Qaeda and organise the global ‘war on terror’ is a global counterinsurgency campaign. The immediate steps in that campaign ought to focus on discrediting the ideology of al-Qaeda, taking advantage of ethnic and religious differences in al-Qaeda, re-evaluating the approach to cyber warfare with the aim of en-
hancing the capability to monitor the information flows on the web. In short, there seem to be no short-term solutions to reducing terrorism.

The study begins by discussing the meaning of ‘terrorism’ and reviewing some of the definitions used. It is then followed by a historical characterisation and overview of the incidence of terrorism in the present-day world. The next section addresses the effectiveness of terrorism and the variables influencing it, with a special emphasis on incidents of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. The overviews of the general features of terrorist organisations and of the nature of ‘war on terror’ take the discussion further. The study concludes with an assessment of the possible future of terrorism (al-Qaeda, in particular) and outlines some ways and measures for tackling it.

**Ambivalent role of religion in international relations**

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This article analyses the role of religion in international relations and conflicts in three time periods.

The first part addresses the interaction of religion and international relations in the Western world, considering three periods in history:

1) The Middle Ages (from the fourth century until 1648), when ‘politics were subordinated to religion’. It was not so much the church that controlled the state, but rather religion was controlling the whole system of international politics. The powers of both church and state came from God. Both the state and the church were parts of a religious universe. Within such a framework, the church had a distinctive power to give the legitimate right of rule and conquest to the earthly rulers. The church sanctioned international treaties and conducted international diplomacy.

2) The age of nation states, modernity and ideologies started with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991). During this period, “religion was subordinated to politics” or to the sovereign nation-states which were the main actors in the system of international relations. The power of the state was not limited by the church or religion. Secular international relations theory and secular ideologies dominated international relations during the 19th and 20th centuries, although religious features were still present in colonial conquests and international wars, in ideologies like Nationalism, Communism and Fascism, in World Wars, and even in Cold War confrontations. A substantial ‘comeback’ of
religion began in the defeat of secular Arabism during the Six-Days War (1967), which boosted political Islam in the Middle East, Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), the increasing influence of the religious right in the US, liberation ideologies in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, and the Catholic Solidarity Movement in Communist Poland during the 1980s.

3) Since the end of the Cold War (1991), the third period emerged, where ‘religion is in politics’. While religion is engaged with several major international conflicts, in contemporary politics, unlike in previous periods, religion can neither control the state nor be controlled by the state.

The second part of the article maps contemporary theoretical approaches to religion in international relations. Some scholars exclude the independent influence of religion and argue that the real causes and solutions of conflicts are not related to religion; others argue that at times religion has been directly related to either the cause or goal of the conflict, or in legitimising violence during conflict. Marc Juergensmeyer has even claimed that a global ‘New Cold War’ is taking place between the secular state and religious nationalism. The ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis of Samuel P. Huntington links global conflicts to religion in an indirect manner - religion is one of the main characteristics of civilizations, but the main emphasis of Huntington is not on religion per se, but on civilizations.

The article concludes with the discussion about the positive and negative aspects of religion in international conflicts. Religion can be a powerful weapon both for good and evil. Religion may justify conflict and violence, but it can also promote inter-religious dialogue and conflict resolution. Religion has justified discrimination, torture, genocide, intolerance, ethnic conflict and racism, but it has also inspired protest against such manifestations, and movements for peace and democracy, human dignity and the rights of the citizen.

In analysing religion as an escalator of conflicts, one should remember that the respective religious traditions and doctrines also have a potential for peace, and it may be religion that can become a vital source for the solution of the problems that are related to the same religion. And vice versa, in treating the positive functions of religion—religious diplomacy and the dialogue between civilizations or religions—one should not forget the dangers related to the political use of religion.

The scholars should avoid unfounded broad generalizations of the political role of religion. They ought to evaluate in more detail the character of the use of religion by specific persons, groups, movements or states.
Limits to Freedom of Expression

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Freedom of expression is not just an expression of unambiguous human right. Any individual and any state may have different conceptions of to whom and under what circumstances this freedom is permitted. When defining freedom of expression, a special emphasis should be placed on its limits. Due to variations of these limits in both time and space, the emergence of conflicts over freedom of speech are difficult to foresee.

This article gives an overview of the concepts of freedom of speech and its limits in the contemporary society. Three conflicts causing the debate over freedom of speech are analysed: the cases of Salman Rushdie, David Irving and Natalie Maines. Although these cases had significantly different causes, there can still be some common traits as essential primary causes of the ‘freedom of speech conflict’. These primary causes also delineate thematic areas, where the debaters should be cautious and should take good care not to exceed the ‘limits of freedom of speech’ with their arguments.

Most often, conflicts over the freedom of speech deal with highly sensitive issues, where the society, or more precisely different societies have historically established patterns of thought. With their arguments, the participants in the conflict do not violate existing written laws (although one of the cases in this article is an exception), but, on the contrary, are practicing their most self-evident human right – to speak freely. While discussing topics like religion and politics or questioning the generally acknowledged approaches to history, the unwritten laws such as different moral norms, conventions and traditions should also be taken into consideration.

The article argues that the limits of the freedom of speech are changing in time and that conflicts between different opinions cannot be avoided. Such a conclusion, however, also has its positive side. Freedom of speech is an integral concept of democracy. Democratic societies welcome pluralism of opinions, as it enables them to seek and find the best solutions possible. New solutions, moreover, enable them to avoid the stagnation of society. In order that democracy can be sustained, it has to be continuously recreated. This is exactly the task that is performed by social conflicts, including debates over the freedom of speech. Conflicts help to concentrate public attention on respective themes. In the process of public debate the themes are discussed in depth, the principles existing in society are tested and further elaborated upon if there is a need.

The article concludes with the statement that while the restriction of the freedom of speech may often be useful on the level of the individual, society
or state, however, on the level of humankind, freedom of speech most definitely contributes to its progress.

**Modelling the Tropospheric Water Vapour**

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Using the Global Positioning System (GPS) in meteorology requires both a state of the art knowledge and some information about the regional specialities and technical setup. Numerical simulation, an imitation of the process on a computer, is an efficient and well-known way to study the process, if both time and money are of consideration. This paper aims to give an Estonian reader a short overview of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and to explain some of the main principles of radio signal propagation in the atmosphere. Iono- and tropospheric refractions have been referred to as the main factors causing signal delay, and some delay determination methods have been explained. A method for the detection and monitoring of the tropospheric water vapor and its modeling possibility are described. The first results are provided for a fixed geographical point (Tartu, 58°23′30″ N, 26°41′41″ E, with the antenna height of 75.80 m from the ellipsoid). The goal of the simulation is to imitate the distribution of tropospheric water. The article describes one possible mathematical approach to the construction of the virtual ground-based GPS-receiver network and discretisation of the troposphere.

As an example, the situation is modelled, where the required information for the water vapour content surveillance in the lower layer of the atmosphere comes from ground-based GPS-receivers and meteorological sensors. The overview presented in this article is part of the task related to the development of an optimal method for spatial distribution of GPS-receivers and the detection of the tropospheric water vapour in a specific geographical area.
How literate are contemporary people?

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Research on reading comprehension and reading literacy has a long historical tradition (Thorndike, 1973), and is a worldwide research topic supported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2000). There is data available from different periods reflecting changes in reading over time.

Although reading research has a long history, there is no concordance between the authors about the development of literacy. Some researchers claim that reading skills in the USA are in decline. Others, however, suggest modest gains. A study in Sweden shows no changes in reading skills over 21 years (Taube, 1993).

In 1990–1991, the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) carried out an international project (involving 32 countries) on evaluating the reading literacy of schoolchildren in two age cohorts: 9- and 14-year-olds (1994; Elley, 1992). A special research procedure was elaborated by the IEA for both groups. The reading literacy score was computed as the sum of the scores on three subscales based on different types of texts: narratives, expository, and documents. Narratives measured comprehension of narrative, emotional texts, while expository texts measured comprehension of informational, textbook like texts, and documents measured the comprehension of tables, figures, maps, etc.

In 1994, the IEA literacy tests were translated into Estonian and data was collected (Must, 1998). The testing was carried out in accordance with IEA requirements: two age groups were tested: 9-year-olds (3rd grade students) and 14-year-olds (8th grade students). A stratified random sampling procedure was used. The general population was divided into three layers according to the degree of urbanization: the capital city, small towns and rural areas. The unit of selection was the school-class and this led to a small difference (<4%) between the planned and actual sample sizes. The size of the sample was planned to be 1500 students in both populations. Five years later, research was continued using the same methodology and database.

In 1994, the 9-year-old students attended the 3rd grade. In 1999, those students were 14 years old and attended the 8th grade. This meant that in the same methodological framework it was possible to carry out longitudinal research and to measure the same students twice: in the 3rd and in the 8th grade, and thus evaluate the students’ progress during the 5-year interval.
The second testing was carried out in 50% of the schools where the first testing had taken place (with every second school studied). Unfortunately, after 5 years, there was some attrition from the first wave because of dropouts, changes of school, etc. Consequently, only 522 students from the original sample (37%, not 50%) were re-tested. The sample was biased toward better students.

The mean reading score of the re-tested sample was higher by 0.19 S.D.s in its original third grade marks compared with the full 3rd grade sample. Thus, the second cohort had dropped some students with low scores. This sample bias needed to be corrected. The mean test score of the 8th graders in 1999 was on average 0.41 S.D.s better than the scores in the same grade in 1994. Yet because the sample of 1999 is biased towards higher scorers, the raw change should be corrected for this sample bias (-0.19 S.D. units). After correcting for this bias, a rough estimate is possible of an average gain of 0.22 S.D.s for the total score. The most impressive gain was in the document subscale (0.52 S.D.s); the change was minimal in the narrative subscale (0.07 S.D.s), and intermediate in the expository subscale (0.19 S.D.s).

But contemporary life is more challenging than only reading literacy. The emergence of a large amount of visual stimuli in the mass media over the last decade requires visual literature skills of the consumers in reading and use of symbols. The researchers, as well as educators, have stressed the necessity of teaching and learning visual analysis (Considine, Haley 1999; Handbook of Visual Analysis 2003). In lists of papers published in the last ten years, the concepts of mathematical, technical, visual, military etc literacy can be found.

Literacy is not related to a specific period of life (childhood, school etc). It is the network of skills, knowledge and strategies which people build up throughout their life time when communicating with different people in different contexts and solving different problems.

**The Efficiency of Teaching Physics and Enhancement Opportunities**

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People engaged in educational activities have most probably read, heard or used the terms *learning efficiency* or *teaching efficiency*. But what is really meant by them?
But how can learning results be measured or assessed? It is easy to measure results in industry where production results are products, as stated in economic theory: "Efficiency is producing maximum quantity of products using existing resources." At the same time, resources do not give a generally accepted method of measuring the efficiency of learning. Therefore our objective was to specify the term learning efficiency in order to find the most suitable formula for calculating it, and to put it into practice in the Estonian National Defence College. At the same time, we tried to establish possible factors that enable the enhancement of the efficiency of teaching physics.

First we determined „the production“ of teaching and learning. This “production” is new knowledge and skills. Thus - using the analogy with the above definition, one can state that the efficiency of teaching and learning means acquiring maximum quantity of new knowledge and skills using existing resources.

As it is difficult to estimate the maximum potential for acquisition of new knowledge and skills, we aimed at determining the quantity of new knowledge and skills as such.

To measure this, we used the results of one and the same test that the students took before and after learning this specific material. The tests were called pre-test and post-test respectively.

The difference between the results of these two tests is efficiency $E$

$$ E = T_j - T_e $$

where

$$ T_e = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} n_i}{N \cdot n} \text{ result of the pre-test; } $$

$$ T_j = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} n_i}{N \cdot n} \text{ result of the post-test; } $$

$N$ – number of students who took the test;
$n$ – number of questions in the test;
$n_i$ – number of correct answers by one student.

Based on the results of the questionnaires we established the factors which predominantly enhance the learning efficiency of physics:

- awareness and consideration of students’ personal learning style;
- taking into consideration the students’ prior knowledge;
teacher’s competence in the subject and pedagogical skills;
- wide use of laboratory tests and solving tasks;
- selection of the method for assessing the learning results.

**Jürgen Fahrensbach (1551/1552–1602).**
The War Record of an Estonian-Born Military Commander

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“In Karkus haeres, palatinus Vendensis, militiae nobilitatis Livonicae, Tervenensis, Ruginensisque etc praefectus” – i.e “Heir of Karksi, Voivode of Võnnu, Chief of the Knighthood of Livonia, Chief of Tarvastu, Ruhja etc.”

Jürgen (Georg) Farensbach [(Low German Varenssbecke) (Lat. Georgius Farensbecius), in Russian sources Юрий Францбек and in Polish Jerzy Farensbach (1551/52 – 17 May 1602 in Viljandi)], was born into an influential noble family of the Saare-Lääne bishopric with manors in Läänemaa and a home church in Märjamaa. He spent his youth during the time when the Old Livonian Confederation was breaking down and its final collapse during the beginning of the Livonian War (1558-1583), which brought about overall chaos in the territories of present-day Estonia and Latvia. As a result of the so-called centennial war held in these territories during the 16th–17th century, the borders of power were redistributed throughout the North-East of Europe.

The territory of the Saare-Lääne bishopric, which had been transferred from the King of Denmark into the possession of Duke Magnus, became a battleground once again during the Nordic Seven Years’ War (1563–1570). The Swedes conquered the land and seized the fortresses; and the leaders of the nobility of Läänemaa were imprisoned and taken to Sweden. It is supposed that the teenage Jürgen Farensbach ended up in Sweden with his uncle, where he studied the basics of warcraft and allegedly recruited his first commando of mercenaries. According to the sources, he moved around in Europe as a member of a group of mercenaries (landsknecht), fighting in France, Hungary and finally in the Netherlands. His going to Sweden is just a speculation; his return to Estonia in 1569 or 1570 is certain; and when he was 18, he entered the Swedish service as the captain (Rittmeister) of Livonian mercenaries under the command of his uncle Klaus Kursell. After returning to his home country he also participated in the rebellion against the
Swedes in Tallinn, in February 1570, led by Klaus Kursell. It was caused by the long-term failure to pay the salary of three companies of Livonian mercenaries (called Hofleute). The rebellion was suppressed in a sudden attack by the Swedes during which the leaders of the rebellion were imprisoned, but Farensbach managed to escape to Läänemaa. Thereafter, he was imprisoned by the Russians and taken to Moscow where Czar Ivan IV appointed him as the chief of the German, i.e. foreign mercenaries. Farensbach also gathered mercenaries from Livonia into the service of Moscow, fighting successfully against the Tartars, as well as compatriots in the membership of Russian troops. Farensbach fought in important battles in Russian history that took place in 1572 – the Okaa or Molod battle crushing the Crimean Tartars.

In autumn 1572, Farensbach escaped to Vienna to Kaiser Maximilian, through Tartar territories; and soon after that yet further on into the service of the King of Denmark Frederik II. From 1572 to 1579, Farensbach served as the Hofmarschall of the King of Denmark in Copenhagen. In 1577, he participated by the order of King Frederik II in the successful defence of Danzig against the king of Poland Stefan Bathory. During the period of 1579-1584 Farensbach worked as the royal Danish regent in Saaremaa, ruling it almost independently due to the fact that he had the full trust of the King.

At the end of the year 1579, the Swedes and Poles established an alliance against the Russians. Stefan Bathory decided to invite Jürgen Farensbach to lead the German mercenaries and with the permission of Frederik II, the King of Denmark, he participated in the campaigns of Stefan Bathory against the Russians at Velikie Luki and Pskov during the years of 1580-1581. On 12 July 1580, Jürgen Farensbach joined the Polish army with his 100 German-type cavalrymen (rajtars) and 50 musketeers at Bielno and moved on towards Velikie Luki. Farensbach was in the redoubts on the front line and proposed taking the fortress by storm. On 5 September 1580, the Polish conquered Velikie Luki and Farensbach was injured.

On his way back through Courland to his premises in Saaremaa, Farensbach met Sophie (Sofia) von der Recke (born Fircks) in Turaida. Jürgen Farensbach, who was 27 years old at that time, fell in love with Sophie who was ten years older than him, and asked her to marry him. Sophie accepted Farensbach’s proposal and they were married.

Soon, Stefan Bathory called Farensbach back to military activities. The advance guards of Poland arrived under Pskov on 24 August 1581, and in addition to the considerable Hungarian military contingent, Bathory had approximately 500 German and 250 Livonian horsemen and a foreign infantry regiment with 1,600 Germans and 250 Scotsmen under Pskov. Farensbach was sent to conquer the Pskov monastery; however, after some
failed attacks he returned to Pskov. On 15 January 1582, the Jam Zapolski armistice was agreed upon. After concluding the armistice, Farensbach returned to Saaremaa.

For his military merits, Bathory granted Farensbach the Karksi castle with one thousand peasants; and, in addition, Stefan Bathory proposed that Farensbach should enter the Polish service on a permanent basis, offering him the position of the Voivode of Võnnu (Cesis). Farensbach presented Bathory’s offer to Frederik II, but the king disagreed.

After the death of Duke Magnus in 1583, the relationship between Denmark and Poland got aggravated due to the issue of the ownership of Piltene. Jürgen Farensbach tried to facilitate a truce between the parties, but Frederik II of Denmark started, and with good reason, suspecting Farensbach of being too Poland-friendly in this situation. Stefan Bathory tried to win Farensbach over and offered him the position of the Regent of Piltene.

Frederik II sent two commissars as his representatives to Saaremaa who, by the order of the king, took over the management of Saaremaa. The leading figures of the nobility of Saaremaa stood up for him and prepared themselves to protect Saaremaa by force. Farensbach manned the Kuressaare castle with the nobility of Saaremaa and a new protection team and asked them to pledge allegiance to him. In this situation Farensbach believed that this might lead to a punitive Danish excursion and went to Prussia to seek mediation by Duke Georg Friedrich. A councillor of the duke, Levin von Bulaw, tried to conciliate King Frederik II personally, but the King was irreconcilable; and the new commissars with the Danish navy, led by State Admiral Hak Holgersohn, set sail in order to win Saaremaa back. There was no battle due to the fact that the protective team of Kuressaare surrendered after six days.

With the mediation of the Duke of Prussia, Poland and Denmark achieved an agreement on the issue of Piltene; and the Kronenberg agreement was concluded between Denmark and Poland on 15 April 1585, in which, however, Farensbach was not mentioned. The conflict with the Danish King was settled disadvantageously for Farensbach, but in order to make up for the material benefits that Farensbach lost in the agreement, Bathory ensured him with the position of Voivode of Võnnu, appointing him additionally as the Chief of Tarvastu castle (Hauptmann von Tarvast) and gave him Karksi with its lands as a bequeathable estate. Thus, at the age of thirty-three, he was the chief of all the Polish troops in Livonia and in principal the Vice-Regent of Northern Livonia. Farensbach was also the captain of the nobility force of Livonia, Field Marshal (Landmarschall) and Commander-in-Chief of the local defence forces whose task it was to organise the defence of the Polish territories north of the Daugava River.
In 1586, after the death of the Polish King Stefan Bathory, Farensbach started to support the candidacy of Sigismund (Zygmunt III Vasa) who was of Swedish origin. In 1587, the forces of Sigismund’s rival for the throne of Poland, Austrian archduke Maximilian, attacked the city of Krakow, in the defence of which Farensbach also participated, leading infantry regiments of German mercenaries. On 14 January 1588, the decisive Byczyna (Pitschen) battle in the Polish monarchy crisis was fought, where Sigismund’s supporters won a decisive victory over the forces of Maximilian. German horsemen led by Farensbach (recruited from Livonia) played an important role in crushing the Austrians. Sigismund III confirmed all the benefits given to Farensbach, who had chosen the “right” side during the monarchy crisis – the benefits granted to him during the times of Stefan Bathory – and added some more, e.g. the Tarvastu area and the Ruhja manor with the villages and other accessories (1588). At the same time, Farensbach was appointed the hetman1 of the Livonian knighthood; and he received a pension in the amount of 2,000 thalers. Thus, Farensbach was the hetman commander-in-chief of the home guard of the hetman-Livonia nobility (in Polish ‘shlahta’). The next ten years of Farensbach’s life passed in the service of the King as an official in Võnnu and Riga, where he participated in securing the Polish rule and tried to solve fights between the Catholics and Lutherans.

In 1598, the movement against Sigismund III in Sweden became a military action, which in the year 1600 developed into a war between Sweden and Poland. Farensbach did not miss it and took part in the battles in Sweden (in the membership of the mercenaries of Sigismund III against the future King of Sweden Karl IX) and in fighting back the Swedes from Livonia during 1601–1602, where a bullet injured him during the siege of the Viljandi fortress on 16 May 1602. The lethally injured Farensbach was taken to the Polish camp, where he died a day later; i.e. on 17 May 1602 when the Viljandi fortress surrendered to the Poles.

The Lääne County-born nobleman who probably had Estonian roots was a very good linguist – besides German he could speak Estonian. Farensbach was a devoted supporter of the King of Poland Sigismund III but he spoke German and was a Lutheran. This man became an outstanding soldier and commander during the wars of the 2nd half of the 16th century in North-Eastern Europe. Not taking into account some lost battles (such as the Stangerbo in 1598), Farensbach can be considered as a successful commander. As declared by many sources, he was good at getting along with mercenaries. Without doubt, Farensbach’s participation in the Molod battle was a turning point in the history of Russia, and the Byczyna battle

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1 Commander-in-chief of the Polish-Lithuanian forces from the 15th to the 18th century.
that took place during the Polish monarchy crisis, make him an internationally recognized commander.

The Adenauer’s Secret and the Emergence of the Bundeswehr Within the Walls of the Monastery. Some Remarks on the Birth of the Bundeswehr

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In 2005 Bundeswehr celebrated its 50th anniversary. Whereas envisioned and planned by former Wehrmacht generals, Bundeswehr is known as a defence organisation of a new and democratic Germany, and it is based on a new set of principles.

At the end of the Second World War Germany lost its independence; it was divided into occupation zones and fully disarmed. All military activities became punishable crime in Germany and it was hoped that the military backbone of Germany was broken for good. Many Europeans witnessed these developments with a great relief in light of Germany’s militaristic past. Yet the times were changing rapidly: the ‘hot’ world war was soon followed by a ‘cold’ war between the Soviet Union and its former Western allies. Western Europe became terrified of thought of Soviet invasion and the defence contribution of then demilitarised Germany became sought after.

A group of people gathered in one of Bonn’s equestrian halls on 12 November 1955 – on the 200th birthday of von Scharnhorst – one of the prominent reformers of Prussian military. Some of them wore uniforms, majority were in civilian clothes. Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic Theodor Blank handed over military identity certificates to 101 volunteers (among them were two former Wehrmacht Lieutenant Generals – Adolf Heusinger and Hans Speidel). Blank also outlined the political profile of a ‘New Wehrmacht’ that was to become an organic part of a new parliamentary state. That modest gathering was decorated by large Prussian Iron Cross that Wehrmacht had used as an award. That was the day that is considered as a birthday of Wehrmacht.

However, was that particular meeting the true beginning of Bundeswehr? The process of Bundeswehr’s birth spanned almost a decade and there were many crucial events and dates. 1955 is still very important year and events that happened then illustrate Bundeswehr’s evolution. The new German military organisation was initially not called ‘Bundeswehr’, but simply ‘armed forces’ or, in some circles, even ‘New Wehrmacht’ indicating its
close connection to German military history. Wehrmacht’s capitulation in 1945 opened the way for Western allies to re-shape Europe and it was their vision of Europe and their policies that largely shaped founding and development of Bundeswehr as well. Germany’s chosen democratic path of development and evolving sovereignty required subordination of military sphere to the liberal and legal norms of democratic constitution of Germany. Konrad Adenauer led Germany gradually toward national sovereignty and one of its constituent parts was the existence national armed forces. The full integration of Germany into various structures was a clever political strategy of Adenauer resulting in various benefits – including NATO security guarantees – through memberships in various political and economic unions.

It was primarily in the interest of US occupation forces that Germany made its contribution to the collective defence of Western Europe. Adenauer saw in it a welcome opportunity for Germany to become an equal partner with other Western European states. The old military elite pragmatically adapted to a new situation, and as chancellor needed military and security advice, they were ready to offer their assistance in re-establishing the armed forces. Initially, everything took place behind the closed doors, but by American initiative the issue of Germany’s re-armament was raised also at the international level. The process was accelerated by the outbreak of Korean War in summer 1950. At the same time, Adenauer initiated the internal preparatory work: institutions were established, various memorandums compiled, advisor on security matters was hired.

The true moment of birth of Bundeswehr, however, arrived in October 1950 when a top secret memorandum was written during the meeting in Himmerode monastery. An expert commission composed of former Wehrmacht generals worked there to answer chancellor’s inquiry: what could be the German contribution to defending Western Europe from a communist attack? The expert commission composed in a few days the basic operative and organisational outline of future German forces that were (at least partially) approved by Western allies and subsequently guided strategically the development of West German armed forces during the Cold War.

The ideas of experts were summed up in Himmerode memorandum that is the main subject of present study. The generals who were strongly influenced by their World War Two experiences imagined German contingent having to carry out massive land operations. They envisioned 12 well-equipped and mobile armoured divisions that were to form three large territorial formations, and able of counter-attacking while carrying out active defence operations. German contingent had to make a contribution to the collective defence of Western Europe and it was to be used only in defence of Germany and Europe. It was stressed that Germany was never again to become a source of aggression against other states. The command structure
had to secure civilian control and functioning of Bundeswehr as a defence organisation of a democratic state. Simultaneously, serious efforts were made to clean Wehrmacht’s reputation and stress the continuity of traditional German military values under new political conditions. Following personnel developments characterise it well: of the 15 Himmerode experts, seven became later generals, and one became an admiral of Bundeswehr.

In light of Bundeswehr’s future, several passages of Himmerode memorandum became crucial as they outlined what was that ‘new foundation’ that was to substitute Wehrmacht’s militaristic traditions in order to prevent military from becoming again a ‘state within a state’. Addition of these new thoughts to the memorandum written in rather traditional spirit is called Bundeswehr’s ‘founding compromise’. However, the confrontation between the reformers and traditionalists became very apparent in Himmerode and it surfaced several times after that as well.

It is hard to imagine the modern Bundeswehr that represents and protects democratic values without its leadership and organisational philosophy concept called Innere Führung. On the initiative of Major Graf Baudissin, the vision of legendary Prussian military reformer Scharnhorst of ‘citizen in uniform’ was adopted again in Himmerode. It was to pave the way to subsequent changes in mentality and reforms in military that found their expression in Innere Führung. According to this concept, military is connected to democratic constitutional order of a state in every aspect. It helps soldiers to adopt these values and defend them if need be. Wolf Graf von Baudissin who worked himself up from a major of Wehrmacht to a Lieutenant General of Bundeswehr has later spent decades in developing that concept and applying it in training and command of armed forces.

Himmerode memorandum signified the new beginning of security and military thinking in post-war West Germany. Simultaneously, it was Adenauer’s secret strategic plan for re-armament of Germany that was, at least generally, approved by Western allies. It is possible to say that in Himmerode a new German army was born that has through its crises and reforms reached modern days as a defence organisation that seriously follows the principles of civilian control, rule of law, and rules and norms of international community without losing its role and meaning as an instrument for defence of state.