

SUMMARIES IN ENGLISH



From Concept to Terminology: Exploring the Efficiency of Specialised Language Based on Military Terminology

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This study aims to explore how preference is used in military terms, taking into account the variations between terms, influence, understanding and, in a broader sense, the impact on specialised and professional communication.

I seek an answer to the question whether and to what extent officers differ in their understanding of military terminology, while exploring the underlying reasons for these differences. Any linguistic interaction, including the understanding of terms, can be conditionally divided into three main aspects: socio-linguistic (non-linguistic, depending on the participants in communication), linguistic (related to the code, including the use of certain terms) and meta-linguistic (an assessment of the communication code). On this basis, I raise three lines of inquiry which on one hand deal with training backgrounds and service experience (socio-linguistic aspects) and on the other hand deal with the effect of terminological parameters (linguistic aspects). As far as the meta-language aspect is concerned, I investigate whether perceived difficulties in understanding and the assessed unsuitability of a term can be related to the (standards-based) understanding of terms.

My starting point was the null hypothesis: the use of critical terms in specialised communication does not cause difficulties in understanding. I use “critical terms” to refer to those terms (taking into account related concepts) whose meanings are handled differently by different speakers and which typically result in conceptually or linguistically divergent interpretations among individual officers. The method of data collection was a questionnaire containing three battle scenarios. Each scenario contained 14 military terms for which a common understanding is presumed in all branches of the Estonian land forces. Findings of earlier studies suggested that there might be difficulties in understanding these terms. 164 land force officers, encompassing every structural unit of the Estonian Defence Forces, were selected to participate in the research.

Analysis of term attributes revealed that the primary determining factor here is the length of usage: older terminology is statistically significantly better understood than newer. It seems that understanding more recent terms is influenced by military higher education and, hence, by non-linguistic factors. For understanding older terms, however, military higher education does not have a statistically significant impact, thus in that case linguistic factors are more clearly revealed. Still, the effect of other term attributes was also observed with more recent terms, keeping in mind that the latter attributes manifest as secondary.

Evidently there is no causal relationship between the comprehensibility of certain terms and those factors that are considered to be primary issues in the field of military terminology. With each term the combination of term attributes derives different results, and determining which of these parameters will have the greatest impact depends on various internal and external linguistic circumstances.

Research findings support the widespread view in classical terminology theory, and indeed among the officer corps itself, that the existence of both synonyms and non-standard terminology can, at least in a military setting, hinder comprehension. Predictably, terms that were directly relatable to English terms were understood less well than those not derived from English. In an analysis of both older and newer terms, the impact of figurative terms did not match the hypothesis: figurative terms were less well understood than terms of a more literal nature. The survey, however, draws attention to the fact that while imagery does not contribute to the ability to distinguish between closely-related concepts, figurative terms help to create a general, perhaps blurred vision of the concept and refer to the approximate location of the concept in a broader system of related ideas. In line with the hypothesis, it appears that neologisms (terms invented by the Military Terminology Committee and having the features of novelty words) are understood less well than less new terms.

The results of this study suggest that a representative sample of the more recent terminology innovations such as sociocognitive terminology have if not ignored then at least paid little attention to such sub-categories of specialised language which possess complex systems of concepts and contain clusters of concepts. In addition to closely related concepts with finely-nuanced differences, the latter clusters of concepts are found to be interconnected (e.g., *karpima/contain* – *siduma/fix* – *hoidma/retain* – *seiskama/block*), as are terms of different origins that are therefore misleadingly motivated (e.g., term variants *raskuspunkt* and *põhirõhk* referring to *main effort*, cf. in German

Schwerpunkt, cf. standardised term *põhipingutus*, vs. *raskuspunkt*, cf. in English *center of gravity*).

Based on the third axis of inquiry, I examined how the officers' assessment of the comprehensiveness and suitability of a term is related to a standards-based understanding of the term. One interesting fact was revealed: if the form of the term is distorted then it does relate to the difficulty in comprehending it, but neither is related to the standards-based understanding of the term.

The results of my research should prove useful in the work of terminology management, especially for the Military Terminology Committee and for others involved in the development of military terms. They might also be applicable to the work of language planners. Various fields related to military management, including teaching work, might also be able to make use of my findings.

Functional Training as a Tool for Improving the Physical Training of Conscripts

Vyacheslav Senin

The objective of the research is to develop a functional physical training program (FPTP) that could improve the fitness level of conscripts, and to find ways to implement it into each unit's training schedule. As the combined research strategy is used, the research is divided into three phases, with different methods of data collection in each phase.

The data collection method of the first phase was a survey questionnaire conducted from December 2015 to January 2016. The objective was to detect problems and restrictions in conducting conscripts' physical training (PT) in military units of the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF). Officers and NCOs who deal with the planning and execution of PT in the five biggest EDF units participated in the survey. During the statistical analysis of the collected data, the Pearson correlation coefficient was used to measure covariance; analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used for comparing the groups' means. Based on the detected restrictions, the author defined factors that should be taken into account during the compilation of the FPTP. For effective implementation, PT volume must be in compliance with the intensity of the unit's training cycle. The program must be applicable with minimal equipment, regardless of the

unit's sports facility. The program must have a defined training schedule, where the implemented methods are described thoroughly and exercises are clearly demonstrated. Exercises should copy the movement pattern of real actions from different tactical situations.

The data collection methods of the second phase were a document analysis and an expert group assessment. The objective was to develop a functional physical training program and to assess its suitability for the groups' PT in the EDF. Three different functional training program manuals were analyzed. The chosen programs were previously successfully implemented in different military and civil structures. During the analysis exercises, training methods and fitness measuring means that meet the criteria defined in the first phase were found. Based on these findings, the draft version of the FPTP was composed and given to the expert group for feedback. The program was adjusted in accordance with the expert assessment. The final version of the FPTP consisted of 25 PT classes with progressive degrees of difficulty. A plan for fitting the program into a unit's training schedule, an instructor's manual, class notes and a description of the Battle Oriented Physical Test (BOPT) were included in the program.

The data collection method of the third phase was an experiment conducted at the Kuperjanov Infantry Battalion from July to November 2016. The objective was to evaluate the influence of the implementation of the FPTP on conscripts' fitness and functional capabilities. Two separate experiments were conducted: short-term (7 week) and mid-term (15 week). In both experiments the sample consisted of two company-sized units; one unit (test-group) trained according to the FPTP and the second (control-group) had traditional PT, which mostly consisted of running and bodyweight exercises. The standard Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) and the BOPT that was developed in the second phase of research were used for the fitness level measurements. Measurements were conducted on the first, the 7th and the 15th week of the training cycle. During the analysis of the collected data, paired and independent samples t-tests were used. The results show that for the short-term training cycle advantages of the implementation of the developed program are limited. Compared to the traditional PT, the usage of the FPTP provides at least the same improvement in BOPT tasks, push-up and sit-up tests. At the same time, the FPTP enables participants to achieve statistically significant higher improvement in the 3.2 km running test. It is important to note that the advantages of the developed program over traditional PT were more apparent during the mid-term implementation period. After the 15-week cycle, the application of the FPTP provided significantly

higher improvement and better results in all battle oriented physical test tasks. It is important to mention that FPTP effectiveness becomes more significant in a cycle where physical training volume is limited to one class (90 min) per week. An additional advantage of the developed program is its independence of gym machines. Between the 8th and the 15th week of the cycle, the gym equipment usage was limited due to a higher number of personnel in the unit. Nevertheless, FPTP classes allowed the test-group to achieve significantly better results in tasks that required moving additional weights. At the same time there was no improvement in the control-group results.

Taking into account the outcome of the experiments, the author concludes that successful implementation of the FPTP is possible. Compared to the usual PT, the application of the developed program is more effective in terms of soldiers' preparation for battle-related physical tasks. That kind of preparation creates better conditions for the acquisition of skills and knowledge during collective (tactical) training. The author of the research recommends carrying out a similar study with a long-term (24 weeks) implementation period. In addition to functional capabilities measurement, a survey and/or interviews with participating soldiers should be conducted. The objective is to understand how functional physical training affects the learning motivation of conscripts. Based on the research results, the author made proposals to update EDF instructor training and modernize the sports facilities. These proposals will support the complex implementation of functional physical training into the EDF units' training cycle.

A Forgotten Vision – Development of Estonian Maritime Defence Until 2010

Liivo Laanetu

The only naval capability that has been developed for the Estonian Defence Forces since its re-establishment in the 1990's – naval mine countermeasures – has come under heavy public criticism during recent years. The Navy has mainly been accused of not being capable of contributing to the initial self-defence of the country. However, it is a fact that in the 1990's before Estonia officially started the process of joining the North Atlantic alliance, the military leadership was looking for a Navy with more balanced capabilities and it should have had a clearly defined role in the initial self-defence as well.

In the late 1990's and early 2000's Finland offered a limited number of courses especially tailored for key leaders from the Estonian Defence Forces in order to enhance their level of military professional education. The aim of this article is to introduce the naval thought presented in the thesis of a former Commander of the Estonian Navy (1998–2003), Captain Jaan Kapp, written during the first-of-its-kind higher military studies course for Estonian military personnel at the Finnish National Defence University in 1999.

Kapp, a former high-ranking Border Guard officer with a civilian maritime background, had little military education before his appointment as Chief of the Navy in 1998. In order to counterbalance his personal lack of military expertise, he asked for support from several contributors, mainly newly graduated junior officers from the Navy as well as from the Border Guard. According to Kapp, the overall aim of his thesis was to provide a vision for how the Estonian Navy and national maritime defence should be developed during the first decade of the new millennium. Kapp and his co-workers tried to find solutions to strengthen the naval self-defence capabilities of a small and non-allied country with very scarce resources, as Estonia was at the end of the 20th century. Despite Kapp's high level ambitions, his vision was never fully implemented, and was probably abandoned as a basis for future development when he was still in office as Commander of the Navy.

According to Captain Kapp, the overall military defence should have been based on the principles of territorial defence, including division of the country into territorial defence commands. In Kapp's vision, the Navy's role was to act primarily as an extension of the land forces against threats from the maritime environment. All territorial defence commands bordering the sea should have incorporated a maritime defence subcommand with a clearly defined geographical area of responsibility (territorial sea, coastline, designated coastal land area). The maritime defence organization was designed to consist of units being able to operate in the littoral – the fleet and the coastal defence units. It remains unclear if the fleet's area of operations was limited to the defined territorial area of responsibility or not. The Western military district of the Estonian Defence Forces, due to its geographical conditions, was to be focused on maritime defence and commanded by a naval officer.

It was clear that for a country with only limited resources development of a traditional balanced fleet was not thinkable. According to Captain Kapp, sea mines are the primary naval weapon for a small country. The main tasks of the Navy would have been related to the conducting of different naval mine warfare operations – mine hunting, minesweeping and mine laying. Captain Kapp envisioned three types of ships for the Estonian fleet in 2010 –

mine warfare vessels as the high value assets, supported by auxiliary ships, and all of these protected by fast patrol boats.

Openly recognising his lack of military and naval background, Kapp requested assistance from the best available experts in Estonia. Due to the overall shortage of professional naval officers in the Estonian Defence Forces, most of those individuals were actually junior officers, and in some cases, even cadets in their senior year at the naval academy. Instead of military theory, Kapp's work was based on the then legal framework and reference books, as well as personal experience and previous studies of the author himself and his advisors. References were mainly of Finnish or Russian/Soviet origin.

Captain Kapp's vision for developing maritime defence was written at the same time Estonia, along with the other Baltic states, was starting the official process of joining NATO, a progression that in a few years resulted in the major transformation of Estonia's security posture – the role of a non-aligned small country was changed to membership in the world's mightiest defence alliance. At the same time the West, including NATO itself, was adapting to the new world order, where due to the absence of a conventional military threat, an overall optimism about global and regional security perspective was taking place.

Due to different reasons, only those priorities of development of maritime defence were operationalised which were implemented by Kapp himself. The abovementioned principal changes in Estonia's security policy and the transformation from threat-based to capability-based defence planning were the main reasons why the rest of the vision was never realised.

Notwithstanding some weaknesses, Captain Kapp's vision is worth remembering primarily for two reasons: 1) it is a unique source of Estonian naval thought during that time, including its level and directions; 2) it is a deterrent example of how the value of a military vision is short-lived when it is not in line with the directions on the political level.

Petty Officers of the Estonian Navy 1920–1939

Taavi Urb

Petty officers were an important link between officers and soldiers/sailors in the Estonian Navy. Petty officers were divided into line petty officers (*riviallohvitserid*) and specialist petty officers (*erialaallohvitserid*). Line and

specialist petty officers' tasks differed significantly. Line petty officers were lower level military leaders and disciplinarians for soldiers under their command. They were also trainers for recruits. Specialist petty officers, who were the majority in the Navy, were first of all specialists in a specific area. They handled and maintained different mechanisms. Only higher-ranking petty officers and warrant officers (the rank of warrant officer (*instruktor*) was available only in the Navy, but not in other branches) also held the function of leader and pedagogue: they were in charge of the petty officers and sailors in their unit and were responsible for their additional specialist training. The training of line and specialist petty officers was as different as their tasks. Line petty officers were trained to be leaders and trainers. Major attention was paid to weapons and infantry tactics training. The training of specialist petty officers focused on their specialist knowledge and skills. To maintain the proper level of administrative and line skills, regular refresher courses were introduced in the Navy. The courses were conducted in the wintertime, when the overall training pace was lower.

Although the armed forces of Estonia is based on conscription, petty officers in the Navy were usually professional soldiers, not conscripts. This was due to the fact that specialist petty officers were expected to have service experience, which was hard for conscripts to gain during their mandatory service time. Even if a conscript completed petty officer training and was appointed to the position of petty officer, he was seldom promoted to the rank of petty officer. Professional soldiers had more rights than conscripts, fixed by special law, and representative organizations (*ülejateenijate kogud*). They formed a conscious and unified fraternity, where the status of professional soldier was more important than that of soldiers or the rank of petty officer.

The Winter War and Soviet Military Bases in Estonia

Eve Kubi

In 1938 the Soviet Union started to methodically demand that Finland extend the Nonaggression Pact between the two countries so that it would have been possible to establish Soviet military bases in the Finnish territory on a fully legal basis. The Soviets justified it with a need to ensure national security. In fact, the Soviet Union wished to recover Finland as a whole, it having been part of the former Russian Empire, but in order not to come across as an aggressor, at first it was necessary to use diplomatic means.

Pursuant to a secret protocol of the Nonaggression Pact concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany on 23 October 1939, Finland was part of the Soviet sphere of interest. The Soviet Union began to resolve the so-called Finnish issue on 12 October 1939, when it issued an ultimatum to Finland demanding that Finland shift the state border further away from Leningrad (the boundary ran at 32 km from the city). It also demanded that the Hanko Peninsula be rented out for a Soviet naval base for 30 years, as well as a few islands in the Gulf of Finland. In order to achieve what was desired, pressure was applied: the Soviet Air Force began to systematically violate Finnish airspace.

On 12 October 1939 negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland began in Moscow. The lead negotiator on behalf of Finland was Juho Kusti Paasikivi; the Soviet Union was represented by Joseph Stalin and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov. Since the Finns declined to conclude a pact with the Soviet Union in the style of the Baltic States, Moscow began to resolve the so-called Finnish issue in a military manner. The Soviet Union began acts of war against Finland on 30 November 1939, and the war that was to be historically called the Winter War had an indirect impact also on Estonia.

Preparations for occupying Finland had already been started well before negotiations took place in Moscow in October-November 1939. In March 1939 the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, Komandarm 2nd rank Kirill Meretskov, received an order from the People's Commissar for Defence of the Soviet Union, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov, to evaluate the readiness of the troops of the District for a military conflict with Finland. By 19 April, the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District had prepared a report concerning offensive plans against Finland and Estonia using a north-western front to be created on the basis of the District.

On 7 September 1939 the Red Army started mobilisation and its troops began to concentrate in the Karelian Isthmus. The main force of the planned Finnish offensive was formed by the troops of the Leningrad Military District. According to the offensive plan, four armies (425,640 soldiers), 24 divisions, 2,289 tanks, 2,446 aircraft and 2,876 cannons and mortars were sent against Finland. The most powerful unit of the Soviet military grouping, the 7th Army, operated in the Karelian Isthmus, while north of Ladoga the 8th, 9th and 14th Armies were preparing for invasion.

Preparations for attacking Finland were also made by the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet: the order to prepare a military action plan to occupy Finland was received on 3 November 1939.

The Soviet Union used its air and naval bases in Estonia to attack Finland. The bases in Estonia provided the Soviet Union with a great advantage in the war against Finland as the distances for attacking Finnish cities were rendered considerably shorter. Since Paldiski was remarkably closer to Finland than the Kotly or Koporye airfields in Leningrad Oblast, the range of aircraft based in Estonia was also significantly greater. The aircraft of the 10th Air Force Brigade, located in Estonia, were used in combat against Finland as of the first day of the war. It was very convenient to attack the city and port of Turku from there. Turku and other ports in Southeast Finland were of utmost importance to Finland, as they provided a connection with the West, through which necessary goods, including weapons and ammunition, were obtained. The vicinity of the bases located in Estonia to the war theatre facilitated an easier return to their airfields for aircraft damaged in Finland. Several aircraft returning from Finland performed emergency landings outside their bases. Incidents where Soviet airmen bombed the Estonian coast, probably mistaking it for Finland, were frequent.

In addition to the air force, the Soviet Union also used vessels, mainly submarines, of the Red-Banner Baltic Fleet located in Estonia, in operations against Finland.

As a result of the treaty concluded between the Soviet Union and Finland, the Soviet Union gained possession of the Hanko Peninsula amongst other territories. The most direct way to supply Hanko was an airfield located near Paldiski. Paldiski became an interim base when introducing Soviet soldiers to the Hanko Peninsula.

By using the Soviet-based troops located in Estonia in the war against Finland, the Soviet Union severely violated international law.

Ideological Manipulations with the Syrian Civil War

Üllar Peterson

The Syrian Civil War that began amid the turmoil of the Arab Spring has been amply but superficially covered in the Western mainstream media. Four main media narratives are discernible that turn out to be propagandistic manipulations if scrutinized in the light of first-hand sources.

The first media manipulation concerning the Syrian Civil War is the notion of the “peaceful beginnings of the Syrian revolution in Dar‘ā in March 2011 and its violent suppression by the Syrian regime.” According to first-hand

sources from March 2011, the Dar'ā event presents itself as a typical mosque-coordinated and *ḥutba*-provoked “Angry Friday” phenomenon that soon transformed into an armed rebellion against the government. But some months later the notions of the “peacefulness of the protesters” and the “brutality of the regime” were invoked by NGOs, and such conscious misconception was later fostered by the Western mass media and in literature that came out on the subject.

The second set of manipulations to appear concerns the activities of the main Syrian rebel resistance organisation, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces. It was formed in Qatar in 2012 and was financed by Syrian political opponents. This organization has been officially recognized by the West as sole representative of the Syrians, but it is mostly operated by radical Sunni Muslims who declare to the West that its aims are democracy, civil liberties and protecting Syrians from the inhumane Assad regime, whilst its Arabic message remains pro-sharia. The real aim of this organization is to incite the West to attack the Syrian regime.

One brazen example of not only manipulation but outright lies is the situation concerning the Free Syrian Army (FSA) which was an effective anti-government armed movement from 2011– 2012. In the Western mass media the FSA was presented as a defender of Syrian democracy and human rights in spite of its leaders' clear pro-sharia statements. Although the FSA had been dissolved by 2014, its name was effectively used in the West beyond this date to justify sending weapons to the rebels in spite of the fact that most of them are hard-line Islamists.

The topic of civilian casualties has been a tool of propaganda for the regime as well as for its opponents as both sides try to exaggerate the crimes of the opposing side. From 2011 – 2013 the opposition was successful in its anti-government media war and it spread heavily manipulated data into the Western media through its main vectors such as the SOHR, the Violations Documentation Centre in Syria, the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the Syrian Centre for Statistics and Research, and other NGOs, claiming that the Syrian regime was responsible for most of the civilian casualties. The Syrian regime later regained some equilibrium in the propaganda war and by 2013 the Western media had started to turn its attention towards the crimes perpetrated by the rebels. Nevertheless, this pro-rebel and pro-Sunni hard-line stance clearly persists in the West.

Although the exact number of casualties is impossible to determine, if the available statistics are correlated by available neutral, e.g., Kurdish, sources there appear three approximately equal categories of Syrian civil war victims:

regime supporters/soldiers, anti-regime militants, and civilians. Judged by the available statistics on Aleppo from 2016, it might be argued that pro-rebel sources consciously manipulate the number of civilian casualties in order to incite anti-regime momentum in the Western press.

Judging by these four ideological manipulations fostered by the Sunni rebels, it might be argued that a *de facto* Western-Islamist alliance against the Syrian regime has been operating since the beginning of the civil war.