

ENGLISH SUMMARIES



Operation Iraqi Freedom

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The last war in Iraq differed radically from all the previous wars. It was extremely comprehensive and special with respect to three key figures — the integration of arms of service, dynamics and flexibility of the units operation.

The land, air, naval and special forces units of the anti-Iraq coalition were engaged in combat activity almost simultaneously beginning from the first hours of the war and they ensured continuous and steady mutual co-operation and support during the whole operations period, whereas the Gulf War of 1991 started with long-term air-raids and the land forces were engaged not until the thirty-ninth day. Use of modern informational systems enabled to integrate all structures and means necessary for warfare into a unitary informational network so that the reconnaissance sources and sensors were directly connected to "shooters" through "deciders", thus enabling an exchange and use of information in real time in the entire three-dimensional (the air, the land, the sea) battlefield space.

Before the operation, there were lots of speculations over the plan of its conduct. The majority of military experts tended to think that the Americans will use also in this war the conception of air-land combined operations, which had fully justified itself in the Gulf War of 1991 and the later campaign in Afghanistan. In air-land combined operations the military action is distributed into two phases — a comparatively long-term air force operation and the subsequent offensive of land forces after the enemy has been weakened enough.

As the Gulf War of 1991 left Saddam in power and the issue of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was continuously discussed both at the UN and the USA, the plans of a war against Iraq existed in the respective US

army headquarters more than ten years ago already. On the basis of these specific plans, designing of an anti-Iraq military operation started in January 2002, after the meeting of CENTCOM's commander-in-chief.

The new CENTCOM's war plan under the collective name OPLAN 1003 was initially wholly based on the Gulf War experience and it prescribed involving large land forces with mighty air forces attacks in the primary stage of the operation. During the next 14 months, the plan was provoking a heated discussion between General Franks and the Defence Secretary Rumsfeld. As a specialist, the CENTCOM's commander-in-chief requested involving a larger land force component, the Defence Secretary, on the contrary, insisted on conducting the operation in the conditions of a minimal participation of land force units. Donald Rumsfeld was a great admirer of air forces and his position was that the latter, when using new technologies and high-precision weapons, can play a decisive role and win campaigns in the modern war.

The opinion of the US Government that it was possible to conduct the war comparatively fast and with small forces was also based on overestimating the opportunities of the Iraqi opposition groups and anti-Saddam moods within the country. The Defence Secretary, vigorous and with authoritarian management style, continuously intervened in the operational planning process of the headquarters and even attempted to perform leading the forces, especially in the beginning phase of the operation. As changing of the plan was entirely under the authority of the Defence Secretary and the President, this caused reviewing the war plan OPLAN 1003 more than twenty times. One may consider, how many extra headaches it caused to the military.

The nearer the planning process reached its end, the more it appeared that the military part of the plan was only one component in a large political, diplomatic and strategic game, which aimed at turning military victory into strategic success. However, in this game, the President Bush administration lacked agreement. Some officials supported settling the problem at US own risk, with US forces and in a purely military way (Rumsfeld, Cheney, Wolfowitz), the others (Colin Powell) were sure that in order to launch the operation it was necessary to have the support of international community through the UN, i.e. a sanction of the UN Security Council.

The US Central Command planned the Operation Iraqi Freedom, considering and emphasizing tight cooperation, coordination of action and flexibility between the branches, which had been insufficient during all the previous wars. One of the reasons why the coalition forces were so

successful was the detailed real-time knowledge of the enemy's location, activities and perhaps also intentions, which was provided by the complete integration and extremely effective functioning of reconnaissance structures and means of all levels. In order to obtain objective and timely information necessary for the offending forces, the whole range of the US Army's reconnaissance devices and personnel — reconnaissance satellites, reconnaissance aircraft E-8 JSTAR, air reconnaissance and command aircraft E-3 AVAKS, tactical radio engineering and visual reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned aircraft, reconnaissance units of land forces, special forces subunits, forward air controllers of attack aviation, artillery observers et al. — were all comprehensively engaged. Thus the computers of the US Army V Corps Staff were able to track more than 1,000 enemy ground targets in an hour. In the course of the combat action, each company-level or battalion-level commander of the coalition forces received in real time the intelligence previously already systematized and specified through several channels, which enabled him highly effectively evaluate the situation in the battlefield and take appropriate decisions.

In the field of strategy, besides the “combined air-land operation” doctrine, which was created in 1980-s and successfully tried in the Gulf War of 1991, one may point out the emergence of a new form of warfare, the doctrine of so-called “*universal operation*” in the US art of war. The Iraqi war demonstrated the importance of the complete jointness of forces. The Operation Iraqi Freedom was the first actual joint campaign of basically four branches of service — land forces, air forces, the navy and the marine infantry, in which their tight co-operation was organized not only operationally, but also tactically (up to the battalion and brigade level). This was enabled by newly created, ultramodern, cooperability-providing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Rescue) totally digitalized system.

The allies' military success was ensured by the high-level information technology widely used in the coalition forces, and units and weapons firepower, made extremely precise by electronics.

In spite of obvious military success, the American investigators also point out a number of serious shortcomings of the planning process. Thus the basics of Pentagon's so-called joint planning strategy are largely considered questionable. The Operation Iraqi Freedom was actually planned without a previous integrated and joint operational conception and a plan of formation and logistics of the army group integrated into it, which could have caused very serious complications for the campaign,

had the enemy's resistance been a little bit more substantial. While planning and preparing the operation, many things were done impulsively, on an ad hoc basis. The critics are unanimous about the idea that the US estimation of the Iraqi capacity of resistance was based on wrong strategic deductions. It has also been noted that the US inadequate or deficient diplomacy in the course of the process of preparation for the war has generated high tension with NATO's allies in Europe and substantially decreased support for the US foreign policy and the Iraqi operation.

The former Supreme Allied Commander for NATO in Europe, General Wesley Clark describes the arisen situation as follows: "The plan's excessive risk became clear with the postcombat stage, and here the forces and capabilities were unequal to the task. It was the planners' job to have anticipated the various contingencies and make adequate provision of them, including the possibility of post-war Iraqi resistance to the US occupation. The "rolling start" philosophy, which seemed to emerge as much from continuing deployment problems as any strategic calculus, made this impossible. The result was a US force at the operation's end that was incapable of providing security, stopping the looting and sabotage, or establishing a credible presence throughout the country — or even within Baghdad. The ensuing disorder vitiated some of the boost in US credibility won on the battlefield, and it opened the door for deeper and more organized resistance during the following weeks..."

"... The second major criticism of the plan — a profound flaw — was in the endgame: It "short-changed" post-war planning. Planning military operations in war must take into account planning for the aftermath. Army and joint theatre planning always presents requirements in a kind of four-step minuet: deployment — build-up — decisive operations — postconflict operations. Destruction of enemy forces on the battlefield creates a necessary — but not sufficient — condition for victory. Victory means not the defeat of the opposing army but rather winning the follow-through operation to accomplish the aims and intent of the plan. In this case, the purposes, as enunciated by Secretary Rumsfeld, included ending the regime, driving out and disrupting terrorist networks, finding and eliminating the weapons of mass destruction, eliminating terrorist activities, and crafting conditions for Iraq's rapid transition to a representative government "that is not a threat to its neighbours". Achieving victory requires backward planning, beginning with a definition of post-war success and working backward to determine the nature of the operations required and the forces necessary".

It is important that the people could understand that today the ideal does not exist, there is no ideal in the military, either, and it is impossible to achieve it in the future. The existing factor is only an endless process of aspiring the ideality.

A Discussion on Events in Iraq in the Newspaper Postimees

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The article analyses reasoning in the newspaper Postimees Iraqi discourse on the basis of opinion texts by eight authors (Enn Soosaar, Daniele Monticelli, Mihhail Lotman, Eiki Berg, Kadri Liik, Marek Laane, Indrek Tarand and Voldemar Kolga). The aim is to see, how the newspaper language reflects Iraqi issues from the points of view of representatives of different life spheres, which attitudes are Estonian journalists, politicians and public figures taking towards the Iraqi conflict. The article observes, which rhetorical means do they use to strengthen their argumentation, how their attitudes are reflected by their use of language.

Some authors (Enn Soosaar and Mihhail Lotman) cleave to the United States of America in the conflict and call it the partner. This means the approach is Estonian-centred and pragmatic. The other authors (Daniele Monticelli, Eiki Berg, Marek Laane, Indrek Tarand and Voldemar Kolga) find that the Iraqi war is not grounded. Criticizers of the war talk of the United States of America as a nation with a “Right of the Stronger” in force, whose right we acknowledge because it may be useful for us, too. The arguments concerning Saddam Hussein are unambiguously condemnatory. The difference lies only in the fact, whether his dangerousness is observed only from the standpoint of Iraq or of the world. The analysed articles tend to position Estonia at a place in a conflict between Europe and America but not in relation to Iraq.

The article also views, how the author relates to the statement made, from which position he or she is speaking. A politician (Eiki Berg) and a journalist (Kadri Liik) distance themselves more from the text, using impersonal expression. They detach themselves from their statements, so avoiding personal responsibility. At the same time, the others express personal attitudes more in the first person singular (*I*) form. Criticism is presented in the first person plural (*we*) form, which also highlights the Estonian-centeredness of the treatment. While analysing the *we*-expres-

sion, contrasting the Estonian government and the Estonian people appears. When the *we*-treatment joins them, the expression is ironical.

About the Entrance Competition into the ENDC and its Relations to the Further Studies

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The article analyses the relation of the academic ranking formed on the basis of the three years' entrance competitions of ENDC cadets and the cadets' further academic progress. It appears that the relation varies by years, being relatively weak in regard to cadets enrolled in 2002 and considerably close in regard to cadets enrolled in 2003. In the cadets enrolled in 2001, the relation is steadily modest through all the study years. The correlative relation between the weighted averages of different academic years is noticeable and at the same time expectable. The article points out broad differences between the cadets' third year study loads, which indicates the need for supplementary analysis and harmonization of training programs of specialty studies' (studies of branches of service).

What is this thing called Intelligence?

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The intelligence is a most well-known psychological concept. But there are numerous problems related to defining and measurement of intelligence and its application in selection of people. The article gives a brief review of the history of the theory of intelligence, the main approaches to measurement of mental abilities and academic aptitude. The interaction of education and intelligence has been a matter of several studies: are the high scores in IQ test a precondition for or a result of good education? Estonia is one of these fortunate countries, where it was possible to make comparisons between IQ test scores achieved by schoolchildren in 1930s and 1990s — after 60 years passed. These results show the rise of test scores in Estonia as well as it is found already in

several countries. This score rise is called the Flynn effect. Now there is a question — whether there is real rise in human mental abilities over time or whether it is no intelligence what the scores of IQ test reveal.

About Religious Suicide Terrorism

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This article consists of three main parts. The beginning part presents an overview of the causes and goals, perceived confrontation and enemies of the religious terrorism. Every world religion has faced within its tradition some movements of religious terrorism, but modern religious suicide terrorism has spread only within Islamic civilization — more precisely among the radical groups of its political extreme movement — Islamism.

The second part analyses both the causes and goals of Islamism, and the reasons why Islamists at certain point of the historical developments started to use suicide terrorism as a means of struggle.

The third part addresses the impact of the religious motive among other important (both individual and collective, social and political) motives behind suicide terrorism, and also the mutual relationship between religious and non-religious motives. Not all suicide attackers are religiously motivated, and also religion alone does not motivate anybody to become suicide attacker. Religion is only one of the possible motives for such an attack. Even in those cases, when religious motive is among the most important motives, it still remains only one cause and one motive among several others. In other words, if there were no political and social causes and motives, then religious motive alone (for example the hope for reward in Paradise) does not explain sufficiently these motives, why a person sacrifices his or her life in the suicide attack.

Although there are several elements within the tradition of Shiites (the annual procession in commemoration of the violent death of Imam Husain and the related mourning period have been used as justification behind the practice of martyrdom through suicide attacks) that promote the ideas of martyrdom, the impact of the religious tradition cannot be overestimated. The main incentives for organizing suicide attacks are not coming from the religious tradition (the initial use or the extended use of suicide attacks demands also related theological justifications, and at present moment the approval of suicide attacks is highly disputed within Islamic circles), but from the individual and collective, economic and

political causes that result from the development of the relationships between Islamic and Western world. The suicide attacks are first of all the means of the weaker party for coercing the stronger (and also democratic) party in making territorial concessions. Religion has an important role to play in motivating the fighters and in giving meaning to the confrontation. But as with the causes, the possible solutions, concern first of all the non-religious areas of the conflict — the nationality and the territory, the economic and political situation of the community.

“Let the duty of the Sword be to protect and to punish, the protection of the pious through peace and the punishment of the evil with war.”

Notes on the topic of the political ethics of Martin Luther

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The new century seems to develop into both a forceful return of the religions and a new era of the invasion of violence. Religions have something important to say in this context — let it be justifications for war in the name of religion; the criteria, that should be taken into account in cases when people want to use violence or to kill; or even proposals for attaining peace as the highest political and divine good.

Reformation brought along fundamental changes in the political, cultural and religious life during the 16th century. Amidst these developments was also Martin Luther, whose doctrines about two kingdoms and two governments (Zwei-Reiche- und Zwei-Regimentenlehre) have first of all contributed towards harmonizing the mutual relations between “religion and politics”, but have also promoted the “theologization of the politics”. His thoughts are continually relevant in the light of the questions that have emerged in the modern context of military justice and political ethics.

Luther based his political ethics on the principle, that political government is theologically legitimized, because it performs by the God-given authority of the sword the security of the legal order and peace, and also the punishment of the injustice. Although the usage of violence is justified, one must still follow the principle of proportionality in order to avoid greater injustice and misery. Only nobility (Obrigkeit) has the right to use the military force. In military ethics Luther is mostly guided by the

“just war” (*bellum iustum*), doctrine of the middle ages. He acknowledges as unjust every offensive or preventive war, and as the only just war the defensive war, which means defense in emergency. According to Luther, the soldiers were obliged to get a clear idea of the justification of the use of violence and warfare. In a case of unjust war they should abstain from military service.

Political behavior should be guided by reason and love according to Luther. He invited the rulers to struggle in order to maintain peace and to prefer peace as the highest earthly good instead of the selfish right, non-violence instead of all the means of violence.

The Changing Concept of Neutrality. A Historical Approach

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The evolution of the concept of neutrality has been greatly influenced by the changing means and nature of warfare and international politics during the last centuries. During the pre-modern era the relations and intercourse between belligerent powers and non-belligerents or those who were interested in being out of the armed conflict were regulated by customs or by bilateral treaties. The concept of nation-state and unlimited power of its sovereign gave also impetus to the neutrality and neutral stance in Europe after the treaties of Westfalia (1648). During the 19th century, several multilateral agreements were signed between different states, which institutionalized and specified neutral behaviour in international politics. The culmination of this legal effort was made in international level in the very beginning of the 20th century (the Hague Conferences).

At the end of the World War I, the idea of neutralization and neutrality in general seemed old-fashioned and not feasible in the light of the emerging international institutions and principles, for instance the League of Nations, collective security and general arms reduction. The principle of neutrality was not totally absent in the international relations of the interwar period. The confusion between the mutually excluding concepts of collective security and neutrality reflected gaps between ideas and reality of the League of Nations.

For small states like Estonia, the neutral pattern was determined by greater factors of European politics and all that they could do was to try not to be dragged into the emerging Great Power blocks. Scandinavian

legacy in avoiding the maelstrom of previous European conflicts seemed to be worth following for geographically and culturally close small states (in case of Estonia)

After the World War II and during the Cold War era, neutrality and its variations (Non-alignment, neutralism) were much more political manifestations and were lacking legal characteristics. With the impact of ideas of collective security, the war and warfare was denounced as a crime, therefore the open declaration of state-of-war and neutrality in case of conflicts was decreasing. The means of warfare and starting the hostilities as well as avoiding to be dragged into the theatres of war took more sophisticated forms than before.

Air Defence Artillery Group 1928–1940

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The aim of the study is to give an overview of part of the Estonian Defence Forces, the Air Defence Artillery Group, from 1928 till 1940.

The first chapter reviews air defence including anti-aircraft in foreign countries from 1918 till 1930.

The second chapter gives an overview of the Air Defence Artillery Group's personnel with a focus on professional personnel, the structure, conscripts, discipline and problems with military secrets.

The third chapter refers to military training — exercises, living conditions, training plans etc.

The fourth chapter centres on the weaponry and equipment of the Air Defence Artillery Group and their development from 1930 to 1940.

The fifth chapter discusses anti-aircraft of the Navy and Coastal Defence between two World Wars.

The sixth chapter gives an overview of the Air Defence Artillery Group after the Pact of Military Bases between the Republic of Estonia and the USSR was concluded until the incorporation of the Estonian Defence Forces by Soviet military authorities.

The study discusses how and how much the Air Defence Artillery Group used the opportunities and obligations given by the Defence Forces to develop the Estonian anti-aircraft armoury and to train the personnel.

Estonian pre-war medical periodicals as sources of military history

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The article is a bibliographic overview of the articles on military matters in the periodicals *Eesti Arst* [Estonian Doctor], *Tervis* [Health] and *Sõjaväe arstide teadusliste koosolekute Protokollid* [Proceedings of the Conferences of Military Doctors], published in 1920–1940. The latter publication, 3 volumes published in 1920–1921, could be viewed as a predecessor of the remaining two, emerging in 1922.

The military, including the army doctors, must be viewed as one of the few well-organised institutions in the new Republic of Estonia, emerging within the War of Independence (1918–1920). This was also expressed in the attempts of the military doctors to conduct scientific research, the latter in the very early years more representative than that of their civil colleagues. In peacetime the organisation of military doctors continued to exist, i.e. organising regular scientific conferences (the latter ceased only in 1928).

On the basis of the materials discussed in the article, the first post-war decade can be characterised with a rather broad spectre of topics, covered by the army doctors. It was an era of conversion from wartime situation into civil life. Also, some tensions between the civil (the University of Tartu) and military structures could be noticed.

The second post-war decade (1930s) witnessed the domination of the matters of chemical warfare among the topics discussed on the pages of the studied medical periodicals.