

ENGLISH SUMMARIES



Estonia in NATO — not a consumer but a partner

Ants Laaneots, Major General, Commandant of the Estonian National Defence College

History has shown that due to its smallness on one hand and geographical situation on the other, the defence and security issues of the state have always been an issue of concern for the Estonian politicians and military.

Learning from the history, the modern Estonian defence strategy concentrates on the participation in military alliances, a collective defence system, particularly NATO. The successful developments towards obtaining the NATO-membership (the process started in 1994 and is to be completed in 2004) gives rise to discussions about the future Estonian security and defence strategy. Until now the main emphasis has been laid on the territorial forces, relying on the total defence (*Home Defence*) conception.

The National Security Concept and the National Military Strategy approved by the Estonian Parliament in 2001 confirm this direction.

Recently the present concepts have been questioned. The reason is the overall threat scene that changed after 11 September 2001, which also sets certain conditions for Estonia — the country should re-establish its defence strategy in order to cope better with the demands of joint efforts initiated by our allies.

It is true that Estonia should not view itself just as a consumer of the security granted by NATO. However, it would be reasonable not to limit the national defence strategy to our (modest) contribution in international affairs. Estonia should stay a partner, capable of primary self-defence, thereby fostering the general atmosphere of NATO's collective security.

State defence is planned and established, taking into consideration the worst possible security scenarios. Such scenarios very rarely become a reality, but when they do, they always leave a long-term and tragic impact on the fate of nations. Today's world has a long way to go before it turns

into a global state of security. Even as a future NATO-member, Estonia must guarantee the security of its own people.

From the Officer Courses to the Military Academy

Lauri Väättänen, Colonel, Council to the Commandant of the ENDC

The Estonian National Defence College educating officers for Estonia has been working for six years. 250 cadets have started their studies at the seven basic courses launched thus far. By the end of 2003, about 150 officers had graduated from the various Speciality Courses under the Basic Training Course of three years, and the Advanced Officer Training Course. Thus the number of those already trained is significantly large. The feedback received from the units has shown that the officers have been efficiently doing their duty. The Estonian National Defence College has earned recognition among other higher educational establishments in Estonia.

By today, the biggest development problem in the Military Academy has been solved. This has to do with conflicting views on organising officer training of the Estonian Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of the Estonian Defence Forces. No longer are regulations calling for different action sent from Tallinn to Riia mäe in Tartu where the Military Academy is based.

The Estonian officer training system, developed on the basis of Johannes Kert's vision, has achieved its initial aim and partly even more. At the same time the system has grown into an entity, complying with the European higher educational institutions' system. The first-stage three-year basic course is a well-working entity that forms a strong starting point for the second-stage two-level training programme to be launched in 2004.

The structure of the Management of the Estonian National Defence College has now been defined, the temporary atmosphere of the beginning stages has been left behind. The College has created Departments responsible for carrying out the studies and the level of different Departments has improved. A short-term goal is to initiate the school's own effective research and publishing activity.

During the previous years the school has acquired necessary working premises, but the rapidly increasing number of students urgently calls for additional facilities, both those meant for conducting the studies and those needed for accommodation. It is also essential to reorganise the practice fields, the firing ranges on those, and other training facilities.

The aim of the next few years is to establish a well-working system that would guarantee the III and IV-stage high-level training of officers. One of the possibilities would be the merger of the Estonian National Defence College and the Baltic Defence College. Additionally, studies in English should be launched to the required extent.

Our daily work will continuously include introducing the Estonian National Defence College to Estonians. Only when ENDC is well known all over Estonia, will it have good recruitment opportunities in the future. At the same time, we must guarantee that ENDC gains recognition abroad as a high-level Estonian military educational establishment.

ENDC is a part of the Estonian Defence Forces. It is an institution, capable of training the competent officers that Estonia needs to protect our fatherland. In addition to this protection, these officers are also able to carry out other tasks, related to Estonia's future NATO membership.

The development of partisan activities in Finland after World War II

Major **Urmas Leppmets**, Chief of the Training Department of ENDC, acting as Chief of the Military Academy

The Estonian national defence has been greatly helped by the Finnish experience after our nation regained its independence. One concept that has become rooted in Estonia due to the influence of our Northern neighbours is partisan activity. The action of the regular forces carried out in the territory occupied by the enemy is something that small nations must certainly consider when planning their state defence.

The present article is an introduction to what the author hopes will become a longer series of articles. The first article provides an overview of the territorial defence model developed in Finland after World War II. This model plays an important role in partisan activities. The historical context underlying the formation of the relevant defence strategy in Finland after World War II was the post-war insecure position held by Finland in the close proximity of the former Soviet Union – from one side the so-called *finlandisation* (which in the political context equalled ally relations with the former Soviet Union); from the other side a clear understanding among the military, stating that the main aggressor might be just the Eastern neighbour. Under these conditions, the post-war defence doctrine was developed in Finland. The doctrine has had a significant impact on the modern defence political concept in Estonia.

The influence of concept meaning structures on information organisation and problem solving success

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One of the key elements in military commander training is the problem solving and decision making strategies, teaching which should support a better performance of leaders and units in an actual war situation. An extensive research and theory development has been carried out in this domain during the past decades. Different theoretical approaches underlie different training methods. For example, analytical decision-making school that defines decision-making as a precise calculus based on a learned strategy supports learning the 'correct' way of problem solving and practising the learned strategy in different cases. Pattern recognition approach stresses the importance of automatic application of previously recorded sample solutions and provides grounds for decision-making training that is established by extensive work with different problem situations. The aim is to provide students with a wide variety of experiences that could be used as patterns for solving problems in the future.

People differ in their psychological abilities and preferred ways of organizing and processing information. In the training context it means that the same training method or problem solving strategy provided through the training need not support the learning and later actions of different persons in the same way. One of the central characteristics, which corresponds to the level of success in problem solving, is the problem related information organisation. Expert-novice thinking studies have shown that more experienced problem solvers use more related and rather hierarchical knowledge schemas. Less experienced individuals handle information in more fragmented ways and pay attention to surface features of problem information (e.g. Chi et al. 1982). However, in some cases novices arrange information, using the expert-like hierarchical order. Dufresne describes a learning experiment where participants were divided into 'reasoning groups' by their preferred way of explaining the similarities between different problems (1982). One group was formed of participants whose answers were 'predominantly principle based'. This group gained higher results during the following experiment, irrespective of the differentiated treatment measures. That example emphasizes the role of information organisation in problem solving process.

The present paper explores a possible connection between the preferred concept meaning assignment forms and the preferred organisation of information. The cultural-historical school of psychology provides a promising theoretical framework for that type of analysis. This school's argument is based on Lev Vygotsky's work, which claims people's way

of thinking depends on the relations between representations used in the thinking process. These relations can be described as a meaning of representation. The cultural-historical school of psychology claims that representation meanings can be divided into specific types — ‘types of concept’. Concept types differ in two dimensions. Firstly, concept meaning can refer to abstract or concrete representations. In the first case, reference is made to another concept, which is of a higher-level category (e.g. *a cat is an animal, a mammal*). In the latter case, meaning refers to a perceptible characteristic (e.g. *a cat is furry, ... eats mice*). The second dimension describes the systematic extent of the characteristics used as the concept meaning. For example *scissors and bath* can be categorised as similar objects because *they are both in the bathroom*. However, this connection depends on a specific situation only. Reference between these two concepts could be built by asserting that both of them are *aids to maintain hygiene*. That description could be much more universal. The cultural-historical school of psychology claims that the different concept types develop during a person’s life. Thinking of the heterogeneity theory, which is closely related to the cultural-historical school, we know that when a person learns to use a new concept of a higher level, he also continues to use the older types. What is more — depending on the action domain, people prefer to use concept types of developmentally different levels (Tulviste, 1984).

The present paper suggests that the lower ability of novices to associate problem information, as well as their tendency to focus on surface characteristics, is related to the more frequent use of simpler concept types in a new domain of knowledge. However, if more abstract/hierarchical and systematic concept types are preferred, the more expert-like information organisation becomes available and the quality of problem solving results should increase. A normal adult should be able to use all types of concept. If the arguments presented above were valid, then the pedagogical issue would be to find a methodical solution as to how the preferred concept type can be altered. First it is necessary to test the hypothesis that the concept type preference influences information organisation and problem solving success. The Department of Tactics at the Estonian National Defence College prepared an experiment to study this argument in summer 2003. The experiment has three parts — (1) the pre-test, (2) the learning period and (3) the post-test. The pre-test and the post-test include the same concept type preference test (Toomela, 2002). The test consists of 3 types of tasks, which require respondents (a) to describe the given concepts’ meaning, (b) to describe similarity between two concepts, and (c) to choose two ‘similar’ concepts randomly and to describe similarity between these two. The original test was comple-

mented with tasks, which comprised concepts used in training materials during the learning period. The learning period is 8 hours long and should be conducted in 4 sessions during two weeks. Study material covers different concepts and rules necessary to make a squad fire scheme and is presented to the student as a simple database, which enables the user to access different pages, presenting a certain part of information. At the end of the study period participants have to draw a fire plan according to the given situation and task description. They have to add a written explanation to the scheme. Then they answer two questions, explaining (1) which rules or principles they followed in their action and (2) in which order they solved the task.

The first experiment was implemented with ten participants during November 2003. Participants were voluntary members of the Defence League, who had completed the basic soldier training. One of the participants had also finished the squad commander course. Initial results are not statistically significant because of the small number of participants. However, the results showed that individuals who used abstract and hierarchical meaning description more frequently in the test, also achieved higher results in the fire plan task on average. They also explained their actions by more generalized rules and principles. In two cases the initial task conditions' analysis phase was mentioned, preceding the actual problem solving. That data suggest that concept type preference could be related with information organisation and problem solving success. The initial results could be considered encouraging. It is planned to continue the experiment in spring 2004.

The subjects of Military Geography and Estonian Military Geography in the 1920s

Kersti Vennik, 3rd Lieutenant, Lecturer of Geoinformatics

Every commander of a military unit needs to know as much as possible about the territory where it operates — the landscape, climate, population, etc. — to carry out the tasks of its unit as efficiently as possible. Well-organised teaching of military geography at the facilities providing military education forms an essential basis for gaining such knowledge.

There is a lot to be done to improve the studies of Estonian military geography. One of the starting points for establishing an overall modern approach could be, for example, a lecture course compiled for the Higher Military Courses by Col. Nikolai Reek, the later Chief of Staff of the Estonian Army, already in 1921/1923.

Estonia Joining NATO: Reform of the Defence Planning System

Jaan Murumets, M.A., Chief of the Security Policy and Strategy Branch

The suggested Estonian defense planning system is a Military Capabilities-based one. The EDF's Operational Planning and associated force development processes aim towards the development of those military capabilities necessary to meet a range of operational requirements and tasks, specified through political guidance. This system suits today's security environment where the specific threat is unclear and the range of potential military tasks is determined by security commitments, rather than threat alone.

In the context of this system, Military Capability is defined as the **quantitatively measurable capacity of each EDF structural element to perform a given task under specified conditions up to established standards**. Each structural element may have more than one capability and each capability may be carried out by more than one structural element.

Within this system, the EDF's Operational Planning Process (OPP) is a key to determining capability requirements for the various force elements. Operational planning is carried out within a strategic framework and it seeks to translate strategic guidance and direction into a scheduled series of integrated military actions that are to be carried out by forces to achieve strategic objectives efficiently and with acceptable risks. At the strategic level, operational planning involves the development of strategic military objectives and tasks in support of the National Security Concept (and the National Military Strategy) and the development of the force and materiel requirements necessary to accomplish those tasks.

Based on the planning timeframe, the Estonian defense planning system is divided into Long-Term (10–15 years), Medium Term (5–7 years), and Short Term or Annual Planning.

Based on the objective of planning, the system is divided into Capability-based and Resource-based planning cycles.

Functionally, this planning system consists of the following basic components: Planning, Programming, and Budgeting.

The fourth basic component — Reporting — should ensure adequate feedback to both Capability-based and Resource-based planning cycles.

Prognosing the future academic achievements of the ENDC cadets on the basis of their entrance tests

Peep Uba, Ph. D., Chief of the Mathematics and Natural Sciences Chair

The article analyses the relationship between the initial academic ranking of the ENDC cadets based on their entrance tests, and their later academic achievements. The relationship appears to be a weak one, leading to a conclusion that either the selection criteria for establishing the initial academic ranking should be altered or the curriculum should be analysed and changed, so that the gradable subjects taught during the first semesters would reflect more on the cadets' achievements in military subjects that they obviously prefer to other disciplines.

Doom of gods or rebirth of religions? Ideas about religious beliefs as political tools

Andres Saumets (M.Th.), Chief of the Humanitarian and Social Studies Chair

After the events of the 11 September, together with the international anti-terrorist fight, the role of religion in conflicts has also been brought to public attention. The beginning of the 21st century could be called the era of "rebirth of religion", the period in which religion as a power shaping people is gaining more and more public influence. On the background of armed conflicts and warfare conducted in the different places of the world, the thesis by Samuel P. Huntington about the inevitable "clash of civilisations (religions)" and the soon-to-arrive era of religious wars seems to be a simple, comprehensive and powerful explanation to these conflicts. It must be admitted that throughout history religious beliefs have been implemented as political tools, with the aim to radicalise conflict behaviour and make it more violent. This brings about justified concerns about religiously motivated violence. But is the Huntington thesis about the "conflict of religions" actually correct? Can religious beliefs be mitigating or even problem-solving factors in conflicts? The empirical analysis reveals that there are differences between various religious beliefs but they can influence conflict behaviour. In order to hinder the violence-boosting influence of the religious factor in conflict behaviour, political scientists have developed several strategies. The most influential one seems to be the argumentative dialogue strategy of constructivists that is built upon common sense, aiming to inform people of the real motives of the political leaders when the latter are taking advantage of religious rhetorics, trying to influence conflict behaviour.

Religions do not contain substantial violence potential, and by combined efforts based on dialogue it is possible to move towards peace culture and fight the abuse of religion as a violent political tool. The dialogue strategy helps along with delegitimising violence in the region, and this in turn will hamper use of religion as a political tool fostering and enhancing violence.

How to talk about war? Contemplation on military language

Siret Rutiku, Ph.D., Head of the Language Center

The article discusses the need to make the Estonian Defence Forces aware of the problem concerning military metalanguage. The author arrives at the understanding that the issues of military terminology are widely discussed, but not the problems of language skills as a whole. Deriving from the different interpretation possibilities of the native and foreign language skill, the author poses the question, whether Estonian officers are capable of expressing their understandings and beliefs, to make themselves and others aware of the actual content and goals of their work and responsibilities. The treatise of this issue is based on a selection of essays of the ENDC entrants.

The article ends with the recognition of the significance of teaching the native language in raising educated, thinking and responsible officers for Estonia.

West Estonian islands and military propaganda in the 20th century

Andres Seene, M.A., Head of the ENDC Museum

As far it is possible to conclude that the 20th century visions on the islands near the Western coast of Estonia, more precisely their importance as a military base or naval stronghold of the Great Powers, have been influenced either by the strategic thinking of categories that overstressed the importance of naval warfare (the 19th century conflicts and the influence of the German landing operation in 1917), or they are based on propagandistic grounds. The latter option seems to be one of the propagandastic tools from the arsenal of the Soviet Russia, having been constantly used against Estonia and the other Baltic states during the two decades preceding World War II. The myth of a British naval base was first created during World War I, and was first used by Germans against Russia and its allies. Later Russia began to use the same myth. This issue

is probably a good example of military propaganda and its transformations over time. In this context, it is important to note that the fast overtaking of the West Estonian Islands by the Soviet Union or Germany during the later stages of World War II did not give them the expected essential operational advantage.

“Demographic battles are fought without weapons...”

Ken Kalling, M.A., Chief of the Strategy Chair

The quotation given in the headline derives from an article published in an Estonian-language textbook of eugenics in 1927. Estonia was among the few European states accepting eugenic legislation (The Law of Sterilization, 1936) in the 1930s.

The main aim of Estonian eugenists was still demographic. The so-called *small nation national perception*, characteristic of the Estonian national consciousness both then and now, made pronatalist ideas of eugenists well considered also in the security and defense matters. Demographic processes also became the concern of the military.

The article points at the tendencies occurring in Estonia in the second half of the 1930s. Then Estonia turned into an autocratic regime and it became typical to attempt to solve the problems of the society via a corporate system. The latter, although declaring the so-called *national entity* its method and aim, did not achieve the biological strength necessary for winning *demographic battles*.