

SUMMARIES



The Estonian Military Academy from 1921 to 1940

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The Military Academy of the Republic of Estonia was established as a separate training unit – the General Staff Course Unit – on the 12th. September 1921. On the 1st. October 1923, the courses, together with the Military School and Non-Commissioned Officers School were incorporated into the Estonian Military Educational Institution (in Est. Sõjaväe Ühendatud Õppeasutused). Since then, the Chief of the General Staff Course was also the Commandant of the Estonian Military Educational Institution. The purpose of joining the different institutions providing military training was to put them under a unified authority and thereby ensure common objectives for the training process at all levels, and also to cut personnel and administrative costs of each training unit. On the 1st. August 1925, the General Staff Course Unit was named the Military Academy.

The mission of the Military Academy was first articulated in temporary statutes with the establishment of the General Staff Course Unit in 1921: to prepare officers for junior general staff officer posts and provide additional military training for commanders of military units. In addition, the course was designed to broaden the horizons of the participants in military matters, attract greater interest and devotion to the science of war and provide students with methods of scientific research in military subject areas. The mission of the Military Academy was set out for the second time, in the Law of the Military Academy approved by the Government of the Republic of Estonia in 1931. The law stipulates that officers are to be provided with military higher education, especially directed towards the formation and command of the armed forces, as well as to doing scientific research and implementing possible outcomes, in subject areas related to national defence. The overall aim of military higher education is to synthesize, develop and implement leadership and working methods (doctrine) among Estonian officers in fitting with the special Estonian situation. The ultimate aim of the military higher education is to provide all officers filling both wartime and peacetime posts of battalion commanders or above with a unified military higher education in the Military Academy. The study process was designed to prepare leaders with the ability to think and work independently. The rapid organisation of general staff officer courses in Estonia was made possible by the previous experiences of the War of Independence (1918–1920), and by the common view shared by senior military leaders in Estonia as to the rapid settlement of personnel issues (during the War of

Estonia at that time. The rapid launch of military higher education in Estonia, in turn, made it possible to start the development of operational and tactical solutions fitting the local situation, taking into consideration previous war experiences. From the early 1920s onwards, the training of staff-officers in Estonia has been based on the principle that the officers received their higher education in their home country, and after that some of them have had the opportunity to have additional training in relevant educational institutions abroad, mostly in France. The pattern chosen by Estonia was based on the concept that officers should first get to know the situation and respective tactics in their home country and after that their knowledge could be supplemented by relevant information abroad, if appropriate. During this period, around twenty Estonian officers got their higher military training in military institutions of higher education abroad (most of them in France, some in Poland, Belgium and Germany). Based on mutual mobility, students were also exchanged with neighbouring countries like Finland and Latvia. In addition, during that period, two-way visits and study trips were arranged with military academy students in Finland, Latvia and Poland. In the 1930s, compared with other small countries in the region, the qualification of leaders with a higher military education in Estonia was considered to be advanced, and it never occurred to suspend the activities of the Academy.

The curricula of the Military Academy subdivided the 2-year study period into two courses. For those entering the academy with entrance tests, a 4-month period was added to the two years for writing their final papers. From the year 1938, the course was transformed into a 3-year course. Both academic years were in turn subdivided into summer and winter courses. The aim of the summer course was to teach practical skills and it included various practical tasks. The winter course, on the other hand was more encyclopedic-theoretical, involving more theoretical lectures in the classroom. In this respect, substantial changes were made during the study of the 3rd course (1926–27). The changes were introduced following the pattern of the French Military Higher School (*École Supérieure de Guerre*), and were initiated by officers who had studied there. The previous system based on repetition was replaced by a new system with greater emphasis on independent work. During the same time period, most of the teaching staff-officers of Russian origin or with training received in Russia – were replaced by younger Estonian personnel (graduates from the first courses of the Academy).

From the first years of its existence, limits were imposed on the study process in the Academy by the use of temporary teaching staff. In 1922, the permanent post of a professor was created in the Military Academy, yet in 1927 this post was eliminated from the structure of the academy. The positions of permanent lecturers were established as late as in the academic year of 1936–37. However, the number of permanent posts for teaching staff also remained relatively small afterwards. Military subjects, especially tactical subjects, were taught both by permanent teaching staff and by inspectors of the branches of the armed forces, chiefs of military districts and other specialists. Civilian subjects were also taught by several Tartu University professors.

The subjects taught were subdivided into the principal groups (tactics, strategy, staff procedures and war history) and supporting groups (communications, war gas, fortification, naval warfare, special services, military topography, political history, constitutional law, international law, criminal law applicable to armed conflict, economy, statistics, military psychology, sociology, meteorology and languages:

Estonian, German, French, English and Russian), as was stipulated in the Law of the Military Academy of 1931.

In the war economics specialty opened in the Military Academy in the year 1934, the volume of tactical subjects was smaller than in leadership and staff procedures specialties, or rather a more specific approach was adopted. As an example, subjects like logistic support in wartime (supply tactics) and administration of the defence forces were included in the curriculum. Also, in the specialty of economics, the volume of military subjects was smaller, and instead subjects like chemistry, food, leather, wood and metal technologies, breadbaking, soapmaking, as well as catering for soldiers, commercial law, civil law, labour law, agriculture, economic geography and accounting were taught. The study process in the Military Academy was arranged so that about 70% of all subjects in the curriculum were common for both study branches and 30% of the subjects were taught separately to both specialty groups.

Considering the teaching methods employed, different practical or theoretical independent (written) assignments were most widely used. An important part of the study process was also field trips and excursions focused on diverse tactics, military topography and military history issues.

The study process was completed by the writing and defence of a final paper. Writing the final paper was compulsory for those who passed entrance tests to get to the Academy, while for those who were seconded there, the final paper was optional. The papers on military topics had both theoretical and practical parts. The practical part of the paper addressed the applicability of the theoretical approaches presented in relevant research outcomes to given (Estonian). In historical topics, a review of the main outcomes related to the art of war was required in addition to the scientific research of a specific subject area. The final papers by the Military Academy graduates that have come down to us are an important source of information for exploring military doctrine and its developments in the Independent Estonian Republic.

During the period from 1921 to 1940, officers graduated from the Academy in the leadership and staff procedures specialty in nine year groups, and in the war economy specialty in two year groups. A total of 232 officers graduated, among them 3 officers from the Finnish and 3 officers from the Latvian Defence Forces.

Each year of graduation, there were some experienced officers seconded to the Academy and junior officers who had passed the entrance tests, except in the case of the last, 9th course (1938–40) – all the officers admitted to that course had taken the entrance tests. From the 6th course onwards (in 1931), those officers who were seconded to the Academy also had to take entrance tests. The experienced officers seconded to the Academy made up from one sixth to more than half of all students. In the 1930s, on average, there were three candidates per one student place. During that period of time, about 70% of all graduates of the Academy were those who had entered through entrance tests, while the rest of the graduates were senior officers.

Based on current knowledge, out of the 226 officers who graduated from the Academy (not considering the three Finnish and three Latvian officers), 106 officers (47% of all officers) had received some sort of military training before entering the Academy in other institutions of military education in Estonia (Military School, Military Technical School). More than half (60%) of the students who took entrance tests were the graduates of other military schools throughout Estonia. The rest of the students were the graduates of different military schools in Russia, however, the

majority of them had been to the ensign courses during World War I (i.e. received short-term wartime officer training), followed by peacetime training offered by the Estonian Military School and after that by the one-year in-service officer training courses designed for officers in active service organised by the Estonian Military Educational Institution.

By the time of Estonia's occupation in 1940, there were at least 210 officers – graduates of the Estonian Military Academy in active service, and as many as 50 of them were killed by the Soviet authorities, mostly during the period from 1941 to 1942 in the territories of Estonia or the Soviet Union. Several Estonian officers – graduates of the Academy were killed and repressed by the Soviet authorities also after the second occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union (1944). Another 50 graduates of the Academy perished in concentration camps in the Soviet Union. Consequently, around 100 graduates of the Academy (i.e. 47% of all graduates in the active service as of the year 1940) can be regarded as direct victims of the Soviet authorities. Although in 1940, the majority of the Academy graduates who were in the service that time were incorporated in the Red Army (the 22nd Rifle Corps), by the year 1944, there were only 30 of them left in the active service in the Red Army (i.e. 14% of all graduates in the active service as of the year 1940). At least 65 graduates of the Academy were members of diverse German military and police units and services formed in Estonia (in all 30% of the Academy graduates who were in the active service in the year 1940). Most of them had fled the Red Army in 1941 or were taken prisoners by the Germans.

The two Finnish officers who graduated from the Academy served in 1944, one as a regiment commander and the other as a battalion commander of the Infantry Regiment 200 (JR 200), a unit in the Finnish Army made up mostly of Estonian volunteers.

About ten graduates of the Estonian Military Academy were killed in combat in World War II. Some officers-graduates also died during evacuation or of combat-related incidents.

The training and education of military personnel is a long process. According to some estimates, the period of time needed for preparing a competent officer-leader is about 25 years. The Estonian Republic had almost sufficient time to prepare the officers, however, in losing its national independence or as a result of the turmoil that followed, the nation's military was also destroyed.

Mart Haber (1897–1948)

Mart Haber was born in Harjumaa County in 1897. He studied pedagogical subjects, however, World War I interrupted his studies. In 1916, he joined the Russian military service. In the year 1917, he received the training of a wartime officer and the lowest officer rank (ensign) in the Oranienbaum Ensign School. Yet he did not participate in combat operations as member of the Russian army. That same year, he was assigned as a junior officer to the Estonian national military unit (1st Estonian Regiment), formed with the permission of the Russian Temporary Government, where he served until the spring of 1918. With the German occupation in Estonia, Ensign Haber was released from military service, and he participated as a junior officer assigned to the 6th infantry regiment and was wounded in combat in the War

of Independence (1918–1920) between Estonia and the Soviet Russia. From the year 1920, he continued his service in the same unit as a peacetime platoon leader (second lieutenant) in the Estonian army. In 1921, M. Haber completed the in-service officer training course for wartime officers. From the year 1924, he was assigned to Non-Commissioned Officers School of the Estonian Military Educational Institution and posted as a platoon leader of the rifle company training battalion. In 1929, he was promoted as the commander of the training company. In 1929, being a Captain, he entered the Military Academy and studied there until 1931. In 1932, he completed his studies with the defence of the final paper “Estonians as Soldiers. Conclusions for the Staffing, Training and Command of the Defence Forces”. The paper received a good grade by the opponents, however, the presentation of the thesis was marked as “insufficient”, and so the final grade for the thesis was “sufficient”. Then Capt. Haber served in the General Staff of the Defence Forces and was responsible for the organisation of teaching the subject of national defence in school. From the year 1934, M. Haber worked in the Ministry of Education as an adviser on national defence education (from the year 1940, he had the Estonianized name Kaerma). In 1933, he was promoted to Major and in 1940 to Lieutenant Colonel. In 1941, M. Kaerma managed to avoid the repressions carried out by the Soviet authorities. In 1941, he participated in the work of the Estonian Government People’s Educational Agency formed during the German occupation in Estonia. With the mobilisation carried out by the German military in 1944, seven border defence regiments were formed in the Estonian territory. Based on support from Estonian national political districts and the need to avoid another Soviet occupation, mobilisation brought together more men than expected. Colonel M. Kaerma became Commander of the 3rd Border Defence Regiment. After the dissolution of the front followed by the invasion of the Soviet troops to Estonia, M. Haber hid himself in the forest near to his home farm, and somewhat later he committed suicide.

The present volume of the Proceedings includes the Military Academy final paper by Captain M. Haber as an example of a final paper of that time. As was set out in the guidelines for final papers, the paper consists of two parts, theory and practical parts. The approach of the theoretical part is historic-chronological in which the author provides the written records of Estonians as combatants from the most ancient written records to the War of Independence (1918–1920), as well as of the following peacetime period. The examples presented aim to give a broad picture and, as the author puts it, he intends to go deep within the spiritual structure of Estonians and thereby to portray the psychological world of Estonians. Based on the first part of the work, the second part of the dissertation points out some practical suggestions as to the staffing, training and command of Estonian soldiers. Considering the outcome of the general tendencies, nuances and problems related to the nation’s physical and mental health, the paper comes up with diverse solutions related to command and training issues. This volume of the Proceedings also includes a summary of the dissertation in English.

C o n s p e c t u s**ESTONIANS AS SOLDIERS****CONCLUSIONS FOR THE STAFFING, TRAINING AND
COMMAND OF THE DEFENCE FORCES**

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Tallinn, 1932

P A R T O N E

ESTONIANS AS COMBATANTS, AS OBSERVED FROM AN HISTORIC
PERSPECTIVE. SOCIAL STRATIFICATION OF THE ESTONIAN PEOPLE AS
THE BASIS FOR STAFFING THE DEFENCE FORCES; GENERAL
CHARACTERISATION OF ESTONIANS

Chapter 1

MILITARY CULTURE OF ANCIENT ESTONIANS

According to the opinion of historians and archaeologists, Estonians had reached the shores of the Baltic Sea and settled permanently in this area either during the era of the birth of Christ or, at the latest, during the 3rd to 7th century A.D.

At the end of the independent era, the development of life in ancient Estonia had brought along the organisation of some individual counties which formed self-sufficient integrities of authority. Separately functioning counties frequently formed into unions for the fulfilment of certain tasks; the unions were not of a persistent nature. In general, the process of amalgamation, towards national integrity, was ever continuing.

Likewise, regarding the order of governance, there were elaborate institutions of village, parish and county elders, whose rights were limited with “the houses”, i.e. the general meetings of the people. The elders were the organisers of social life in relevant regions and, simultaneously, also the military leaders during war raids.

Democratic and decentralised order of people’s governance had been well rooted in ancient Estonia, different from the feudal system of the nearby large nations. Decentralised order did not enable the expedient utilisation of military forces for the protection of the territory, thus, the focus for the battle remained the responsibility of single and individual counties.

Military forces in ancient Estonia comprised all men, capable of carrying a weapon who were formed into military squads, under the supervision of the elders of the relevant region, which were consolidated into the troops (Est. *malev*) of different counties. The *malev* comprised infantry and cavalrymen. In addition to land forces, Saare county and other coastal counties also had their fleet which was divided into squadrons (8–10 vessels) with the ship crew being in charge.

The assault weapons used by the land forces were as follows: javelins, swords, axes, clubs, scythes and fish-forks; trebuchets, bows, slings and, finally, also crossbows were utilised as casting weapons. Shields were used as defence gear. Besiege towers, “fire wheels” and “fire carts” were used in fortress battles. The navy also used fire rafts, in addition to the weapons utilised by the land forces. Port mouths and naval routes were closed by way of sinking wooden boxes and old boats.

Regarding military training, the ancient Estonians were at the same level as their neighbours. They carried out their training in a patriotic school where the fathers and elder brothers of the young men taught them how to handle weapons. Exercises were carried out during special festive occasions, under the supervision of the elders of the relevant regions.

Ancient wars in the Baltic countries, up until the coming of the Germans, tended to be raids and punitive expeditions and were not aiming at aggressive goals. After the Germans had entered the Baltics, the war became of an explicitly political nature, dictating a definite goal for the strategy of the ancient Estonians – to conquer Riga. The offensive strategy, prevalent up until 1216/17, was based on wide-range cooperation with the Lithuanians, Russians and Livs, whereas attempts were made, by way of concentric attacks on a wide front, to destroy the *place d'armes* of Riga. In 1217, there was a breakthrough. The political goal – to conquer Riga – remained constant. However, the strategy was now to achieve the goal by destroying the forces of the enemy.

Strategic defence of the land was based on hill-forts as support points and the active operation of the field troops. The nearby people found shelter in the hill-forts until the army became consolidated to provide counter-attacks. Due to the new ways of warfare, introduced by the Germans, the active defence of the hill-forts actually became a passive stronghold war where Estonians demonstrated extraordinary toughness. In the naval war, prevalence was given to the “hijacking war” and raid expeditions to the Scandinavian shores.

Tactically, it was the manoeuvre that dominated, rather than the combat. The fighting took place in infantry lines. For an open battle, the *malev* troops lined into a frontline, whereas prior to the start of the battle, a certain stock was separated, located behind the centre of the troops and was lined into a cavalier line. The battle started with the throwing of casting weapons, followed by hand combat accompanied by extremely noisy war cries and “rattling” the weapons. Attempts were made to force the hill-forts to surrender, with the help of fire and smoke, and also with the “shower of stones” by trebuchets, as the fight, when defending against these weapons, mainly developed behind the stockade; in addition, dashes were being undertaken to rush out of the hill-fort, with an aim to destroy the besieging army.

In naval battles, attempts were made to seize the ships of the enemy; if this was impossible, their own vessels were tied together by two and the enemy was allowed to float in-between their own defending ships, this was followed by boarding.

Ancient Estonians were willing to fight; in the battles, they demonstrated valour and bravery which was particularly evident in the defence of hill-forts. Even the ancient Estonians were vindictive and revengeful, however, at the same time honest and kept their word. The fighting potential becomes more and more intense as the Estonians find out about the aggressiveness of the Germans.

Love for freedom, emerging national feelings and the faith in their ancestors – these were the thrusting forces that propelled ancient Estonians to bloody battles, during the course of 20 years.

Decentralised democratic order did not favour the creation of an appropriate defence organisation, therefore, the *malevs* and hill-forts of individual counties were frequently forced to fight with overwhelming forces. The duels of individual counties weakened the forces of Estonians and finally, the land is forced to surrender (1227) to the foreign power.

The strength of Estonians was broken, however, their spirit did not bend in front of those who had defeated them.

Chapter 2

ESTONIANS AS COMBATANTS DURING THE RULE OF FOREIGN NATIONS 1227–1918

Since 1227, for nearly 700 years, the determination of the destiny of the Estonian nation has been at the discretion of other nations. From the point of view of researching Estonians as combatants, there are eras, of great significance and of more substantial rupture that provide our history with a specific character, according to which the history of Estonia can be divided into 3 periods, as follows:

- 1) The rule of the Teutonic Order 1227–1560.
- 2) The Swedish period 1561–1721. (Actually, the rule of Russians in Estonia commenced in 1710)
- 3) The Russian time 1721–1918.

Following the surrender of Estonia, the new master began to reinforce its authority. Bishops and Order men dared to live among Estonians only in fortified castles; even churches were built according to a similar style so that they could be used as shelters in case of war with Estonians. Hence the conclusion that the new authority highly appreciated the fighting capacity of Estonians; their will to fight had become apparent during the 20-year-long war.

At the beginning of the rule of the Order, up until 1260, Estonians were in a contractual situation with the Germans, assuming obligations to provide military assistance to the Germans which actually did happen in the occasion of several war raids. In the battle at Durben, Estonians decisively refused to go to war in the interest of the Germans and, upon the initiative of the islanders, rose in a new fight for freedom, however, as early as during the next year, the islanders were once again suppressed under the iron authority of the crusaders, in a desperate battle, and this was generally the beginning of the forced era. In 1343, there is another outbreak of new, powerful fight for freedom, however, this attempt for pushing out the foreign forces was again unsuccessful and ended with a tragic destruction of Estonians, the rest were put into slavery.

The Estonians' will to fight was strong, their activity was a threat for Germans; the foreign power, in order to secure its position, had to act in a radical manner, undertaking a savage execution of Estonians, with the help of which they endeavoured to break the fighting will and the heroic spirit of Estonians.

The era up until 1343 endlessly demanded new forces from the Brethren of the Sword, the Teutonic Order, vassals and, finally, also the ancillary forces from

Prussia. It took nearly a century and a half to suppress the fighting will of Estonians. This provides us with an understanding regarding the resistance, firmness of mind and fighting capacity of Estonians, and we can also see their eagerness to fight which took a number of the best Estonian men too early into their grave, in the fight for mental goals and social benefits.

The Swedish period

At the beginning of this period, Estonians were looking forward that the new authority would improve their difficult situation and enforce human rights. Inspired by such hopes, lots of Estonians voluntarily joined the Swedish army and others, formed as small guerrilla units, took active part in the fight, serving the interests of the Swedes, showing specific courage and bravery, so that Estonians were referred to as “Hannibals”. Later, seeing that the new power was not capable or not willing to enhance their situation, Estonians became passive conscripts in the regular Swedish army, thus totally losing their activity in battles and revealing obvious tendencies to desert.

The Russian time

At the beginning of the period, Estonians were recruited in the composition of the Russian army, and later, as conscripts. As a result of becoming the subjects of the Russian Empire, the situation of Estonians became much more difficult than during the Swedish rule, due to the special privileges granted to the lords of the manors. There were local outbreaks of rebellions against the manor-owners, however, they were severely suppressed with the help of bayonets. Estonians regarded Russian soldiers as the ones who protected the interests of the manor-owners and therefore, Estonians considered that a military service in the Russian army totally contradicted their own interests and thus they tried to evade this at any cost. A lot of criminals were taken into the Russian army, and as our rural municipalities and also the manor-owners wanted to get rid of the criminally intended people, such men were usually determined to become conscripts, resulting in the opinion that only criminals served in the army. Such a psychological moment in the mindset of people totally decayed the morale of the conscripts.

Estonians did not have any idea-based principles to serve in the Russian army, and the difficult service far away from homeland, among other nations, inevitably evoked tendencies to evade military service and did not favour the development of military characteristics in Estonians. Finally, the Revolution totally destroyed the morale of the army.

The Russian time did not provide any results with regard to military training and the development of military properties in Estonians, instead, this period was the time when Estonian increasingly wanted to evade the direct duties of military service.

When trying to characterise Estonians as combatants, during the era of surrendering to the foreign power, and using a curve for this purpose, we can see that up until 1343, the line would be at the same level as during the end of the independence period, with slight inclinations, however, since then, there is a general and consistent decline, finally ending in the negative side of the chart by the end of the era.

Chapter 3

ESTONIANS AS COMBATANTS DURING THE WAR
OF INDEPENDENCE AND AS SOLDIERS DURING
THE PEACE-TIME TRAINING

At the beginning of the War of Independence, the population was, in general, passive and inert with regard to the currently developing events. The majority of the Estonian people had no faith in their strength. The population was tired of the events of World War I, demoralised in the whirlwind of the Russian revolution and mentally oppressed during the occupation period, therefore, there was no necessary spiritual interest towards the new events. However, the more active part of the leaders of the nation, together with military commanders began to energetically organise combat cohorts and commenced with the heroic fight for independence and the crowds, finally pushed to move, went along with this.

During the War of Independence, the foundation for the army had to be established on the battlefield, whereas the military organisation and personnel, around which to consolidate the mobilised, was totally nonexistent. The army had to be created on the battlefield. The men drawn together by way of mobilisation were initially consolidated into one division, in addition to which volunteers were formed into special units, upon the initiative of local leaders, which later evolved into military spearhead components.

At the beginning of the war, the mood of the men, drawn together by mobilisation, was fluctuating and, in general, pessimistic. Young and small-staffed military units were incapable and outnumbered to resist the enemy and they withdrew without any resistance. There were numerous occasions of desertion, non-fulfilling of orders and other revelations of disorganisation, and even armed resistance. However, when seeing the destruction caused by Bolshevik raid units and their savage massacres, people pulled their strength together. As a result of consistent awareness activities, the zest for life emerged in people, dictating the need to independently determine their destiny and be the masters of themselves. Following the arrival of foreign aid, the decisive attack commenced and soon the enemy was pushed out of the ethnographic boundaries.

The War of Independence proved the combat capacity and will of Estonians, providing abundant heroes who, with their self-defying fighting fervour, became the backbone and cement of single military units, thus resolutely shaping the underlying spirit of military units.

Troops of volunteers, comprising the intelligentsia and heroes who were willing to experience the thrill of battle and who were also better armed, became the striking units in our struggle for independence, and the enemy was always destroyed as a result of the ferocity of their attacks.

Our average soldier was a mediocre fighter (still, stronger than the communist Russians); he surrendered easily to the effects of fire and unexpectedness, however, easily regained his self-control, but he was not capable of showing heroism similarly to the volunteer troops. In the War of Independence, our soldiers fought the battle of political independence which, according to their opinion, meant the protection of ethnographical borders. When foraying far into Russia, the aim of the fight was no longer clear for the large masses of soldiers; there was overt grousing which deteriorated the capabilities of the military units. The fight against Landeswehr, the

historic enemy, commenced with great enthusiasm and it could be defeated in a foreign territory.

Estonian soldiers solely acknowledged internal discipline based on the reciprocal trust between the commanders and subordinates, whereas the external forms of revealing discipline (by way of using the greeting gesture) were non-acceptable for them.

In general, an Estonian as a combatant, within the mass, was relatively mediocre during the War of Independence. The main actors in the battles were single individual heroes who, with their self-sacrifice and resistance force, were those pillars around whom the masses spiritually consolidated. The War of Independence was the victory of heroes to which the masses contributed; it was the merit of commanders who had sufficient mental strength and willpower to overcome critical moments.

Regarding the training during peace-time, it is possible to state that it was consistently successful, evidencing willingness to work and allowing us to suppose that our soldiers obtained necessary military training during the 1-year-long service. Less success was achieved in the subjects that pre-necessitated speed and rapid understanding. Manoeuvres have proved our soldiers' endurance during long-range route marches and have also shown that close range offensive operations, with speedy sequential runs, are difficult for our soldiers.

Regarding morbidity, our soldiers are easily affected by weather-related influence, which means that special attention has to be paid to the organisation of equipment gear.

Soldiers do yield to military order, however, they allow certain rights to themselves (unauthorised departure). They do not forget the injustice done to them and frequently, when taken out of balance, they lose self-control, harshly demanding that they should be honoured – in numerous occasions, this has caused conflicts between the persons in superior-subordinate relationships.

Chapter 4

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION OF THE ESTONIAN PEOPLE AND THEIR GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

At the end of the 18th century, the Estonian people were split into 4 “ranks”, namely: farm-owners, farm-hands, manor servants and yeomen. According to the laws of 1816 and 1819, liberating the peasantry, the Estonian people were altered into a uniform proletarian mass. During the second half of the 19th century, a new differentiation commenced. Along with the emergence of the 1905 socialist flow in Estonia, the organisation of different “classes” evolved on the basis of ideological convictions. The majority, 2/3 of the population were more or less economically secure, providing a stable basis for the organisation of social life.

The current Estonian people could socially be divided as follows:

- 1) farmers-landowners,
- 2) petit bourgeoisie in towns,
- 3) large-scale entrepreneurs-bankers,
- 4) workers and
- 5) intellectuals.

Peasants form the majority layer of the Estonian people and, being so numerous, create a solid basis for the organisation of national life and provide a stable element for staffing the defence forces. Regarding the purely military issues, peasants are less active than the other stratifications of the population.

Petit bourgeoisie in towns has mainly emerged as a result of the migration of the more active element from rural areas. They are more pampered and demanding, however, more entrepreneurial, and due to this nature, they become more active figures in the war and tend to commit heroic deeds, more easily than the peasants.

Large-scale entrepreneurs-bankers are currently still in the state of development. Due to their way of thinking, concentrated on specific interests, and the correspondingly evolved mindset, it cannot be expected that the members of this class would become good fighters.

Workers, regarding their nature, are a restless and ever searching element; they yearn for power and always play leading roles in disturbances. They are used to fighting and they are not discouraged by defeats. In the war, this class becomes an active-heroic element, however, it is less stable and easily subjects to propaganda.

Intellectuals are the ones who lead the people during peace-time; they become our leadership during war-time. Intellectuals with bourgeoisie tendencies are modest, more delved into themselves; the ones with socialist inclination are, on the contrary, eccentric, moody and form the more active part of our intellectuals.

If we manage to successfully amalgamate all the stratifications of society into one national integrity and the understanding, of the necessity of independent statehood, is prevalent among all the layers, the Estonian nation could provide strong defence forces.

Natural birth rate of our nation is very small. In comparison with other European countries, we are in the last but one position, which paralyses the military potential of the nation.

Age-wise composition of the people currently favours the staffing of the defence forces, however, the relevant future trend refers to general deterioration.

Health-related situation of the people can be considered satisfactory, however, at the same time, it is necessary to underline that tuberculosis, mental illnesses, suicides, respiratory and cardiovascular diseases consistently decrease the number of citizens eligible for serving in the defence forces.

Educational situation of the people is generally good, thus creating a favourable basis for staffing the defence forces with leadership, enabling a wide variety for selection.

The morale of people stands on a thin foundation. There are particularly abundant violations and crimes against social and public order, indicating that Estonians are unbending towards regulating rules and orders.

According to the current acknowledged opinion, Estonians are considered to be members of the Finno-Ugric family. Recently, statements have been published that Estonians on the shores of the Baltic Sea actually represent a specific type “formed on the basis of the Eastern-Baltic race, mainly by way of crossbreed of the Northern, Dalian and the Alpine features”.

It is clear that Estonians are actually not a pure race. Due to crossbreeding and close living with other races, the main characteristics of Estonians have altered in the course of time. In general, Estonians intrinsically have a materialistic nature, revealing itself in the following:

- 1) Conservatism. Obstinacy and stubbornness are one of the strongest manifestations of the feature.
- 2) Selfish egoism, the side effects of which are enviousness, whining and lack of concord.
- 3) Tenaciousness or stamina which enhances the will to fight and endurance.
- 4) Practical being; during the course of times, this feature has brought flexibility into the characteristics of Estonians, however, frequently, it has evolved into servility.

Strong materialistic inclination in the character has resulted in the lack of genteelness in the soul of Estonians, recently this has been accompanied by indifference.

As an outcome of spiritual sparseness, national feelings are not well rooted in Estonians and are mainly revealed verbally.

Estonians demand matter-of-factness and justice. They are known as bearing a grudge and thinking of how to revenge the injustice done to them.

Estonians are people of the mind rather than feelings, therefore, they are apt to independent activities.

Strongly established individualism creates serious obstacles for cooperation between the people; in military matters, this is not at all insignificant.

Considering all the above-mentioned, we can state that Estonian people have experienced numerous moments of upheaval that have, either directly or indirectly, affected the evolvement of the characteristics and mindset of Estonians. As a result of living closely together with other nations and crossbreeding with other races, Estonians have lost a lot of positive features in their main characteristics, and have attributed a number of negative shades.

During the era of surrendering to foreign nations, Estonians have lost a lot of their military virtues. The will to fight, intrinsic of ancient Estonians, is constantly decreasing; foreign powers have attempted to destroy this with drastic measures. The 700-years-long pressure period during which a series of ever so unsuccessful attempts were made to regain the abolished rights had to leave a feeling of powerlessness in the souls of people for an independent fight for freedom. Thus, it is understandable that the people were withdrawn at the beginning of the War of Independence.

Estonian people have always been ready to fight for their freedom; in these fights there was always perseverance and will to fight. During the War of Independence, the people of Estonia provided from among themselves a number of heroes and heroic figures who formed the founding base on which the masses could rely during critical moments.

Estonian people have a uniform past, a similar historic tradition. The stratifications of the nation have social differences which decrease the mutual acuity within the people and facilitate the amalgamation of the nation into one whole, by way of a military organisation with an aim to serve the Estonian nationality.

P A R T T W O

CONCLUSIONS FOR STAFFING, TRAINING AND
LEADERSHIP OF THE DEFENCE FORCESCONCLUSIONS FOR STAFFING THE DEFENCE FORCES

The smaller a nation the more prepared it has to be to make efforts to exist as an independent integrated statehood. We have to have the courage to utilise all our strength for military purposes; we have to start organising our defence forces according to the principle of an “armed nation”. The people can make bigger efforts in case of general conscription which would remain to be the only way to staff our military forces.

The following principles have to be adhered to when providing the staffing with soldiers:

1) The defence forces have to be staffed pursuant to territorial principles, with the peasants and the workers in rural farmsteads, within the current administrative districts of defence forces (staffing regions), excluding the Pechory district of defence forces.

2) According to the principle of exterritoriality, proportionality has to be guaranteed in all districts of defence forces, when staffing the military units with:

- d) the proletariat layer of industrial workers in cities, towns and rural industrial centres;
- e) the layers of petit bourgeoisie and large-scale entrepreneurs and intellectuals;
- f) ethnic minorities (Russians).

3) Different branches of the army have to be staffed with the citizens of all social layers, following the principle of proportionality, whereas the physically and morally stronger element has to be appointed to the infantry which is the main branch of the armed forces.

4) Ethnic minorities should be used for staffing the services and military units where their insufficient knowledge of the official language enables using them in the service.

5) Upon staffing, and aiming at the facilitation of peace-time training and more expedient use of men during war-time, the men with relevant specific knowledge have to be appointed to the services and military units which are in close association with their profession. When staffing with commanding officers, primary attention has to be paid to military capabilities of the selected person and his moral values as a commander, and particularly, a medium-level commander has to be the invigorating soul of the team, the carrier of difficulties in the battle. Upon the staffing with the leadership, the following principles have to be adhered to:

- 1) The person to be trained to become a leader has to be a convinced nationalist, a citizen with a great sense of duty and thorough patriotism.
- 2) Upon the selection of the candidates for leadership, psycho-technical studies have to be implemented in order to determine the military value of the selected candidate.
- 3) According to the first two principles, the leaders have to be selected from among all social layers, whereas in the case of equal military values, preference has to be given to the candidates with “social weight”.

CONCLUSION FOR THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF THE DEFENCE FORCES

Currently, the issue regarding military training is closely connected with the general education-related problems of citizens; these two issues in the military training of citizens form an integral whole. Together, education and training enable the perfect and harmonic development of an individual's moral, intellectual and physical strength.

Everywhere, in parallel with training, a lot of attention has been paid to moral education. At the present day, the field manuals of all countries underline the moral value of combatants. In our case, the Internal Regulations set education as a priority.

The short-term length of current service does not enable the provision of education solely in the defence forces and instead, this is primarily provided by families, schools and society, by way of a number of different organisations.

Education in the family depends of the convictions and viewpoints of the parents; it is not possible for a central state organisation to directly affect this.

Education in schools is the founder of a young citizen's worldview and thus, the state has to check school activities in order to avoid the emergence of tendencies detrimental for national integrity. Our schools have a loyal attitude towards the introduction of national ideals and make attempts to educate general human beings and the latter standpoint has to be reviewed.

With the help of education, it is necessary to deepen the strong feelings in people, whereas the priority should be given to ethnic national feelings as the basis of our independent statehood. A nation with well-developed national feeling forms a mental whole which is capable of extinguishing alien ideas. In parallel with the feeling of nationalism, it is necessary to develop patriotism and the sense of duty. From a military standpoint, the training of the will to fight is of particular significance and can be implemented by way of reviving hero worship.

As our general education of citizens stands on a flimsy surface, the defence forces have to evolve into a patriotic school where common goals and views are being shaped and where citizens from different layers are being amalgamated into a common national family.

Upon the military education of soldiers, it is necessary to develop nationalistic spirit and deepen the senses of duty and discipline.

The aim regarding the education of leaders has to be the development of the properties needed in combat. We have to instil into our leaders that they are the carriers of combat difficulties and a moral support for our soldiers in battle. It is necessary to develop a firm character in leaders, courage to take responsibility and to demand from them to justly treat their subordinates.

The success of military training depends on the system and method which, in main issues, have to be adapted to the properties of the character of the persons to be trained. A strong materialistic inclination and the dominance of individualistic mind in the character of Estonians pre-necessitates a well-calculated educational system and training methods adapted to the individual properties. Regarding the training of Estonians, mechanical drill does not provide the results that can be achieved by way of a conscious way of training. With regard to training methods, maximum results could be obtained as a result of the so-called work method. It is necessary to simplify the training in firing, using the combat requirements as the basis.

Aiming at rationalising the training, it is recommended to guarantee a definite division of labour between the officers and non-commissioned officers, according to the following principle:

- 1) The officer organises and commands the exercises whereas the non-commissioned officer is the actual implementer of the exercise.
- 2) The subjects, where the theoretical part is of dominant importance, have to be personally taught by the officer.

CONCLUSIONS FOR THE COMMAND OF THE DEFENCE FORCES

In order to command the military forces, it is necessary to have a leadership apparatus that resembles a pyramid the stem of which comprises the commanders of the lower level, and higher commanders are at the gradually ascending level, consolidating into the peak of the pyramid which is actually the highest power of the state. Military leadership demands autocratic order where the relationships between the commanders of different levels are regulated by definite subordination relationships.

Definition of leadership is very broad. Technically it is possible to differentiate leadership as follows: 1) political-strategic, 2) operational and 3) tactical.

Political-strategic leadership, when transcending our material strength and deeply rooted non-aggressiveness in the people, can only be considered in the case of a political defence war, and we have to draw all our attention to the maintenance of the immunity of our state.

Operational leadership is actually a question of a well-established system and method. Our system of operational leadership has to be established on the dominance of the commander, whereas:

- 1) Between the commander and the staff, there has to be benevolent cooperation which pre-necessitates successful leadership in the present day combat operations.
- 2) The basis for the cooperation is the commander's final decision the realisation of which is fully to be the responsibility of the staff.
- 3) The commander is to decide the principal questions whereas the details of fulfilling thereof have to remain the liability of the staff.
- 4) The commander has to find time to go to the forward line and encourage the men where the combat difficulties are most sizeable.
- 5) The commander, by way of frequently talking to his soldiers may delve more deeply into their problems, and with his authority, he can affect the frame of mind of the soldiers and increase the combat capacity of military units.

With regard to tactical leadership, it is necessary to underline the importance of personal example.

Our commanders have to remember that their closeness to our soldiers is a great moral support for the latter: they feel spiritual relief when a senior commander has told them some encouraging words. On the other hand, the commanders, when being in close contact with the soldiers, obtain a true impression of the frame of mind of the soldiers and become aware of the actual situation in the military unit; in leadership practice, this enables to properly estimate one of the elements – that of the situation of our capabilities.

