

# SUMMARIES



## **Kriitiline ja loov mõtlemine: kas innovatsioon ja initsiatiiv on relvajõududes teretunud?**

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Siinse artikli eesmärgiks on arutleda selle üle, millises suunas areneb nüüdisaegne juhtimisfilosoofia lääneriikide relvajõududes ning kas tänapäeva relvajõud toetavad ka tegelikkuses innovatsiooni ja initsiatiivi, nagu seda pidevalt avalikult väidetakse.

On kiirete muutuste ajastu: kiirelt arenevas ühiskonnas muutuvad vastased ning ka vahendid, millega vastast mõjutatakse. On üldteada, et alates 11. septembrist 2001 on paljude riikide relvajõudude ülesandeks olnud võidelda globaliseeruva terrorismiga ning sidevahendite kiire arengu tõttu on märgatavalt muutunud ka tänapäeva võitluskeskkond. Siinne artikkel heidabki valgust teguritele, mis mõjutavad tänapäeva relvajõudude arengut, ning hindab relvajõudude vastavust nüüdisaja nõuetele.

Esmalt käsitletakse artiklis põgusalt sõja olemust ja sõjale iseloomulikke jooni ning jõutakse järeldusele, et Preisi sõjateoreetiku Carl von Clausewitzi mõtted sõja olemuse kohta on jätkuvalt jõus: kaos ja ebamäärasus lahinguväljal ei ole vähenenud hoolimata relvade täpsusest ning vaatlus- ja seirevahendite arengust. Seega peavad tänapäeva relvasüsteeme kasutama sõjaväelased olema jätkuvalt heade juhiomadustega. Seejuures on neil võimalik oma töös kasutada ühte kolmest käsusüsteemist. Ajalooliselt vanimas ehk ülemakeskses käsusüsteemis (*command by direction*) sõltub edu saavutamine ülema omadustest ja oskustest, mitte aga juhtimise tsentraliseerituse astmest. Planeerimiskeskse käsusüsteemi (*command by plan*) puhul on otsustajateks võimalikult kõrge taseme ülemad ning tegevusi püütakse detailselt planeerida. Ülema mõjule orienteeritud ehk ülesandepõhises juhtimises (*command by influence*) on ülema kavatsus eelkõige suuniseks, tegelikke otsuseid tehakse madalamal tasemel, võimaldades parimal moel ära kasutada kohalikke olusid ja reaalselt olukorda.

Artiklis analüüsitakse ühendoperatsioonide, personalipoliitika ja tehnoloogia arengu kui tänapäeval väga oluliste tegurite mõju nüüdisaegsele sõjaväelisele juhtimisele. Analüüsi põhjal saab väita, et selgelt on näha suundumus, kus ühendoperatsioonide planeerijad püüavad alluvaid tasandeid nn üle juhtida ning põhjendavad seda vajadusega võimeid ja mõjusid sünkroniseerida (*synchronize capabilities and effects*). Vähenevate koosseisudega armeede personalipoliitikas on ohvitseride edutamisel järgnevale ametikohale järjest olulisemaks saanud vigade nulltolerantsi ja nn üles-või-välja-

põhimõtted, mis tuginevad (eksi)arvamusele, et sõjanduses saab põhimõtteliselt vigu vältida. Selline lähenemine toetab nn toksilisi juhte ja direktoreid, kelle jaoks on oluline ainult isiklik karjäär, mitte aga sõjalise juhtimise (ehk lahinguedu tagavad) põhimõtted. Tehnoloogia kiire areng on tekitanud sõjaväes olukorra, kus primitiivseid, kuid teadmisi ja oskusi nõudvaid toiminguid ei osata enam sageli teha ilma moodsaid seadmeid kasutamata. Sõjapidamises ei tohi mingil juhul eirata sõjapidamisvahendite arengut ning tuleb suuta kiiresti kohaneda uute vahenditega, minetamata samas lihtsaid tõdesid ja oskusi. Seega peab ajaga kaasas käia tahtev sõjavägi õpetama oma isikkoosseisu ka kiiresti õppima, mitte ainult kasutama tõhusalt kõrgtehnoloogilisi vahendeid.

Käesolev artikkel ei püüa leida selgeid ja lõplikke lahendusi tekkinud olukorrale, pigem juhib ta tähelepanu selle erinevatele aspektidele. Autor loodab, et lugejal tekib pärast artikliga tutvumist küsimus, kas siiski on piisavalt lahti mõtestatud vaadeldud tegurite ja tendentside tegelik mõju nüüdisaegse sõjalise juhtimise tõhususele.

## **Foundations of Capability-Based Planning**

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What is CBP and how it differs from other, alternative, methods of defense planning? For nearly four decades the method for accomplishing defense planning was one of the bounding threats. The idea was that using those bounding threats as requirements, as represented by one or two point scenarios, would lead to the appropriate capabilities. Point-scenario planning is characterized by a fixation on particular enemies, particular wars, and particular assumptions about those wars – a fixation that comes at the expense of more flexible and adaptive planning. CBP, in turn, is designed to accommodate uncertainty, the infamous Clausewitzian ‘fog of war’, a feature that point-scenario planning lacks. CBP could be defined as planning, under uncertainty, which aims to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of future challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework. To distill the key features of CBP, the author draws upon two approaches – the 1995 overview of the Australian defense planning system, and more recent U.S. approach, linked to the guidance and requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review document. Australians have developed a planning methodology that is based on the Government policy guidance, and develops an economically feasible defense

force that carries military capabilities required to counter 'credible contingencies'. The baseline requirement is the existence of comprehensive Government policy. Defense planners, in response to government guidance, conduct a comprehensive analysis of military capabilities possessed by relevant countries identified within a geopolitical and geostrategic context, as well as by own country; followed by the development of series of credible contingencies for both near- and medium-term timeframe, and with five-year resource availability estimation taken into account while forming defense requirements. The end product of a planning phase is a family of credible contingencies that describe security challenges to the nation in terms of adversary capabilities, and resource-constrained capability requirements for own forces to confront these challenges. Further, employing the family of credible contingencies and resource-constrained capability requirements, a process of Force Development is undertaken. Defense planners identify the array of tasks to be executed by own forces across all credible contingencies; identify capability gaps in existing Forces, i.e., areas where current and approved capabilities are insufficient to meet established mission requirements; and develop specific proposals to bridge identified capability gaps. When approved, these solutions will drive the future funding or programming process. Much recent analog to the Australian model is a U.S. methodology that has been elaborated within the framework of policy guidance provided by Quadrennial Defense Review process of 2001. The U.S. process begins with identifying the full range of plausible contingencies, followed by the scenario-space analysis of significant scenarios. From there, relatively few operational challenges are presented in the form of military missions that, in turn, will define military output-capabilities required to execute these missions—and metrics to measure the required performance. The next step for each operational challenge, then, is to conduct a mission-system analysis to ascertain which capabilities are required. The outcome of this phase of CBP is a set of capability package options carrying somewhat different combinations of required core capabilities, along with a 'scorecard' estimation of how well each of these options performs under varying circumstances. The assessment of performance of each of capability options forms an important analytical support to the decision-making process to select options the development of which will get funding. Whilst general capability options have been selected, the next question to address is to ascertain how much of a capability is enough to meet diverse requirements stemming from a number of different scenarios under existing resource limitations. CBP's implementation should emphasize flexibility, adaptiveness, and robustness of capability. That *implies* a modular, building-block approach to force design and operations. The overall 'syntax' of building blocks is "Who does what, in pursuit of what goals, according to

what concept, using what assets?” The outcome of modular approach, taking into account the results of the mission-system analysis of capability requirements from significant operational challenges, is, then, a set of building blocks – across all three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical – in the form of units possessing systems and support structures that are tailored to conduct identified operations. The U.S. CBP methodology of QDR 2001, then, can be summarized as the one that focuses on modular capabilities and emphasizes mission-system analysis, exploratory analysis, and hierarchical portfolio methods for integration and trade-offs in an economic framework. Though somewhat differently packaged, the essential internal logic of the process remains the same for both Australian and U.S. approach. The key steps of the generic CBP process are as follows:

- Policy guidance
- Development of scenarios
- Identification of Missions
- Development of Capability Requirements
- Identification of Capability Gaps
- Development of Solutions to bridge Capability Gaps
- Selection and Approval of Solutions that will guide further resource allocation.

### **The Application of Tactical Decision Games in the Training of Battlefield Decision Making at Company Level**

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The purpose of this study was to find out if tactical decision games (TDGs) are suitable to teach and practice battlefield decision making skills at the infantry company level. It is difficult to find field exercises and other training events for officer-cadets where they could actually lead a company sized unit in real life. At the same time they are expected to lead an infantry company in a conscript army during wartime after their graduation. The hypothesis was that solving TDGs improves the quality of decision making on the battlefield.

The study was conducted in the Estonian National Defence College with 35 officer-cadets who were involved in the infantry company commanders' course. There was one TDG per day during a three week period. 16 TDGs and an evaluation scale made by the author of the thesis were used. The evaluation process was conducted by three subject matter experts.

All the participants solved 4 TDGs. They were expected to give their orders which they would have given via radio, in written format. A 15 minute timeframe for reading, understanding and issuing orders was used.

Then the class was divided into two subgroups, the first continued with 8 TDGs, the second wrote an analytical essay about a theme in tactics.

The third part of the experiment was conducted as the first one. During the whole experiment no feedback about the students' tactical solutions was given by the directing staff.

The written solutions were evaluated on a four step scale. The scale was built up on the basis of fulfilling the commander's intent and avoiding unnecessary losses to their own unit.

The findings of the study support the statement that TDGs are suitable for training company commanders. The group that solved more TDGs scored higher than the group that solved fewer TDGs. The results were statistically reliable. It is remarkable when we consider the extremely simplistic nature of the learning environment. Without any feedback the cadets who solved more TDGs and collected more patterns showed development in tactical thinking and formulation of orders.

Some traits became evident in the study that show statistically reliable positive correlations between TDG scores and a person's mathematical and overall mental aptitude.

### **Tubakatoodete tarvitamise mõjust sõjaväelaste sooritusvõimele**

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Tubakatoodete tarvitamisega kaasnevad otsesed ja kaudsed kulud on tõstnud selle küsimuse vältimatuks tervisepoliitiliseks prioriteediks. Euroopa Liidus kulutatakse veidi enam kui 1% riigisisest kogutoodangust tubaka tarvitamisega seotud haiguste ravikuludeks. Mõnes uuemas liikmesriigis võib see küündida isegi 3% SKT-st. On teada, et enim ennetatavaid surmi põhjustab tubakatoodete tarbimine, mille tagajärjel kaotavad elu kolmandik kuni pooled selle tarvitajatest. Uurimuste kohaselt peetakse Euroopas suitsetamist vastutavaks kokku ligi 19 000 kaotatud eluaasta eest ning 2030. aastaks võib kõikidest maailma surmadest 10% olla seotud tubakatoodete tarvitamise tagajärgedega.

Hoolimata pessimistlikest hinnangutest, mille kohaselt järgneva paari aastakümnega suitsetajate hulk ning suitsetamisega seotud surmade määr kahekordistub, näitab statistika tubakatoodete tarvitamise jätkuvat langust.

Võrreldes 2002. aastaga on 2005. aastal nii Ameerika Ühendriikides kui Euroopas tubakatoote kasutamine järjekindlalt langenud. Langus ei ole olnud silmatorkavalt järsk, see on jäänud vaid 1% piiresse, kuid suundumus on püsiv. Tubakaga seotud surmade statistika põhjal võib arvata, et tubakatoote tarvitamise langustrend on täheldatav juba 1980-ndate esimesest poolest.

Tubakatooteid on aegade jooksul tarvitatud rohkem militaarstruktuurides kui tsiviilmaailmas. Siiski on tubakatoote tarbimise langustrendi märgata ka militaarstruktuurides. Näiteks Kanada armees on vastavad näitajad langenud isegi madalamale kui tsiviilelanike seas. Kahjuks ei ole sellist positiivset muutust märgata kõigis sõjaväe väeliikides, sõjaväelaste vanusegruppides ega ka riikides, samuti mitte kõigi tubakatoote kategooriate puhul. Eestis näiteks ületab tubakatoote tarvitamine sõjaväelaste seas tsiviilelanikkonda umbes 13 protsendipunkti võrra. Samuti on pigem kasvanud ka tubakatoote (eriti suitsuvaba tubaka) tarbimine maaväes ning noorema vanusegrupi sõjaväelaste seas. Tubakatoote tarvitamise sagedus ja intensiivsus (sh uute tarvitajate tekkimine) tõuseb ka välisoperatsioonidel. Põhjastena on välja toodud (1) stressi, igavust, unepuudust; (2) alternatiivsete tegevuste ja privileegide puudumist; (3) veendumust, et operatsioonidega seotud ohud elule ja tervisele on kõrgemad suitsetamisega seotud riskidest; (4) sõjaväelise kultuuri soovivat mõju. Suitsetamiskäitumise negatiivne muutus välisoperatsioonidel leidis kinnitust Eesti sõjaväelaste seas tehtud uurimuses, kus lisaks sagenenud suitsetamisele ilmsid ootuspärased seosed sõduri suitsetamiskäitumise ja tema üldise tervise ning psühholoogilise enesetunde vahel (sõdurid, kes hakkasid rohkem suitsetama, hindasid enda üldist tervist ja psühholoogilist enesetunnet halvemaks).

Tubakatoote tarvitamise negatiivset mõju sõdurite sõjalisele valmisolekule on uuritud põhjalikult. Näiteks esineb suitsetajatel sagedamini psühhiaatrilisi probleeme, koormusmurde, nende nägemisteravus on halvenenud ning oht haigestuda kopsuhaigustesse on suurem. Suitsuvaba tubaka tarvitajatel esineb sagedamini suuõõnega seotud probleeme, kolesteroleemiat ja kõrgeenenud vererõhku, halvenenud on visumotoorne sooritus. Kui tubakatoode ei ole kättesaadav, kahjustub nn ärajäämanähtude tagajärjel ka suitsetajate sõjaline valmisolek, mis väljendub pikenenud reaktsiooniajas, südame langenud löögisageduses ning samuti sotsiaalses eemaltõmbumises.

Sõjaväelised tegevteenistujad on suhteliselt noored ja tugeva füüsilise ettevalmistusega ning võrreldes alkoholarvitamise või riskantse liikluskäitumisega ei ole tubatootede mõju nende sõjalisele valmisolekule nii otsene (nt surma, haiguste, vigastuste põhjustajana). Kuna periood tubakatoote tarvitamise ja tervisliku seisundi muutuse vahel on pikk, avaldab see tervisekäitumine mõju pigem vanematele (ja erru läinud) sõjaväelastele seas ning väljendub madalamas elukvaliteedis ja eluea lühenemises. Tuleb siiski

arvestada, et tubakatooteid tarbivate teenistujate sõjalised võimed halvenevad, ning võtta kasutusele ennetavad meetmed, mis aitaksid tubakatoote tarvitamist vähendada.

Sekkumisstrateegiate väljatöötamisel tuleb arvestada seda, et tavaliselt esineb koos mitu tervist kahjustavat käitumist (tubaka ja alkoholi ülemäärane tarvitamine, riskantne liikluskäitumine). Et sekkumine oleks tõhus, peab see olema suunatud korruga mitmele käitumisele ning arvestada tuleb ka spetsiifilise riskigrupi vajadusi. Strateegiate väljatöötamisel on eriti oluline arvestada sõjaväelist kultuuri ja tubakatootjate ärihuve, mida peetakse õigustatult tubakatoote tarvitamise varjatud soodustajateks sõjaväelaste seas. Et sellega konkureerida, tuleb läbi mõelda sõjaväelastele suunatud sõnum, mis peaks eelkõige rõhutama, et suitsetamine (1) vähendab sotsiaalset mõjujõudu; (2) suurendab enneaegse teenistusest vabastamise tõenäosust; (3) langetab valmisolekut võidelda ja võita; (4) vähendab tegevuse tulemuslikkust teenistuses.

Nii veteranide kui ka tegevteenistujate seas tehtud uurimused näitavad, et tubakatoote tarbimise vähendamine ning tervisekäitumise toetamine militaarstruktuurides ei ole lootusetu ettevõtmine, kuid sisutihjude loosungite ja ühekordsete ettevõtmistega tulemust ei saavuta. Positiivsete tagajärgede saavutamiseks on tarvis pikaajalist läbimõeldud tegutsemiskava koos täpsete elluviimisjuhiste ja kõrgema juhtimistasandi selgelt väljendatud toetusega.

## **Ülesannete lahendamine füüsikaõppe tõhustamiseks**

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Siinse uurimistöö eesmärk oli teha kindlaks, kuidas ülesannete lahendamine mõjutab füüsikaõppe efektiivsust. Artiklis tutvustatakse hajusandmetega ülesandeid, mis koosnevad olukorra kirjeldusest ja esitatud küsimusest. Algandmed on esitatud eraldi ja neid on kas rohkem või vähem, kui lahendamiseks vaja läheb.

Ülesannete traditsioonilises lahendamismetoodikas nähakse ette, et õppur kordab füüsikaliste suuruste tähiseid, nende ühikuid, õpib ja harjutab ühikute teisendamist, kordab seadusi ja jätab meelde vastavad matemaatilised mudelid, õpib analüüsima ning lahendama füüsikalisi probleeme. Traditsioonilise ülesande lahendamist soodustab asjaolu, et üldjuhul on selline füüsikaülesanne eluvõõras ja selle lahendamiseks on antud kõik vajalikud andmed.

Tuleb ainult leida sobiv valem, paigutada sellesse arvud ja arvutada välja vastus. Õppur juba teab, et kui mõni täht ja sellele vastav arv jääb kasutamata, siis on lahendus kindlasti vale. Keerulisemates ülesannetes tuleb ka ühikuid teisendada või mitut kasutada valemit.

Elulised ülesanded on aga tihti keerulised ning nõuavad, et lahendaja rakendaks teooriat loovalt. Selleks on vaja analüüsivõimet, oskust probleemi mõista ja lahendada ning oskust vajalikke lähteandmeid iseseisvalt leida.

Selleks et füüsikaülesannete lahendamine aitaks tõesti õppuril omandada füüsikat, mitte ainult oskust valemitega manipuleerida, on artikli autorite arvates vaja uut tüüpi ülesandeid. Selliste ülesannete koostamisel tuleb lähendada sellest, et elus ei ole kunagi kõik vajalikud andmed kohe antud. Samuti tuleb otsustada, kas kõiki asjaolusid tuleb arvestada või võib vähemolulised kõrvale jätta. Loomulikult võtab selliste ülesannete lahendamine rohkem aega, aga siinne uurimus näitas, et see tasub ära – õpilane õpib analüüsima, seoseid looma ja ka meelde jääb rohkem.

Uuring korraldati 2007/2008. õppeaastal ja selles osales 620 õppurit kogu Eestist. Tulemused näitasid, et kui füüsika õpetamisel lahendada hajusandmetega ülesandeid, kasvab õppeefektiivsus umbes 36%. Seega võiksid õpetajad kasutada hajusandmetega ülesandeid ja neid ise ka koostada. Korrigeerida võiks traditsiooniliste ülesannete teksti: lisada rohkem või vähem andmeid, kui ülesande lahendamiseks vaja, ja siduda need tavaeluga.

## **The Free Peasants (*land-frei's*)<sup>1</sup> of Koguva in the Context of Vassalage and the Wars in Sixteenth-Century Livonia**

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Koguva is a coastal village on the Northwestern coast of Muhumaa, near the Väike (Small) Strait. The first mention of the village's name is from 1532, when the Master of the Livonian branch of the German Order, Wolter von Plettenberg, gave a land of 2.5 plow-lands on the coast of the Väike Strait as a fiefdom to Hansken, the forefather of Schmuul-Smuul family.

Regarding Hansken, there are 3 aspects of note. First, he wasn't an ordinary peasant, but an elder (oldeste). Secondly, the land of 2.5 plow-lands (8–12 ha) was in Hansken's possession before 1532. And thirdly, this document of fiefdom only gave fixed personal freedom and rights to the

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<sup>1</sup> *land-frei's*: Free land (or fief-)-owning peasants in medieval Livonia.



lands for Hansken and his heirs, but these were active already before that. Plettenberg's document may have been only a confirmation of an earlier document dating from 1389, with the same content.

The Stift of Maasilinna (Soneburg) was in several ways different from the other domains of Livonian Order. The lands of the stift lay (islets not included) on three different islands: Eastern Saaremaa (Pöide, the domains of Maasilinna), Muhu and Eastern Hiiumaa. Thus the Stift of Maasilinna was like an archipelago in its own right and contacts between different parts of the stift was more complicated than usual. For the Order's Maasilinna castle, the port area of Koguva was the closest and most convenient place for landing, so it's logical to assume that this was the transition spot for post and other connections. In the Hansken's document of fiefdom there was stated a duty to employ one "war horse" (a steed). Thus resulting in an assumption that he was a horseback-messenger (postman) between Väike (Small) – and Suur (Great) straits. It seems, however, that the purpose of Plettenberg's document of fiefdom was to confirm the status of Hansken as a minor vassal – light horseman. Using Estonian light cavalry was an old tradition for the Livonian Order, which dates from the conquest of the land itself and, in the case of Saaremaa, founded in the treaty of surrender from 1255, as a part of land-defence duty of Saaremaa's natives. One document discovered by E.Blumfeld, dating from between 1288–1346, includes a list of the villages of Järvamaa, and next to each village name was a note of the number of different types of horses and armor that the village had to provide in case of a war threat – all together 433 horses and 88 units of armor-plated vests (*plathen*). But this has also been understood as 88 men of fully armored light cavalry and 433 auxiliaries on horses. The German Order's Prussian branch is also known to have demanded the service of minor vassals as light horsemen, on the basis of fiefdom rights. This kind of service was called *Platendienst*. Thus, the duty of Hansken, enshrined in the document of Plettenberg, to keep one good steed, probably means the duty to attend for cavalry service, as a compensation for fiefdom. The fact that during peacetime he may have served as a postman is another matter, and it does not exclude the cavalry service.

So, we are tempted to consider Hansken as a typical minor vassal, a great number of whom were Estonians or at least of Estonian descent, mostly the descendants of Estonian elders or of the local elite. Degree by degree, Germans, and Germanized families of Estonian descent joined in later on. Mixed marriages contributed to Germanisation as well. In later times, the gap between squires – a large-number in Saaremaa – and richer peasants was small, and there were mixed marriages.

In the 16th century wars, Muhumaa suffered greatly; in addition to havoc expeditions, crop failures, famines and plagues, peasants had to pay blood

tithes to the landlords. The war that broke out between the Grand Prince of Moscow and the Livonian rulers in 1558 did not leave Saaremaa and Hiiu-maa untouched. Right at the beginning of the Livonian War, when the truce of 1558–1559 ended, the Livonian Order mobilized a vast amount of land defence forces formed of peasants. Of these duties, only those of Maasilinna stift's are known: in the spring of 1560, the Vogt had to provide, in addition to his own and stift's nobility's cavalry (all together 22 "horses") and auxiliaries (12 men as "gunners"), 700 Estonian and 100 Swedish peasants, but the peasants of the nobility's manors were left out of the consideration (they were taken only into the train). Maasilinna's Vogt also had to call 50 riders into the Maasilinna stronghold to keep them prepared for battle, and 15 *landsknecht's* (mercenary foot soldiers), so that Saaremaa would not remain completely defenceless.

The mobilisation of Maasilinna's stift could, in a modern sense, be called a general mobilisation, considering its vast extent. According to Swedish land revision, the former lands of Maasilinna's Vogt of Livonian Order had all together 517  $\frac{5}{8}$  plow-lands, 545 households and 283 plots of *üksjalg's*<sup>2</sup> and half-*pundenik's*<sup>3</sup>, included. We have to exclude the landless peasants, because they probably did not participate in war duties. According to the list, a total of appr. 800 peasants were taken into service, or one peasant from each household. Or, if we also exclude *üksjalg* (onefooters) and half-*pundenik's*, it amounts to one and a half men from each household. In villages with Swedish tenants the duty was twice that size.

Not much good came from the mobilisation of Maasilinna's peasants. In 1559–1560 the new Grand Master Gotthard Kettler refused to use the peasant forces in war, although a certain number of them were included in his forces nonetheless. Neither were the free peasants (*land-frei's*) of Koguva left untouched by the war. Although the aforementioned mobilisation call upon the Maasilinna lands probably did not reach its goal, and the Livonian Order was eliminated in 1562, the Northern Seven Year's War started in 1563.

Hansken of Koguva died before the collapse of the Livonian Order. As far as it is known, the second document given in Koguva, dates from December 24th, 1565, and it states that Heinrich von Lüddingshausen-Wulff, Maasilinna's Vogt of the German Order, entitling himself as Vicegerent of the whole of Saaremaa, confirmed Asmus's, son of Hansken of Koguva, the right of fiefdom, and also freed him of the obligation to entertain the lord for his loyalty and faithfulness. Sources make clear that Asmus's services

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<sup>2</sup> *üksjalg* – onefooters: socially unique class of peasants in medieval Livonia, with fewer duties than plow-land peasants.

<sup>3</sup> half-*pundenik's* (*pundenik*: socially unique class of peasants in medieval Livonia, with fewer duties than plow-land peasants, usually richer than onefooters).

towards Danish Royal Vicegerent were not small, but it can only be speculated on, as to what they actually were.

In what unit may Asmus of Koguva have fought? As mentioned before, the Vogt of Maasilinna had to gather 50 horsemen into the Maasilinna stronghold in the spring of 1560. It appears that they were not the *rossdienst* to be gathered, because they were mentioned separately in a different account, according to which the cavalry of 22 noble horsemen (as the *rossdienst*) were to be gathered. If Plettenberg's document of fiefdom was to be taken into account, according which Hansken had to: "keep one good steed, to set it out to serve the Master Vogt in case of need," Hansken's son Asmus may easily have been one of those 50 horsemen.

Another possibility is that Asmus belonged to those 700 peasants mobilised from the Order's lands of Maasilinna. Since the number of Estonian land defence force is a large one, we have to assume that the lower divisions were led by local elders, either village chiefs or *wakka-elder* (Hansken is named an *oldeste* (an elder) in the document of fiefdom). It is known at least from the Middle Ages that peasant land defence divisions (*malewa*) and reinforcement divisions were led by peasant elders or chiefs. These mobilised peasants certainly did not participate in the hostile action against Russian forces in 1560, but they were probably mobilised in the autumn of 1559 as well, when the efforts of the Livonian Order were at their greatest in numbers. War activity was then taking place mostly in Tartumaa and in the surroundings of Laiuse. In 1560 the Vogt of Maasilinna started to collaborate with Duke Magnus and Denmark and did not participate in the war with Moscow.

Later, during Livonian war, the peasant force of such a number was not mobilised, so Asmus's later service of 1559–1565 (until the document of Lüdingshausen-Wulff), had to take place in the composition of forces usually called (*mõisamehed hofleute*, manor men). In 1563–1564 the troops of manor men Rittmeisters Jürgen von Tiesenhausen and Heinrich Dücker were positioned in Saaremaa. In the lists of those forces the name of Asmus is absent, but it may be due to him being of peasant descent. Also, we might assume that if he served in one of those troops, it is more probably to have been Tiesenhausen's, which was recruited from vassals of Läänemaa and Saaremaa. The account of Tiesenhausen's troops was kept by the Danish Royal Vicegerent Heinrich von Lüdingshausen-Wulff, who in his document of 1565 was very much aware of Asmus's services in war. Asmus's participation in war probably ended in 1565 as well – he stayed in Koguva, not leaving for mainland with the manor men (*mõisamehed*).

The Livonian War, which brought about the collapse of the Livonian Confederation, may be considered to be the end of the Middle Ages in Estonia. What happened was a transition from a medieval fiefdom-based system

to a modern-era governing system, which brought about governmental centralisation and the diminishing importance of the great vassal families in governing the land and deciding its fate. Based on historical sources and records of fiefdoms given to persons of Estonian descent, we can establish that not all of the Estonian nobility (elders and prosperous people) perished in the fights of the Livonian Crusades, but integrated into the local nobility. Until the Livonian War, the percentage of Estonians among local vassals (mostly minor- and secondary vassals) was quite high. The Livonian War was fatal for many of them, and the knighthood that emerged during Swedish, Polish, Danish and Russian rule, was formed mostly from those of foreign descent. Still, among them were some families that themselves dated from the Middle Ages, and called themselves old nobility (*Uradel*), but in the 18th and 19th centuries avoided admitting their descent from local natives, because it was politically undesirable to descend from the contemporary serfs. Therefore they searched for distant ancestors with similar or similarly sounding family names mostly from Germany.

The free peasants (*Land-frei's*) of Koguva survived the Livonian War. The name of *Koggi Aßmuß(e)* can be found in addition to land revision of years 1569–1571, in revision books of years 1592; 1617–1618; and 1618–1619. It is not clear if it annotates a man with the same name or just a name of the farm. Within one century, the *land-freis* or minor vassals of Koguva, had become free peasants.

The fate of the free peasants of Koguva has been unique in the context of Estonian history: one house of Estonian *land-frei's*/minor vassals did not integrate in the course of centuries into local Baltic Germans (since they lived separately within the Koguva area) nor into local peasants-serfs (due to the document of fiefdom and later documents, they managed to stay free). They carried out the mailing services once entrusted to them until the end of the 19th century. Not until 1894 did the Livonian Governorate find that the mailing service duty considerably exceeded the profitability of the land given to Koguva peasants 350 years before, neither did the duty answer to the needs of the time nor established order in the postal service. It was decided, then, that the postal services would rest upon the whole community and that the mail-men of Koguva would pay rent equally with others.

## **The Formation of the Military School of the Republic of Estonia and its First Graduates in the War of Independence**

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As it is generally known, the lack of officers on all levels of command was seriously felt in the Estonian People's Army during the War of Independence. The article handles the junior officers (company officers) preparation during the War of Estonian Independence. At that time the company organization was fixed, in addition to the company commander position, one senior officer position and 2–3 company junior officer posts. To meet the needs for filling the posts of company junior officers, the warrant-officer status was introduced. During the war those more educated non-commissioned officers who had shown bravery in combat were promoted to warrant officer rank, most of whom lacked proper NCO training. According to some estimates there were 1–2 warrant-officers in service in every company at the end of the War of Independence. NCOs were also appointed to platoonleaders posts.

At the end of March 1919 the Commander in Chief Major General Johan Laidoner made the proposal to the Minister of War of opening the Military School for officer preparation. His proposal described the situation in a very serious perspective, as the whole front was held by only around 20 or so experienced officers whose ranks were to remain sparser and melt down as the hostilities continued. Therefore, it was necessary to form the officer school for strengthening the resistance power of the front. The Military School of the Republic of Estonia was officially founded by the order of the Commander in Chief from April 3rd 1919. According to the command of the day the school was opened on April 22nd 1919. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the school the Commander in Chief emphasized that there was no more old Imperial Army and the firmness of the democratic state's armed forces should be based on mutual understanding and friendship between soldiers and officers.

Captain Aleksander Simon (1877–1960) was appointed to the duties of the first commandant of the school. He had served during the WWI as an adjutant in the Russian Sveaborg fortress and later in the Estonian Headquarters. The Military School was located in Tallinn and was immediately subordinated under the undersecretary of the Minister of War. There was one infantry Cadet company (120 cadets), one Cadet battery (two platoons – 50 cadets) and one Cadet cavalry platoon (25 cadets) foreseen in the school organization. In being an all-arms school, it was also divided by study organization into classes (for instance battery class).

The curriculum of the school was adapted to the principles of the former Russian reserve officer (war-time officer, so called ensign school) programme. The subjects taught in first class were tactics, topography, fortification, trench making, machine guns, artillery, former Russian military laws and instructions, Estonian language, healthcare and gymnastics. In the cavalry and artillery branches appropriate subjects were taught thoroughly (hippology, riding, ballistics, artillery tactics etc). In the infantry course as much as it is possible to distinguish drill training was the dominating part of the programme. Mostly the training copied pre-war Russian principles and methods (for instance instructions) which were out of date in the new environment of warfare. As much as it is known there was only one small tactics manual available as a teaching aid in Estonian, composed by the inspector of classes. The lecturers were officers and civilian experts, many of whom worked in the central military institutions in Tallinn and could not devote enough time to their pedagogic duties. There were no fixed syllabuses and programmes, and lecturers were left free hands in their activities.

Of the first infantry course – 106 graduates were promoted to officer rank (ensign) on August 3rd 1919 after a little more than a 3 month long training. The cavalry cadets (25 graduates) were promoted on September 15th 1919 and from the artillery course (57 graduates) on October the 5th.

After the graduation of the first classes the second course was formed. Now the Cadet (infantry) battalion was formed (consisted of 2 companies), the cavalry and artillery study formations remained at their previous limits. With the end of hostilities on the fronts, the second course was prolonged. In late autumn of 1919 the Naval Class of the Military School was also formed.

Altogether (in the 3 branches) there were 191 graduates-ensigns from the first classes of the school who were born between 1886–1902. The average age of the cadets at their graduation was 21 years. Around 20 graduates had participated in the WWI battles in the Russian Army, almost the same number of cadets had started their officer education in Russian military schools, which were interrupted by revolution and civil warfare. The majority of the first graduates were gymnasium students from the elder classes, who started service as volunteers, in many cases from the very first days of the war. About 20 cadets had been injured or wounded in the battles of the WWI or the War of Independence. Only about 30 graduates from the first classes had not participated in hostilities before entering to school.

After the graduation in the final battles of the war at least 7 graduates-ensigns served in the posts of company commander, at least another 6 carried out these duties temporarily. A few graduates also acted in the duties of reconnaissance commando leader. Altogether 16 of the first class graduates were awarded with the high order for military merits – the Liberty Cross (in one case posthumously) after the end of the war.

Six graduates-ensigns can be estimated to be direct victims of the war (2 lost in battle, 1 killed in action, 1 wounded (died in hospital) and 2 more died in hospital).

After the end of the War most graduates of the school were released from army service under the demobilization (mostly in 1920–1921). For those who wanted and were able to continue a peacetime officer career, supplementary military education was considered necessary. About 20 percent (40 persons) of the first war-time graduates continued to serve longer, in the peace-time Army, Defence League (Kaitseliit) or Border Guard units as officers (promoted at least to Captain rank before 1940). Seven of those mentioned before were able to obtain a higher military education from the Estonian Higher Military School (1921–1940), 3 of them reached promotion to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in their military service career before the Soviet occupation in 1940. The foundation of the Estonian Military School during the War of Independence could be seen to be one aspect of the whole rear organization process. Its first graduates could not entirely satisfy the overall lack of junior officers, however the foundation of the school somehow raised self-confidence and morale, cultivated national identity and secured domestic life in the capital. Despite the contrast between, in many aspects, an outdated and insufficient education and that of the real nature of warfare in the War of Independence, the cornerstone of the nation's military education was laid down.

### **Treaty of Mutual Assistance Between the Republic of Estonia and the Soviet Union and Later Agreements Thereof**

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Year 1939 became one of the most fatal in Estonian history in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. On August 23, 1939, two countries with a totalitarian regime – the Soviet Union and Germany – concluded a treaty of non-aggression, the secret protocols of which divided Eastern Europe into spheres of interest and, owing to that, Estonia would prove to be in the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union. Germany, having secured its back, started warfare against Poland on September 1, 1939. On September 17 also the Soviet Union started aggression against Poland. In the war commenced the Republic of Estonia would promptly declare its neutrality and announce its standing aside from any military conflict. It also refrained from both total and partial mobilisation. Mobilisation would have not changed anything in practice, yet a growth in

national-public self-awareness and better preparedness of the nation and armed forces to an international crisis situation would have ensued.

After a successful campaign in Poland the Soviet Union addressed its interest to the Baltic countries. The basis for mutual communication between the Republic of Estonia and the Soviet Union was the Tartu Peace Treaty concluded between the Republic of Estonia and Soviet Russia on February 2, 1920. In the said treaty Soviet Russia would declare Estonian sovereignty. Diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations between the two countries were working too. Against such a background it would have been difficult for the Soviet Union to justify an aggression against Estonia in the international arena. For the Soviet Union it was vital to realise its so-called advanced defence doctrine. By means of that, control would have been gained over the Baltic Sea, as well as dominion would have been assumed in the Gulf of Finland. For that there were two possibilities: to establish military bases in the Baltic countries and in the more distant future occupy these countries, or to opt for the way of direct military aggression. The Soviet Union would choose the first option as its way of further action, i.e. establishing bases.

Whereas no country can transfer its military bases into the territory of another sovereign country out of the blue, without direct military action, the Soviet Union had to come up with a ground. In the case of Estonia advantage was taken of the fact that in the night of September 14/15, the Polish submarine "Orzel" landed in Tallinn, which, despite being interned, fled in the night of September 18. The Soviet party right away began accusing Estonia of aiding the Polish submarine to flee.

On September 19, 1939, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Molotov, informed the Estonian envoy in Moscow, August Rei, of the fact that the Soviet Union would hold Estonia liable for the escape of "Orzel" and that the Red Banner Baltic Fleet would start looking for the submarine all over the Gulf of Finland. Consequently, a naval blockade was established, which was followed by an intrusion of Soviet ships into Estonian territorial waters and shooting its coastal region.

On September 22, 1939, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Karl Selter, went to Moscow to conclude a new foreign trade contract with the Soviet Union. At a meeting held on September 24 with the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, as well as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. Molotov, the latter would announce that the trade contract would be renewed only in case Estonia agreed to the establishment of Soviet military bases in its territory. According to V. Molotov, the neutrality policy of Estonia jeopardised the security of the Soviet Union and compromised its navy and merchant navy, as well as immediately Leningrad. In addition to that, V. Molotov declared that they had outgrown of the terms and



conditions of the Peace Treaty of 1920 and that we were dealing with a military and economic superpower, whose interests needed to be taken into account. Consequently, the Soviet Union had decided to obtain consent from the Estonian government for the conclusion of a military or mutual assistance treaty, which would be followed by the right for the Soviet Union to possess footholds or bases for the navy and air force within Estonian territory. The establishment of military bases in Estonia was hoped to be formulated officially as a treaty of mutual assistance. The government of a country having remained independent for 21 years gave in to pressure by Moscow and, based on a treaty of mutual assistance concluded between the Soviet Union and Estonia on September 28, 1939, the Soviet Union acquired the right to establish military bases in Estonia. The treaty is better known as the treaty of bases and it served as a basis for the destruction of Estonian statehood and its occupation by and annexation to the Soviet Union a few months later.

Thus, one of the direct consequences of the non-aggression treaty concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany on August 23, 1939, is also the treaty of mutual assistance concluded between the Republic of Estonia and the Soviet Union on September 28, 1939, which would result in establishing Soviet military bases in Hiiumaa, Saaremaa and Paldiski. On the basis of an additional confidential protocol belonging to the treaty, Soviet military vessels were allowed to use the Port of Tallinn for supplying with food and fuel and docking for up to two years. The conclusion of the treaty of mutual assistance was not easy: already during the negotiations the Soviet party requested Red Army troops be located in many places within Estonian territory. The Estonian government, on the contrary, was holding the firm position that Soviet Union troops can only be located in few bases fixed in the treaty.

The Soviet Union, however, would ignore the positions of the treaty and plan locating its armed forces in many places within Estonian territory. With an order of the People's Commissar for Defence, Kliment Voroshilov, and the Chief of the General Staff, Boris Shaposhnikov, of September 30, 1939, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Leningrad Military District was entrusted to locate Red Army troops not only in Saaremaa and Hiiumaa and the Paldiski region, but also in the Haapsalu-Tallinn, Viljandi-Valga, Haapsalu-Pärnu and Paide areas.

The introduction of Soviet troops was preceded by military negotiations in Tallinn on October 2–10, 1939, where issues related to the establishment of Soviet bases and the transport and accommodation of the troops were specified. The Soviet delegation was led by the Commander of the Leningrad Military District, Army Commander, 2<sup>nd</sup> degree, Kirill Meretskov, and they would arrive in Tallinn on a special train on October 2. In the morning

of the next day, October 3, also a Soviet naval delegation arrived, led by Flagman, 2<sup>nd</sup> degree, Ivan Isakov. The Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Nikolai Reek, was nominated the head of the Estonian delegation. From the beginning of the negotiations, the Soviet party would assume the position that they had to achieve anything they desired.

Already at the first meeting of the heads of the delegations at noon of October 2 it was evident that the demands of the Soviet delegation in relation to the location of the troops in Estonia would go further than the treaty of mutual assistance had foreseen. At a general meeting of the delegations it became clear that, in addition to the bases mentioned in the treaty, the Soviet delegation required that a tank brigade be located in Paide, a cavalry brigade and a mechanised regiment in Valka and bombardment aviation regiments inland. The Estonian delegation submitted grounded claims, which were at first ignored by the Soviet delegation. Therefore the situation at the negotiations proved to be very tense.

Thereafter Lieutenant General Nikolai Reek explained the situation to the Government of the Republic, where it was decided that the pact should be followed and the head of the Soviet government, V. Molotov, should be informed about the situation.

In the afternoon of October 4 the Estonian envoy in Moscow, August Rei, visited Molotov and submitted a written diplomatic note concerning the disagreements and supplemented oral explanations to it. At first Molotov did not agree with the positions of the Estonian government and informed Stalin about the fact. The latter arrived soon, listened to Rei's explanations and decided that a specific instruction should be sent to the Soviet military delegation. A few hours later a telegram was sent to Meretskov, where it was advised to withdraw from locating troops and airfields in Valka and inland.

Owing to the aforementioned telegram and the fact that Karl Selter was asked to lead the Estonian delegation, it was possible to break the deadlock of the negotiations. Selter could parry the exaggerated demands of the Soviet delegation by using Stalin's positions. Both parties made certain concessions and the military negotiations ended on October 10, 1939, with signing a respective agreement. In addition, on October 11, 1939, seven other protocols concerning the location of the Soviet Union navy in Saaremaa and Hiiumaa, granting areas of land and water in Paldiski to the Soviet Union for use, the temporary location of Soviet military vessels in Tallinn, etc., were concluded.

In the protocols signed on October 10–11, 1939, issues related to the introduction of base troops and the locations of the land, air and sea forces of the Red Army were specified. It was allowed to establish bases for land forces in Saaremaa and Hiiumaa, in the neighbourhood of Haapsalu and Paldiski. Suitable areas were allotted for building airfields in Saaremaa, the

Haapsalu and Paldiski area, in the lands of the Kuusiku and Kehtna manors. Ports and roadsteads were granted for use to the navy in Saaremaa (Kõiguste, Bay of Kuressaare, Mõntu, Bay of Kihelkonna, Bay of Tagalaht, Bay of Küdema), Hiiumaa (Kärdla) and in the Paldiski area (Bay of Pakri). The Soviet Union was also granted the right to establish coastal and air defence batteries, observation and communication posts to defend its naval bases. In addition to the vicinity of the bases, it was allowed to establish similar constructions also on the Sõrve, Harilaiu, Ninase and Pammana Peninsulas in Saaremaa; on the Sõru, Kõpu, Tahkuna and Sääre Peninsulas in Hiiumaa and on the Pakri Islands and Pakri Peninsula.

The entry of Soviet troops was to begin on October 18, 1939, according to the treaties concluded.

### **Ameerika Ühendriikide välis- ja julgeolekupoliitika mudelid**

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Ameerika Ühendriikide ühiskonna kollektiivne enesemõtestamine põhineb utoopilisel, Vanast Testamendist pärit kujutlusel metafoorselt Jumala rahvast, kes lahkus Euroopast kui Egiptusest Ameerikasse kui Tõotatud Maale. Ameerika ühiskond sai üleilmseks eeskujuks jumalikel alustel loodud ühiskonnana, Uueks Jeruusalemmaks, kus inimesed saavad vabalt püüelda oma individuaalse õnne suunas. Selline kollektiivne enesemõtestamine eeldab paratamatult ka moraalselt allakäinud ja mandunud vastase kuvandit. See eeldab moraalselt mõtestatud kompromissitut võitlust täiuslikkuse ja moraalse allakäigu, hea ja halva, Jumala ja kuradi vahel.

Utoopilise, idealistliku ja entusiastliku tahu kõrval on Ameerika ühiskondlikus enesemõtestamises ka tugevalt skeptiline hoiak inimloomuse suhtes. Juba Ameerika Ühendriikide rajajad leidsid, et inimesed pole inglid, vaid loomult pahelised. Inimesele on omane isekus, ambitsioonid, kadedus, uhkus ja iha kuulsuse järele. Ilma hästi korraldatud valitsussüsteemita laguneks inimühiskond peagi kildkondade, rivaalitsejate, ühiskondlike lõhede ja inimlike ambitsioonide tõttu. Ameerika Ühendriigid loodi veendumusega, et hästi toimivas ühiskonnas peab inimlikku ambitsiooni kontrollima ja tasakaalustama teine inimlik ambitsioon, igat võimu mingi teine võim. Võimude lahusus ja vastastikkune kontroll on ainus ning parim inimese ja gruppide vabaduste kaitse. Sellist arusaama peeti hästi toimiva vaba ühiskonna

universaalseks aluseks ja enesestmõistetavaks ideaaliks, mille peaksid üles leidma või enda jaoks avastama ka kõik teised maailma ühiskonnad.

Ameerika Ühendriikide välis- ja julgeolekupoliitika põhineb neljal, reaalsuses tihti üksteise kõrval ja üksteisega läbipõimunult toimival lähenemisel.

Neist esimene peab Ameerika Ühendriike vaba ja moraalse ühiskonna mudeliks kogu inimkonna jaoks. Eeskuju ja mõõdupuuna on Ameerika ühiskond paratamatult kõigist teistest eraldatud: ta on parem, kõrgem ja ülimuslik. Viimaste sajandite erakordne ühiskondlik ja majanduslik areng on tõestanud jumalikku õnnistust ühiskonnamudelile, mis rajaneb indiviidi vabadusel ja õnnetaotlusel. Kui Ameerika Ühendriigid laiendasid 19. sajandil oma territooriumi või laienes riigi mõju üleilmses poliitikas hiljem – alati on sellist laienemist mõtestatud kui hästi toimiva ja kiirelt areneva progressiivse tsivilisatsiooni levikut.

Teine lähenemine keskendub Ameerika Ühendriikide ainulaadsusele. Ajalooliselt on oma ainulaadsust tajutud eelkõige, vastandudes ühiskonnaelu korralduse Euroopa riikides, ehkki majandussuhteid Euroopa riikidega on hoitud ja edendatud.

Esimese maailmasõja järel, pärast pea sajandipikkust eemalehoidmist maailmapoliitikast, algas kolmanda lähenemise – demokraatliku internatsionalismi – kõrgaeg. Taaskord sai oluliseks idealistlik-moraalne kuvand Ameerika Ühendriikide rollist maailmapoliitikas. Kui president Woodrow Wilsoni juhtimisel edendati Euroopas demokraatliku enesemääramise ideaali, siis põhines see veendumusel, et Ameerika Ühendriigid võiksid oma õnnistatud ühiskondliku olukorra kogemust levitada ka Euroopas. Viimast on traditsiooniline ühiskonnakord kaua lagundanud ning I maailmasõjas hävingu piirini viinud. Wilsoni arusaam uuest poliitilisest korrast põhines nii seesmisel (ühiskondlik vabadus) kui välisel (riikidevaheline rahu) demokraatial. Kui varem olid Euroopa riigid saavutanud ajutise stabiilsuse juhul, kui tekkis jõudude tasakaal juhtivate riikide vahel, siis sellest ajast alates pidi rahu tagama kollektiivse julgeoleku põhimõtete järgimine. Wilson toetas Rahvaste Liiga rolli kollektiivse julgeoleku tagajana, kuid see institutsioon toimis vaid lühikest aega. Liiga lühiajalisus oli osalt tingitud sellest, et Ameerika Ühendriikide enda poliitiline eliit, Ameerika Kongress, seda ei toetanud.

Teise maailmasõja ajal ja järel jätkati Wilsoni ideelist suunda, mille järgi rajanevad riikidevahelised suhted vastastikulisuse põhimõttel, demokraatial, liberaalsel majanduspoliitikal ja rahvusvahelisel rahul. Nimetatud suund tugineb Bretton Woodsi süsteemile ja ÜRO rajamisele. Ameerika Ühendriikide kui nn juhtiva võimu staatust kaitsti innukalt selleks, et uus rahvusvaheline kord püsima jääks. USA dollarist sai peagi maailma peamine valuuta ja Ühendriigid kasutasid korduvalt oma vetoõigust ÜRO Julgeoleku Nõukogus. Siiski ei mõtestatud oma juhtivat rolli domineerimisena teiste riikide

üle, kelle huvidel poleks Ameerika Ühendriikide huvide kõrval ruumi. Seda mõtestati pigem kui konsensusse leidmist kõikide riikide huvide ja toimimis-põhimõtete osas. Muu maailm ei ole sunnitud järgima Ameerika ideaale – neid kannustab Ameerika Ühendriikide nn pehme võim (*soft power*), tema poliitiline, sotsiaalne ja kultuuriline atraktiivsus.

Neljas lähenemine, mille pooldajaskond kasvas külma sõja ajal, on hoiakult skeptiline ja põhineb realismil: rahvuslike huvide hegemoonilisel edendamisel rahvusvahelistes suhetes. Maailm on ohtlik paik ning selleks, et tunda end ohutult, on vaja seada esikohale rahvuslikud huvid. Samuti on vaja omada piisavat võimu selleks, et tasakaalustada konkureerivate militaarvõimude jõudu, või veelgi parem: teiste võimude nõrkusi ära kasutades lõpuks domineerida ise kogu ülejäänud maailma üle. Taaskord ei mõtestata domineerimist negatiivselt, kui eesmärki omaette. Külma sõja aegses võidurelvastumises pidi lihtsalt selguma lõplik võitja ning 1990. aastaks polnud kahtlustki, et Ameerika Ühendriigid olid võitnud – teistest oldi selgelt üle nii sõjaliselt võimsuselt, majandusarengult, sotsiaalselt sidususelt kui (osaliselt) ka kultuuriliselt atraktiivsusest. Need, kelle ambitsiooniks oli poliitilist kesk-konda kontrollida ja mitte kujundada, nägid külma sõja järel soodsat võimalust Ameerika üleilmse hegemoonia edasiseks suurendamiseks. Kuna inimloomusele on omane kalduvus teha halbu otsuseid ning riigid koosnevad õigupoolest ka vaid inimestest, muutuks rahvusvaheline süsteem ilma toimiva domineeriva võimuta anarhiliseks. Rahvusvahelist anarhiat saab ära hoida või leevendada vaid domineeriv võim. Kui seda rolli ei täida Ühendriigid, täidab seda keegi teine.

Pealegi on Ameerika Ühendriikide näol tegemist healoomulise hegemooniaga, kuna talle omane idealistlik-moraalne hoiak ei luba tal oma võimu ohjeldamatult kasutada.

Iseäranis viimane hoiak on toonud kaasa Ameerika-vastaste meelsuse leviku. Kuna otsesest hegemooniat ei suudetaks aktsepteerida, leiavad kriitikud, et Ameerika Ühendriigid on silmakirjalikud, kui nad varjutavad majanduslikus ekspluateerimises ja rahvusvaheliste suhete süsteemi kontrollimises väljenduvat hegemooniat jutuga moraalsest poliitikast, kuradist ja paljudest teistest, kes takistavad inimkonda jõudmast paremasse maailma.

Realistlik hoiak valitses Ameerika Ühendriikide välispoliitilises enesemõtestamises veel George W. Bushi ametiajal, kes nimetas Ameerika Ühendriikide üleilmsete kohustuste hulgas ka kogu maailma vabastamist kurjusest. Kas Barack Obama ametiajal naastakse varasemate, kollektiivsemate ja vastastikkulisemate moraalsete ideaalide juurde, näitab aeg.

## **Protestant Legitimation of Racism in the History of the United States, Southern Africa and Australia**

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The article analyzes the Protestant legitimisation of racist policies by White Anglo-Saxon Protestant settlers over the indigenous tribes in Southern Africa and Australia, and forcefully immigrated and enslaved Blacks in the United States. The cases of racist regimes are related to denominations of Protestantism – in South Africa primarily to the Dutch Reformed Church, in Australia predominantly to the Anglican Church, in the United States to various Protestant denominations.

In principle, the Christian doctrine stresses the brotherhood of all men. In practice, however, when organized religion is closely connected to the dominant classes in multiracial societies, religious identities and beliefs have often contributed to various forms of racist policies. The paper argues that political racism culminated with the triumph of colonialism, and the advance of biological conceptions of race during 19<sup>th</sup> century. The prototypical origins of social and political racism, however, already existed in Medieval Christendom. The main practical causes of racist policies were economic, not religious. As a rule, religion has provided legitimacy to racist regimes. In individual cases, religion has also directly influenced the racist nature of these regimes.

The article is organized in four parts. The first part identifies four historical phases in Western Christian history, which illustrate the declining influence of the Church, the rise of secular states, secularized science, and nationalism as a secular ideology together with an increasing emphasis on racialism. Until the Crusades, the secular rulers were weak and the prime emphasis was on religious equality of individuals and on the creation of a common Christian universe. The Crusades resulted in the conquest of new territories, opened up new populations to European enslavement, and witnessed an increasing power and role of secular rulers, who increased their autonomy in construction of outsiders and insides. During the fifteenth century, European empires started to expand into Africa and the Americas, the Church continued to support slavery in both policy and trade, and the discourse of races started to be focused on racial differences, which remained unchanged even if the persons and peoples involved did convert to Christianity. During the eighteenth century Enlightenment there emerged a variation of Christian humanism, inspired by John Locke and represented among others by Voltaire, which assumed once again the unity of mankind. The last major change in the conception of race took place in 19<sup>th</sup> century

with the advance of nation-states, biological-scientific understanding of racial differences and an unprecedented wave of colonization of indigenous peoples outside Europe.

The second part focuses on the economic purposes of slaveholding and the colonial acquisition of the rights to the land from the indigenous peoples. Slavery was a legitimate form of economic management almost everywhere until the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The economy of the United States was – from the mid-1600s until the legal end of slavery in nineteenth century – dependent on slave labor to a much greater extent than the economies of South Africa and Australia. In particular instances, the economic basis of racialism was also related to the legitimate ownership of the land. The White settlers, who were willing to procure the rights to land formerly utilized by indigenous tribes, justified their policies with superior abilities to use the land more efficiently and productively. The Whites were considered as being able to rise above nature, while savage Australian Aborigines were not. Consequently, the latter were progressively pushed away from their native lands.

The third part of the article discusses the autonomous influence of Christian beliefs and Protestant Churches on the racist policies. The Protestant churches have mostly tended to internalize the socially respected ideas, including slavery and racial segregation. Even if there emerged Christian groups, which were religiously inclined to condemn slavery, they still had to balance their religious motivation with social concerns. They had to maintain working relationships with social classes and political authorities. In particular instances, exemplified by the theological justification of apartheid by the Reformed Churches of South Africa, however, the responsibility of churches for racial policies seems obvious. In general, the actual role of a particular Protestant church depends on the pattern of its connectedness to the sociopolitical classes in a multi-racial society.

The last section of the paper argues that although every interpretation of the Bible is dependent on the social position of the interpreter, the Bible itself gives more material for those who seek justifications for slavery than for racial equality or racial segregation. For contemporary Protestants, racial equality has become a self-evident article of belief largely irrespective of the literal content of the Holy Scriptures.

## **The Ideas and Practices of the Relationship Between Church and the State, Based on the American Free Church Model**

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The United States continues to follow the motto “In God We Trust” at the time when the rest of the Western world is undergoing an increasing secularization. This poses a question, why is the American religiosity so different? The American religiosity and the organizational forms of religion have successfully put up with the invasion of different tendencies of modernization, have proved to be strongly adaptive to new conditions and thus have become even more vigorous and pro-active regarding the developments in society.

Even more surprisingly, the United States has been able to hold on to one of the most important accomplishments of the democratic constitution – a clear-cut line of separation between state politics and organized religion. In the Old World, the drawing of the line of separation has been painful for both sides, and the legacies of several centuries are still overshadowing the church-state relationships as is demonstrated also in this paper. In many ways, the United States is an exceptional pathfinder. It is the first state that has been able to formulate a continuous and democratic constitution, which has set the realms of religion and politics free from everlasting competition for power and authority, and has given them a possibility to concentrate on their essential tasks and functions. The article outlines briefly the historical developments before the formulation of the U.S. Constitution that contributed to the understanding of religious freedom as the inalienable right and to the constitutional consolidation of religious freedom. Religious freedom was understood also to be the basis of the freedom of opinion, which itself is the key source of all the rights of the citizen.

Revolutionary socio-political changes in the society of America during the 18<sup>th</sup> century can be termed as manifestations of the modern processes of secularization. These processes did not aim at “killing God and destroying the church”. Instead, they aimed at the emancipation of religion from the shackles of state authority and the guarantees of the inviolable right of free practice of religion for all individuals. Religion was freed from unnecessary ballast and could flourish and develop further. This kind of relationship between religion and politics is usually conceptualized as the American *Sonderweg* or the free-church paradigm. The present paper outlines briefly its formation and peculiarities. One has to bear in mind that the topic of religion and politics in U.S. is closely related to their *own* history, which also cannot be arbitrarily separated from the centuries-old religious-political



history and culture of the West. The article cannot present a full historical-systematical overview of the relationships between religion and politics. Thus, the author has unavoidably treated the history selectively and tried to concentrate on specific material of general history and church history, which enables us to understand better the general paradigmatic developments in church-state relations, on this basis also the formation and the peculiar characteristics of the American *free-church* model, and the tasks and perspectives that emanate from this model in contemporary societies and churches.

First, the paper outlines the theory of the paradigmatic change in the light of the history of the Christian church. The approach of Hans Küng has set the course for this theory in this discipline. The political and cultural developments in Western Europe enable us to notice that the European boundaries of the democratic tendencies were developing not in harmony, but in confrontation with the churches. The modern paradigm developed often in a clear-cut *anti-clerical* and *anti-Christian* atmosphere. The churches themselves contributed to the formation of such *anti-attitudes* by their reactionary behavior during the processes of modernization. Motivated by the reasoning of the Enlightenment, religion moved increasingly from public sphere into the private sphere. Society experienced the change of paradigm, but the churches did not recognize it (or did not want to recognize it) and were thus stuck in their old mind-set.

The emergence of the modern paradigm is often associated with the two bourgeois revolutions in France and America, which brought along fundamental political changes with their declarations of human rights. One must notice, however, that these revolutions both had different sources and correspondingly also different ways of development. In Western Europe the modern paradigm can be marked by such notions as ‘anti-church’ or ‘anticlericalism’ and with their consequences, post-revolution Northern America, however, witnessed a completely different kind of modern paradigm, where Christianity demonstrated itself to the society and contemplated about the state and society differently than in Western Europe.

The article also outlines briefly the main forms of church-state relationships. The concepts “church” and “state” are among the main topics of the history of the Occident. Both church and state have emerged in the context, where they have been subjugated to the historical changes of the circumstances, tasks, issues and interpretations. Consequently, an abstract and empirical question of how the church and state relations should be regulated cannot have a timeless and a universal answer. These relations, however, can be observed and described in their mutual influence on each other, and can be reduced to generalized basic forms. The observation of these basic forms yields us the foundational and comparative aspects for one more possible

model or paradigm. The context of the Western world is characterized by three main models which explain the changes in the *European* mind-set: 1) religion as the basis of the social and political order (the establishment model); 2) the state sees religion as a hindrance to public life and wants to eliminate it (model of separation as elimination); 3) religion is a tolerated phenomenon, the co-existence of churches and state is regulated by laws and concordats, the state usually collaborates with a church or churches which have a significant historical legacy (mixed model of separation, coordination and cooperation).

In the post-revolution Northern America emerged a model different from the Western Europe, which did not turn against religion and Christian tradition in order to get rid from religion as a troublesome competitor, and did not continue the development of cohesion or partnership between the church and the state. In Northern America between churches and the democratic state emerged such a relationship that fits better to the *internal* character of both sides than the *European* main models. The American model of *separation* derives from the understanding that the management of religion is not among the tasks of the public government. Such a presumption does have religious tolerance as the main principle (nor the application of it) and does not require contracts between both realms (church and state). The American model of *free-church* (the prefix 'free' refers to two significant aspects: "*free from state*" and "*voluntary*") differs from the three European main models mentioned above sufficiently enough in order to conceptualize it as a *free-church paradigm*.

In North America the development of church-state relations did not follow the path of Enlightenment-rational and *anti-church*, but took place in a wholly rational, but at the same time in a *pro-church* and Biblical vision. The resulting political practice was wholly different and in accordance with the Christian faith. The article outlines the historical emergence and development of the free-church model of church-state relations from the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century as the carriers of the radical reformation and/or the representatives of the religious dissidents that emerged from English Puritans (Baptists, Quakers, Congregationalists, Presbyterians etc) who fled from religious persecution to the New World and became the pathfinders of modern democratic society (i.e. also of the emergence of the free-church model) by their mind-set (first of all due to their views about the freedom of religion and of conscience). The attempts to apply the free-church model can already be noticed during the North American colonial period (Roger Williams, William Penn). Religion, which turned out to be very inflexible in moral norms, evolved from striving for emancipation from central patronage into the founder of democracy. In the colonies it can soon be noticed how among Americans there existed a deep religiosity and political passion in

combination with the solid and practical mind in every aspect of life. Although the free-church model, which was represented in Northern American colonial period primarily by Baptists and Quakers, was initially the model of bystanders, the system of the *established* church(es), i.e. European state-church system, never did dominate in the colonies due to vast religious differences among the Protestant settlers. This religious pluralism resulted unavoidably in religious freedom. Revolution was accompanied by the movement against the establishment of churches (*Disestablishment*). The separation of church and state in Northern America without bloodshed and mutual hatred has been considered to be the utmost achievement in American – but also in general – church history, because it represented a radical departure from the European practice and witnessed to the birth of a new paradigm. In Northern America two movements – the Deistic-Enlightened political elite and the Puritan masses of the young republican radicals – united their forces decidedly by the end of 18<sup>th</sup> century and on this basis there developed and consolidated the paradigm of mutual separation in the church-state relations. This development cannot be compared to the *European* “one-way” trends, be they religious tolerance yielded by the state in England, the separation of church and state in revolutionary France or the respective developments in the context of the enlightened Absolutism.

The ideas of the president James Madison about religion, religious liberty and free exercise of religion have played a significant role in the context of the emergence and development of the new paradigm of the North American relationships of the church and state. Religious liberty and the separation of church and state have traditionally been the spiritual and legal cornerstones of the American religiosity. The complex problem of state and church (in an extended sense of religion) was raised at the federal level and the free-church model of separation became a part of the Constitution at the Foundation of the Republic. The First Amendment of the *Bill of Rights* enacts that Congress cannot pass any law which prescribes the establishment of *one* religion (not to mention one particular church) or hinders the free exercise of religion. The message of the American leaders of the day was straightforward: *religious* citizens must feel themselves welcome in the state, but they cannot expect that any subordination of all to one operative divine will be elevated to the status of a Constitutional principle. The Founding Fathers did not create a theologically derived contract of the Union. Instead, they founded a secular political order, where religion and state are separated from each other. The Constitution does not deal with the regulation of the religious opinion, churches and religious communions are free to follow their doctrines and manners. They are not obliged to justify before the state the authenticity or reasonability of their ideas and cults. The system of full religious freedom and full political freedom grants churches and religious

communities a role, what they can fulfill in accordance to their essence. At the same time they have a freedom to play that role also in the political process. One has to recognize that the separation did not take place in the U.S. in order to facilitate the death of religion. Instead, the separation was *in the best interests of religion*. This is proved continually by increasing religious plurality and strikingly high level of religious vitality, which up to the present day has not shown any sign that this vigorous and constantly renewing religious life would disappear.

Of course, as with the other models that characterize the church-state relations, also the externally American and essentially free-church paradigm is an ideal-typical simplification. If to follow what goes on in the relationship of religion and politics in the United States, one gets an impression that this paradigm exists simultaneously with an another paradigm. The greatest danger to the free-church paradigm is represented today by segments of Christian (Neo)Fundamentalists or Evangelicals (which paradoxically are dominated by the very same denominations, primarily Baptists, who once fought a principled fight for religious liberty and the rights of the citizen). Those forces of *New Christian Right* have already for decades influenced the domestic and foreign policy of the United States by their lobby. Without lingering on the essence of Christian Fundamentalism in the United States and on the problems related to it, it must still be emphasized that in every instance, when religion and politics have started to cross the line of separation on both sides and to mix with each other, the greatest damage has been done and is done to the religious freedom, irrespective of the claim of religious groups, who intervene into public life and politics, that they defend religious liberty.

It must also be emphasized that the free-church paradigm considers *all* religious communities and associations to be equal in one society (including also the so-called religion of secularism). No state institution can pass any value judgement and cannot thus prefer one church, denomination, religion or world-view to another. The historical experience proves that societies have been quite resistant towards totalitarian political systems, when the free-church paradigm has either directly or partly been established and the pluralism of churches and denominations has been supported.

The article concludes with the discussion over what kind of problems, duties and possibilities may be derived from the American free-church paradigm for the democratic societies and religious associations of Europe. Free churches and different religious associations constantly remind a democratic and liberal state of how necessary the religious and ideological *neutrality* of the state and constitutional protection is, not only for religious communities, but also for ideological groups. *General equality of rights* is the conditional goal towards which the European democracies have still a way to go. *Free*

*churches* are a manifestation of a *free state* and therefore also the exemplifications and guarantees of the constitution – the spirit of both democratic and liberal constitution corresponds to the voluntary and free religious associations. If the latter were to disappear, the state would lose a significant part of its freedom.

The contemporary task of the *free* churches and associations is to develop a socially binding system of decision-making. The democracy of the *spectators* must transform into the democracy of *participants*. In this regard, the free-church tradition has both the beneficial theoretical foundation and the historical practice of the principle of the priesthood of all believers. The society needs individuals and groups that are religiously motivated and follow firm values so that *the priesthood of all believers* as the *churchly* manifestation of the participatory democracy could support and add to the political participation of all citizens. The free-church paradigm gives a task to *free* churches and congregations to re-discover their old legacy – to serve the society *for the service sake*. The neutrality of the state would be a reasonable framework enabling such kind of activities, because only this can offer religious associations guarantees of their free development and for the devotion to *their own* tasks. The more religious associations serve their own goals, the more *free* they are and the more fervently they are capable of participating in social and political issues without a *patronage*. Only in this way can we be really free and remind ourselves that one should not and even cannot make his or her own principles and practices obligatory for whole society.